FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Fall 1979 *$3.00 a copy*

Foreign Policy in the 1980 Campaign—*William P. Bundy*

The Revolution in Nicaragua—*William M. LeoGrande*

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An Opening "Window" for Arms Control
Admiral John M. Lee

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Who Lost Patagonia? Foreign Policy in the 1980 Campaign ..... *William P. Bundy* 1
The Revolution in Nicaragua: Another Cuba? *William M. LeoGrande* 28
Brezhnev and Beyond ..... *William G. Hyland* 51
The Future of Soviet Jewry: Emigration and Assimilation ..... *William Korey* 67
Turkey's Travails ..... *Dankwart A. Rustow* 82
Stagflation: How We Got Into It—How To Get Out *Harold van B. Cleveland and Thomas F. Huertas* 103
An Opening "Window" for Arms Control .. *Admiral John M. Lee* 121
Cryptology Goes Public ..... *David Kahn* 141
The Indochina Refugee Crisis ..... *Barry Wain* 160
Comment and Correspondence 181
Recent Books on International Relations 187
Source Material ..... *Janet Rigney* 207

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EDITOR'S NOTE

An Editor who has tried the reader's patience in the body of this issue can afford to be brief in this Note. In this, the first issue of Volume 58, I shall use it to make clear our intentions concerning the major innovation introduced last February, the year-end issue dealing with *America and the World—1978.*

We do plan definitely to have a similar issue early in 1980 to deal with the events of 1979. The basic plan and approach will be the same, although with two or three changes in topic—this time, for example, there will be an article on energy developments, muted in 1978 but once more central this year. All told, we shall again have about a dozen essays by individual authors, dealing interpretively and critically with highlights of the year, and with elements of prescription for the future. In contrast to our usual practice of commissioning 20–25 percent of our articles, all of the articles in the year-end issue will be commissioned.

Last year's initial effort seems to have been a success, in terms of the response of our regular readers, newsstand sales, and, to our considerable gratification, the sales of the accompanying paperback version printed by Pergamon Press for the special use of teachers of international relations at the college or secondary school level. We especially welcome the added exposure of the magazine to students and hope that they will find the issue trenchant as well as informative.

In this connection, we have had a few comments that for teaching purposes a review that appears in early February can become just a little dated by the fall term of the year. We see no way around this. Happily, the opposite side of the coin is that for courses offered in the spring term (if teachers are prepared to take our contents on faith at the time they do their planning) the material should be absolutely up to the minute. In any event, we expect to publish the paperback once again and thus make its use for spring-term courses more common than may have been the case last year when no one, including ourselves, knew how this special issue would turn out.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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William P. Bundy

WHO LOST PATAGONIA? FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980 CAMPAIGN

Thirty years ago this October the United States "lost" China. When Mao Zedong and his followers came to power, the new regime seemed to represent not only communist control of the largest single country in the world but the embryonic formation of a massive Sino-Soviet bloc, cemented by the treaty signed in Moscow in February 1950. And almost at once there followed the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950. American ground forces were nearly thrown off the peninsula, recovered dramatically, and then were hit on their way to the Yalu by the massed forces of China, which inflicted the worst single defeat in American military history and, with the North Koreans, were only driven back to the area of the original 38th parallel boundary in bloody fighting that went on until the armistice of July 1953.

The internal political debate that accompanied these events soon took the nastiest possible form. Republicans charged that Democratic administrations, in power continuously since 1933, had been directly responsible for the communist victory in China and for the Korean War. President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson became, in the words of a Congressman just turned Senator named Richard Nixon, the professors at a "college of cowardly Communist containment," a cry taken up by many other Republican Senators led by William Knowland and supported by Robert Taft. And, in fairly short order, these leaders condoned (or more) the accusations of still another Republican, Senator Joseph McCarthy, that the "loss of China" was due to the disloyalty of key individuals who had participated in policy decisions regarding China and to the toleration (or worse) of top officials for such individuals. The depredations of the Senator persisted for nearly five years, from early 1950 to late 1954, attaching his name to an era in American politics.

The story remains vivid both to those who lived through it and to later generations. Almost all historians—not to mention recent writers on their own experiences—have joined in condemning

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what happened at that time as one of the blackest episodes in our history. But the chorus of shame and regret has always had to compete, in the practical arena where foreign policy decisions are made and elected officials have to weigh their own survival, with the moral that it is mighty dangerous to be "on watch" (in naval lingo) when any country in the world comes under communist control—or, in the language of the 1940s and 1950s, moves from the orbit of the "free world" to that of the Soviet Union or, for a long time, that of Communist China or of the two together.

So the legacy of 1949–50 clearly went beyond the harm to individuals and to national ideals and cohesion; political fears cast a dark shadow over successive administrations' decisions and contributed heavily to policies that treated the cold war on a global basis going well beyond the centers of industrial power that had formed the core of George Kennan's original containment proposals. The advent of Castro to power in Cuba in 1959 must in any event have touched an exposed nerve; but the lengths to which Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy went in the next years to oust him, at the Bay of Pigs and in covert operations both before and after that disaster, surely owed much to the felt pressures of public opinion. In particular, the debates on Cuba in the 1960 campaign between Kennedy and Nixon read today like a competition in *machismo*.

In East Asia, similar concerns accounted heavily for the 1950s policy of wide commitments that in turn led directly to the Vietnam War. Some would attribute the key Vietnam decisions of 1964–65 very largely to the sense that a President who did not stand up to communist expansion there would surely be subject to a massive backlash of popular feeling at home; others (including this writer) felt at the time that domestic political factors virtually canceled each other out, with the memory of the public reaction reflected in the 1952 election and its slogans, against an Administration that got itself involved in a long and painful war in East Asia. But there can be no doubt that the backlash factor affected the policy of hanging on in Vietnam (including the invasion of Cambodia in 1970) pursued by President Nixon from 1969 to 1973—and operated also to restrain the growing congressional opposition to the war until public opinion had manifestly and overwhelmingly turned against it.

Then, briefly, the cold war receded into history, in a period of détente proclaimed by the same Mr. Nixon and his chief adviser, Henry Kissinger. Although the argument over basic decisions and the conduct of the Vietnam War has raged widely elsewhere, there

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has never been, at least in the political arena, any inquisition as to who "lost" Vietnam. Candidates at all levels who had supported the war at the times of decision were able to proclaim their disillusionment in varying degree (Governor Jimmy Carter, for example), and to join in a tacit consensus that decisions over a long period of time, under Administrations of both parties, were inextricably intertwined, and that any partisan advantage was simply not possible over a matter the nation preferred to put behind it.

With the post-Vietnam syndrome, the pendulum then swung in the opposite direction. Revelations in 1974 of Mr. Nixon's use of the CIA in Chile in 1970–73 against the Allende government (especially the abortive attempt to foster a military coup in the fall of 1970 through the so-called Track II effort) were roundly attacked—to the point where these operations were assigned a much greater role than they actually played in Allende's largely self-inflicted downfall. Myths of the Right gave way to exaggerations from the Left. A major wave of recrimination, with the CIA as scapegoat for activities almost always undertaken on the clearest sort of presidential direction, washed back to condemn anti-Castro operations of the mid-1960s and to throw a harsher light on well-publicized earlier CIA operations that had restored the Shah to power in Iran in 1953 and had thrown out Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Defenders of any of these actions, or of any continuing CIA role in the range of American policy options, were for a time either silenced or outgunned.

What appeared to be taking shape was, if not a consensus, at least a dominant opinion that tended to limit critical American security interests to the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, treaty commitments in the NATO area, Japan and Korea, and the long-standing moral commitment to Israel. On this view, the advent of new governments in other areas of the world was an issue to be addressed carefully and selectively, even if the results included the overthrow or defeat of governments or groups friendly to American policy and interests and the coming to power of hostile forces of a menacing or communist coloration.

Angola in 1975 started the pendulum moving back toward its cold war position. A Democratic Congress acted to block the attempted covert intervention set under way by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, and the upshot was a Soviet-oriented government in Angola, a precedent for later use of Cuban forces in Ethiopia, and a new sense of Soviet threat throughout black Africa. By 1976, détente was a dirty word within the Republican

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Party at least for the duration of the campaign, and the same Mr. Kissinger was attacked from the Right by wide segments of his own party. Increasingly, congressional and public opinion were becoming gravely concerned at the Soviet buildup of strategic and conventional forces, and at the demonstrated ability of the Soviet Union and its allies in Cuba and Eastern Europe to take advantage of opportunities in Africa and the Middle East.

These concerns were far from being aberrations of the American public's imagination; they were indeed widely shared among our NATO allies. And, of course, they coincided with the growth in the power of the oil-producing countries made dramatic in the events of 1973–74, and with a general sense of malaise at the inability of the nation to get on top of its economic and energy problems. Plainly America's power had diminished, at least in relative terms, and this was something much of the country was not readily prepared to recognize or accept. Conditions were ripening for a return to the old American (and democratic) tendency to blame leaders harshly for their real or presumed failures, and for that tendency to apply once again to adverse changes in the Third World.

Jimmy Carter was, in hindsight, leading with his chin when he ran for office on a proclaimed policy along the lines of the 1974–76 "dominant position" just described, and especially when he emphasized the advancement of human rights as an American policy objective to a degree that went beyond either the proclaimed or actual policies of his Democratic predecessors. The contrast with the Realpolitik of Mr. Kissinger was, and was intended to be, stark—and could hardly have failed to make Republicans generally eager to pounce on cases of failure or alleged weakness in the Administration's handling of Third World problems.

Through the first two years of the Carter Administration the debate was muted and glancing; older historical memories dominated the Panama treaties issue, and Senate Republican leaders in the end joined to support ratification. But party lines were being drawn increasingly, and the Republican Party was moving toward a viewpoint that went well beyond attacks on the Administration's coherence or tactical competence. A major part of the hardening Republican position has to do with defense policy and the generalized theme of weakness abroad. At some point, if the Administration's policies toward the Arab-Israel dispute and the crisis in southern Africa should founder, these might become targets—even though in both cases the Administration's policies

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(in practice if not in rhetoric) have had a considerable degree of continuity with the immediate past.[1]

But there are today two potential issues that have overtones of 1950, 1952, and the Cuba discussions of 1960, and that could become, key Republicans apparently believe, the "sleepers" of the 1980 campaign. These are the Administration's handling of the events in Iran that culminated in the Shah's overthrow and of the Nicaraguan civil war that has just ended in the ouster of Somoza. The grave consequences of the former are already with us on every hand; by next year the latter may seem terribly damaging (and much nearer to home). They are indeed the stuff not merely of a replay in 1980 of the campaign charges of overall American weakness and loss of prestige that John Kennedy used to telling effect in 1960, but of something resembling the disgraceful donnybrooks of 1950 and 1952.

This article is emphatically not a brief either for the Carter Administration or for the burying of foreign policy issues in American political debate. Nor is it a plea for a return to the tradition of bipartisanship that established itself, at the time to great constructive purpose, from 1947–48 through the 1960s—aided by the fact that for much of that time the President and Congress were controlled by opposing parties and had to get along if the nation was to have an effective foreign policy at all. Any such brief or plea, apart from falling on totally deaf ears, would ignore the genuine differences in approach that do exist both between and within the Republican and Democratic parties today. And the general sense of competence and wisdom, as

[1] Mr. Kissinger would doubtless dispute this statement. In a recent interview and elsewhere, he has argued that the Carter Administration has paid undue deference to the role of the radicals in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and has even attributed the intransigence of the radicals at Geneva in late 1976 to the outcome of the election and the sense that policy would change under President Carter. See *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1979, p. A17. But the commitment to clear-cut majority rule in that country expressed in his Lusaka speech of April 27, 1976 went a long way to change basic U.S. policies (and certainly reversed the previous policy associated with NSSM 39 of 1969). The suggestion that the radicals and their African government supporters would have been any less difficult if President Ford had won seems far-fetched; the issue would have had to be faced as one of the many unsolved problems the outgoing Administration bequeathed to its successor, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's recent agreement at the same Lusaka suggests that a Ford Administration would have had a hard time sticking to the line Mr. Kissinger appears to be suggesting.

Likewise, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Palestinian issue would have had to be faced in some form by an incoming Administration, and Mr. Kissinger's previous tendency to deprecate that issue would have had to be altered before there could have been any hope of negotiation with Sadat. He may and does dispute the means the Carter Administration used to dramatize its position on the centrality of the Palestinians, but again he would have had to meet the same problem in some fashion. In the event, of course, Mr. Kissinger has roundly applauded the Camp David agreements; that he would have reached such agreements sooner is not evident from the lack of progress of 1975–76, even in opening up the key issues.

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between an Administration and its challengers, is an inescapable issue in any campaign.

But the cases of Iran and Nicaragua, in particular, do now appear likely to raise once again the issue of *what sort* of debate is useful and reasonable and honest—or conversely may be destructive and debilitating in the same manner as the debate of the McCarthy era. And it is this issue that needs airing and careful thought. In what sense, if any, were Iran and Nicaragua "lost" and with what possible consequences? To what degree can the Carter Administration be fairly held responsible, as compared with its predecessors or with the hypothetical policies of a Republican Administration if Mr. Ford had squeaked through in 1976? And what range of American policies toward political change in the Third World might responsible political leaders, regardless of party, put forward?

II

In the case of Nicaragua, domestic political controversy has attended every move the United States has made since early 1977. To be sure, that controversy has been far more acute on Capitol Hill than among the public at large; President Somoza was far from being a popular hero, but over the years he and his supporters had appealed shrewdly and effectively to those in positions of influence who tended to view stability in a volatile Central America as paramount. The result was a Somoza bloc in Congress that was in a position to put strong pressure on the Administration not to try to oust him directly, and in any event to avoid the coming to power of a new radical regime. With the Administration dedicated only to the latter objective, there is great force to the argument advanced by William LeoGrande elsewhere in this issue that conflicting pressures led the Administration to act always behind events. Thus the moderate forces U.S. policy was intended to support were disappointed, placed in an impossible position and replaced at the head of the revolution by more radical elements. On this view, the Administration acted too diffidently and ended up with the worst of both worlds. It was right to seek to get rid of Somoza, or alternatively to force him to change the character of his regime drastically. But the means and tactics were wrong.

The opposing thesis challenged the policy objective itself. It argued that the Administration should not have started something it could not finish, and specifically should never have put pressure on an already embattled Somoza regime unless it had a clear and

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workable program and prospect that his successors would be moderate and "pro-U.S." "Sure, Somoza is an SOB," ran the argument, "but at least he is our SOB!" It would belie all past experience if this view was not held and strongly advanced at the intermediate levels of the Pentagon and CIA, and perhaps by some in the State Department. Outside government, it was not only urged by the Somoza bloc in Congress but in a more muted fashion by several Republicans. In the last week of the Somoza regime, the possible shape of things to come was clearly suggested by the comment of Richard Nixon, on a visit to Mexico, that "the choice we face is not between . . . Somoza and somebody better, but between . . . Somoza and somebody much worse.[2]

In the face of this line of argument, the Carter forces will not be likely to make headway in next year's campaign by blaming their tactical difficulties on the pressures of the Somoza bloc. The two most prominent leaders of that bloc, both Democrats, were in committee chairmanships from which they could affect the passage and substance of legislation properly deemed vital by the Administration, above all the legislation to fund and carry through the Panama Canal treaties ratified by the Senate in April 1978. It was indeed bad luck that the final House votes on this legislation coincided with critical choices in Nicaragua, and thus gave the bloc special leverage; the situation reflected the disastrously diffused power structure in Congress today and the endless opportunities for irresponsible action thus created. But the point is that in the political terms of a presidential campaign it just won't wash to argue that "we could have got a moderate government in Nicaragua if our hand had not been joggled at every turn by a group of Congressmen led by two Democrats!"

Conversely, Mr. Carter's opponents are not likely—for different reasons—to argue that the proper course, once the civil war had reached a serious stage (say, by September 1978, or at latest by early 1979), would have been to follow the example of Lyndon

[2] *The New York Times*, July 14, 1979, p. 2. Henry Kissinger struck a similar warning note on several occasions, including his *Washington Post* interview of July 3, 1979. After the event, he summed up his view on "Meet the Press," on August 12, in the following terms: "I think it was a very dangerous business in which we were engaged because it is one thing to turn against another government; it is another to do so without knowing what is going to take its place, and I believe that the practical consequence of the overthrow of Somoza is to replace an admittedly unattractive regime with another government whose domestic practices may not turn out to be much more attractive, but whose foreign policy implications against the United States are bound to be very serious." He cited the impact in El Salvador and Guatemala "and in time even on countries like Mexico," and "the relationship developing between Nicaragua and Cuba." Later in the same appearance, he argued that "if we were prepared to move against Somoza, I think we should have also been prepared simultaneously to put in his place a moderate alternative." NBC Transcript, pp. 11, 13.

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Johnson in 1965 by landing American forces, with or without the approval of the Organization of American States. Such forces could have policed a cease-fire and held the ring until an election could be arranged. Reports from Latin America suggest that this, or something like it, is what many in the area (both of the Right and Left) expected from Uncle Sam. They would have denounced it from the housetops, but key leaders might well have tacitly welcomed the United States once again acting as umpire.[3]

But any Republican candidate for President who argues that this should have been done would have to make clear whether the objective would have been a fair election—in which case Somoza could hardly have survived—or propping up Somoza at all costs, which would have turned the clock back to 1912 and 1926 in far riskier circumstances. The first choice repudiates Somoza and in effect endorses the case against him; the second is, to put it mildly, unattractive. It is too early to say that the United States has passed beyond the type of intervention the 1965 Dominican episode represented. But the campaign of 1980 is not likely to contribute to a revival of such actions.[4]

No, in terms of the 1980 campaign, the issue has to come back to fundamentals, and it is a fair issue. If Gerald Ford had been elected in 1976, almost certainly his Administration would have continued the aloof posture it had adopted toward Somoza in its last year. But even such a posture would have avoided the affirmative pressures applied under President Carter and would probably have inhibited the Nicaraguan opposition of all stripes from the degree of action necessary to get up revolutionary momentum. A Democratic Congress would have fussed and insisted on human rights reports by the State Department, and would perhaps have cut off any form of U.S. aid to Nicaragua. But in purchasing his military needs, Somoza had already begun to turn elsewhere—to Israel notably—and his own economic empire would have remained intact (or growing). So it seems a

[3] The Dominican intervention of 1965, though a favorite liberal target within the United States, particularly in university circles, had not looked so bad over the years of Balaguer's rule, and the willingness of the Carter Administration to raise its voice to ensure honest elections in 1978—and thus Balaguer's defeat—has helped not only its own standing in Latin America but the reputation of the 1965 action.

[4] Mr. Kissinger has recently suggested a variant of this—implying, *inter alia*, that he too does not see political mileage in backing a replay of the Dominican use of U.S. military forces. He says that he would have understood it if the CIA had been used to overthrow Somoza and install the moderates forthwith. *The Washington Post*, July 3, 1979, p. A17. The notion seems a neat way of avoiding the appearance of Mr. Kissinger's backing Somoza no matter what, but hardly more than that, given the evident difficulties of any such enterprise.

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safe bet that Tacho Somoza would still be in charge in Managua and his amiable brother-in-law still extending *abrazzos* to all and sundry in Washington as dean of the diplomatic corps.

That the issue is fair does not mean that it will not be argued in phony ways. Whether the United States should have gone on supporting Somoza or turned to the policy of pressure followed by President Carter was emphatically not an issue of "not intervening" as opposed to intervening. Perhaps more than any other single ruler in the world, Somoza (like his father before him) was the creation of American policy and action going back 50-odd years; he acted accordingly, brandishing his support from the United States on all sides. This history and the very weight of the "colossus of the North" made any pretense of "nonintervention" a transparent fiction to all Nicaraguans. The Carter policies were, in the Nicaraguan context, no more or less interventionist than the previous condonation of Somoza's practices had been.

But, when such underbrush is stripped away, there remains a fundamental issue on which serious and responsible leaders can differ in high degree and with a measure of vehemence. On the one hand, there is the argument that democratic values have never been deeply rooted in Latin America and certainly cannot be imposed by an external power; that for the United States to act against any ruler of established legitimacy is to invite a wave of unforeseen political convulsions and changes elsewhere, including possibilities of Cuban and Soviet alignments and interventions; and that the U.S. posture toward any regime should be guided by whether it is conducting its external policies on lines supportive of U.S. interests. On all counts, it can be argued, to shift from the historic U.S. support of Somoza was playing with fire, and the risks were compounded by inept tactics that helped bring about a potentially radical government now threatening the stability of its neighbors and the spread of Cuban and Soviet influence to the grave detriment of U.S. interests in the Hemisphere.

It is not for this writer to weigh the appeal of this argument to the American electorate. Twenty or even 15 years ago, it would have been almost impossible to counter; in 1960, John Kennedy was impelled by both political sense and personal conviction to outflank Richard Nixon on the hard side of the Cuba issue—even though it was hard to accuse the Eisenhower Administration of being "soft" on Castro, let alone of having contributed to his coming to power by a hostile posture toward Batista.

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Today, however, a generation of North American scholars has carried the tide of revisionist thinking a long way in relation to Latin America, especially among those under 40. The Linowitz Report of late 1976 reflected what might be called the new liberal consensus, which coincided with the basis of Mr. Carter's policy toward Latin America even before human rights were so stressed as a general and overarching theme.

In relation to Nicaragua, the pro-Administration argument will doubtless be that there is a basis in Latin American tradition and ideals for the spread (with whatever ups and downs) of democratic practices and civil liberties, that in any event a corrupt dictatorship like Somoza's is "stable" only in a limited short-term sense and at immense cost to human welfare as well as to the reputation of the United States if it had gone on supporting it, and that in the longer run it is just such regimes that sow the real seeds of radicalism and even cause it to take on totalitarian forms.

These are the opposing lines of argument that may be joined in the 1980 campaign, with each side drawing heavily on how events unfold over the next year. Much will depend, too, on the public image of the new Nicaraguan leaders—and of Somoza himself in exile; it is self-evident that individual incidents such as the killing of ABC's Bill Stewart in June by Somoza's National Guard can be immensely damaging to either side.

If Nicaragua settles down, if new radical regimes do not appear elsewhere in Central America, if the influence of Cuba and the Soviet Union appears muted, the Nicaragua issue may not bulk large. But if developments seem adverse, it could indeed be the sleeper of the campaign. Central America is only a shade less sensitive than the nearby Caribbean to Americans, and in the wake of the Panama treaties debate—with many Republican presidential candidates on record against the treaties and with the polls still showing a slight majority of the American public opposed to those treaties despite their ratification—the scope for reargument is enormous. If Panama itself should be affected by a radical tide stemming arguably from Nicaragua, hold your hats.

But, to repeat, the issue is a fair one. Somoza is as good a symbol as could have been found of past U.S. policies in Latin America and of the arguments that can be made for not moving precipitately away from those policies. And the Carter Administration chose deliberately, through its human rights policies, to change the thrust of U.S. policy in the Hemisphere. Whichever side may be the gainer, the debate will be worth having.

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III

What then of Iran? Is there a fair issue of policy raised by the Carter Administration's handling of the Iranian revolution?

On the face of it, one would conclude that there simply must be. The revolution happened on Jimmy Carter's watch, with no serious indication prior to January 1977 that an early upheaval was likely. The United States was enmeshed in the affairs of Iran to a greater degree than anywhere else in the Third World except for wartime South Vietnam and perhaps South Korea in the 1950s. And, whereas the Nicaraguan revolution has not had any significant adverse consequences to this point, that in Iran has already (to simplify only very slightly):

(1) precipitated a second crisis in world oil prices and supply balance;

(2) by its example, affected the long-run policies of oil-producing countries so that they will almost certainly reduce their development plans, and in any event limit their output and exports so as to keep the oil market perennially tight;

(3) threatened the stability of neighboring nations all around the vital area of the Persian Gulf, the more so coming as it did on the heels of communist takeovers in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan;

(4) reversed Iran's policy on the Arab-Israel front, encouraging the Palestinians and redoubling their pressures on the moderate Arab states, while at the same time scaring the Israelis and making them tougher bargainers.

To which some would add a fifth consequence, that the Islamic character of the revolution could drastically affect internal political forces in other Muslim countries or tend to create some new Islamic bloc of nations.

In short, barely a year after Camp David coincided with the first big riots in Tehran (September 8, 1978), it is a safe guess that the historian of the future will find the latter—the Bastille Day of the Iranian revolution—to have been by far the bigger event. Iran's revolution may well have doomed the crucial second phase of the Camp David agreements by its impact on both sides. Certainly it set off a vicious circle of political, economic and oil decisions that could amount to the gravest threat to world peace and the interests of the United States and other Western nations since the end of World War II.

And the revolution in Iran is far from having run its course. In

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the storehouse of history, the model of a swing back to a conservative law-and-order regime (the Directory in France in 1795) seems somewhat more likely than a radical Left takeover (analogous to the Kerensky-to-Lenin fate Mr. Kissinger wrongly thought would befall the Socialist government in post-1974 Portugal). But nothing can be ruled out except an early return to anything resembling orderly administration or external and oil policies congenial to the United States.

So it is not surprising that, in the private meeting places of Washington, and occasionally in print, one sees the testing and stirring of arguments that might be embellished in a campaign. Surely, it is argued, there must have been some crucial moment when the Shah could have used his armed forces to put down the revolt once and for all, or when the Iranian military might have launched a successful coup even after the Shah had left. Or perhaps the CIA, still allegedly possessing a powerful mystique in Iran, might have been unleashed despite the crippling attacks to which it had been subjected (by a Democratic Congress, of course). Those who make such charges do not have to specify what the moment or form of action should have been—a rhetorical question is enough, and in the right setting perhaps a reference to what the Eisenhower Administration was able to bring off in 1953, without bloodshed and with years of apparent stability and progress thereafter under the restored Shah.

Nor do they have to explain why they did not speak out at the times of decision. The debates within the Administration on how to save the Shah or at least a constitutional monarchy in Iran—intense as they may have been within the limited circle privy to policy—were never aired in public, discussed with congressional leaders, or made the subject, apparently, of the quiet continuing consultations with such Republican leaders as Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger that have played some part in limiting the field of argument on SALT II and the Arab-Israel negotiations.

Rather, the Administration acted throughout in secret and on its own. The plain fact is that in cases like Iran there really is no way to form a bipartisan policy unless there is not only broad policy agreement on the objective (as there was here), but also a very high degree of agreement on the type of measures to be employed, and unless these measures are overt and subject preferably to congressional approval.[5]

Most important, the Administration's statements and tactical

[5] The sharing with the Congress of proposals for CIA operations is now of course required by law. But Angola in 1975 showed how this can run into immense problems and, if anything, accentuate later controversy.

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handling of the situation certainly left an impression of some floundering. Until December, it held to a public posture of firm support for the Shah, but there were leaks of contrary views within the State Department that served, or so it can be argued, to leave the Shah in doubt where the United States stood. And American representatives on the spot seem to have stuck to a hands-off policy, not offering the Shah any clear-cut advice. It appears that the Shah, even before September, gave a lot of thought to announcing a transition to a constitutional monarchy; in the spring and summer of 1978 such a move might have defused the revolution and certainly delayed it. By the fall, Khomeini's position seemed too strong, apparently, for any Iranian leader to be prepared to step in as prime minister in such a transition. Conceivably, if the United States had foreseen the extent of what was coming, it might have acted (perhaps with the British) to urge the Shah strongly in this direction.

But this is a "might have been" for the historians; it is not the stuff of red-blooded politics. Rather, any Republican campaigning in 1980 is far more likely to argue that the Administration was to blame for not pulling out all the stops, at all levels, in support of the Shah and above all for not encouraging him to act with maximum force, some time from September on. The fact that just this policy appears to have been urged within the Administration by Mr. Brzezinski, at least at intervals, lends the argument added weight.

True, the Administration's position did nothing to prevent the Shah from doing just this; on the contrary, the repeated statements of support from the White House clearly implied that he would be backed whatever he decided to do. The one thing the Administration did *not* suggest—and probably would have declined if it had been asked—was the direct support of American military forces if Iranian forces sought to subdue the revolt and then ran into trouble. But surely this is a question that would have been raised by the Shah if he himself had ever taken the option seriously—as he apparently did not (unlike his ambassador to Washington). And any critic of the Administration should be forced to be clear how it should have been answered.

Or is it enough to argue that the reason the Shah did not seriously contemplate the use of military force was some generalized feeling that the United States was weaker in the area?[6] I

[6] Thus, Henry Kissinger has contended that reverses in Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan, "plus the general perception of American geopolitical decline, had the consequence of demoralizing those whose stock in trade was co-operation with the United States, undermining their resolution towards potential revolutionaries." In context he was obviously referring to the Shah. *The Economist*, February 10, 1979, p. 31.

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think not. For the United States to get him to screw his courage to the sticking point would surely have taken some fairly direct assurances of contingent military support.

As for the idea of a coup by the Iranian military, the Administration sent a senior general, Robert Huyser, Deputy European Commander, to Tehran in January to maintain contact with the Iranian high command. Apparently his line was to "cool it," or at any rate to plan with the utmost care any action taken. A contrary American position at that time—after the Shah left and before Prime Minister Bakhtiar fled and Khomeini arrived—might well have led to what an advocate of such a course has described privately as a "real throw of the dice." But what would the chances have been? And, again, would the military have acted without some assurance of more than moral U.S. support?

In short, those who argue that "there must have been a way" should be made to explain very carefully just what that way was, and what risks it would have entailed for U.S. forces themselves, including the possibility of a Soviet counter-intervention.[7] Any honest proponent of the hard-line course must also acknowledge that, for good or ill, it would surely have involved the United States far more deeply and visibly in the political future of Iran. The memory of what happened after the overthrow of Diem in Vietnam in 1963 can hardly be confined to Jimmy Carter and his moderate advisers, who apparently gave this consideration great weight in their hands-off policy.

Finally, one thing that *cannot* be claimed is that some neat CIA-backed operation would have done the trick. By mid-1978 there were no pro-Shah mobs there for the organizing, while the opposition was, as the event has conclusively demonstrated, almost universal. The Shah himself knew all along that there was no chance of reenacting the events of 1953. Putting down the revolution could only have meant military force in large doses, undertaken by an army whose willingness to fire on its own countrymen was suspect long before its final collapse in January and February.

In what may already have been an overlong discussion of the

[7] The Soviet reaction to an attempted military coup, without the presence of U.S. forces, might well have been restrained; the Soviets played a cool hand throughout what actually happened, and would probably have calculated that even a successful military coup would be only temporary and that a failed or inconclusive one would only improve the eventual chances of a genuinely radical or even Soviet-oriented government. But if U.S. forces of any kind whatever had come in, the Soviets could, and almost certainly would, have invoked the 1921 treaty that expressly gave them the right to send in their own military forces in such a case. The least they might have done would have been to seize one or two northern provinces and hold them for bargaining or even retention.

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issues of "crisis management" in Iran, it should not be necessary to dwell on the much-bruited claim of serious intelligence deficiencies.[8] No doubt these existed, but the policies that limited American unilateral intelligence operations in Iran and thus made American appraisals heavily dependent on the Shah's own SAVAK sources dated from long before Jimmy Carter. Republicans are hardly in a position to throw stones at that particular pane.

Here one hits a basic point on the whole Iran experience. If the issues of crisis management seem very "iffy" and hard to sustain, it is at least clear that the Carter Administration must take responsibility for this aspect. But were not the underlying conditions that had grown up over the years in Iran far more responsible for the revolution? What was the degree of American responsibility for those conditions, and how should it be apportioned as between the Carter Administration and its predecessors?

In 1949–50 Republicans could get away with the claim that Democratic policies "lost" China in very large part because Republicans had not been in power since 1933. But in the case of Iran, Republican and Democratic administrations alike had supported the Shah for more than 30 years; even the Shah's debt to Eisenhower for the 1953 restoration could have been paired with his debt to Truman for helping to get the Russians out of Azerbaijan in 1946. Not only the American quasi-commitment to Iran (embodied in a 1959 executive agreement rather than a treaty) but the details of American military and economic aid programs were accepted and approved over the years on a bipartisan basis, and to an overwhelming degree the administration of policy was left to professionals.

In short, with only two exceptions, anyone who lived with American policy in Iran from 1949 to 1979 would be hard put to point to any major American policy or practice that would plainly have been different if the other party had been in power. The first of these exceptions was the policy of all-out and unquestioning support for the Shah followed by the Nixon Administration from 1972 onward; not even private advice, apparently, was ever offered to the Shah on such blatant issues as the corrupt practices of his family, and the policy was symbolized dramatically by President Nixon's blank check of May 1972 for the Shah to buy any U.S. military equipment he wanted regardless of its sophistication or the judgment of military experts as to Iran's needs and

[8] See, for example, James A. Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '78," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79, pp. 339–40.

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capacities. Any Democratic administration in that period would probably have behaved differently on both counts.

And equally, a hypothetical Ford Administration after 1977 would surely not have adopted the Carter human rights policy. Even though the application to Iran was muted, and counterbalanced by Jimmy Carter's overcompensating toast in praise of the Shah in Tehran on New Year's Eve of 1977, there was unquestionably an impact in Iran.

So it is natural that Henry Kissinger has put his finger on the human rights policy (as well as the Administration's alleged lack of general firmness), while George Ball, in reply, has attacked the "blank check" Nixon military sales policy.[9]

But is either point really significant? Certainly the Shah was enabled by Mr. Nixon's generosity to acquire sophisticated military systems way beyond Iran's capacity; large numbers of American technicians in Iran were, on almost any analysis, a disturbing political factor. Vast resources and high-quality manpower went into a bloated defense effort and were thus conceivably denied to development programs, housing, and so on, and some American secrets were endangered.

But suppose another American President had been more standoffish. Would the Shah have changed his priorities or would he simply have bought less sophisticated equipment elsewhere? Leave aside the U.S. balance of payments, or the teasing question whether unlimited arms sales gave the United States any special influence on the Shah's oil price actions and votes in OPEC. The question is whether the *internal* situation in Iran would have evolved any differently. I doubt it.

As for the Carter human rights policy, those who knew the Shah best do not assert that his own very limited liberalization moves in 1977–78 were significantly affected by American pressure. At that stage the Shah acted, it would appear, from his own sense that it was time to let up a bit, and apparently with the idea of a possible future transition to a constitutional monarchy that he believed could not sustain itself through continued drastic repression. Later, when the crisis was visible, his limited concessions were in response to his own tactical sense.

It is less clear to what extent the human rights policy, by the simple fact of its being enunciated, encouraged the opposition to come out in the open and start pressing hard. Responsible Iranians claim that there was such an impact, even though nothing in the

[9] *The Economist*, February 10, 1979, p. 32, and February 17, 1979, p. 4.

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American posture—even before the Carter toast—suggested a U.S. turning away from basic support of the Shah. But not even an analysis of the revolution from a conservative viewpoint sympathetic to the Shah assigns the human rights policy more than secondary importance in the complex of factors that led to the revolution and the Shah's downfall.[10] The tide of opposition to the Shah that revealed itself in the fall of 1978 was far too vast to be attributable to any such single factor.

So much for the principal arguments now evident.[11] What they confront, basically, is the central fact that it was the policies of the Shah himself that were his undoing. And, whereas the United States, through its aid programs, commitment and close association, had very marked direct leverage on those policies through roughly the late 1960s, thereafter its influence was much reduced for the simple reason that the rise in oil prices made the Shah increasingly independent. Thus, in his last years he tended more and more to act on his own and to resist advice that was even slightly critical of his central policies.[12]

No American should bemoan, in principle, that a once-dependent country became able to stand on its own feet. But Iran's post-1970 independence was more than that—it both reduced specific American influence over the Shah's policies to nearly nil, and symbolized a major shift in power away from the oil-consuming countries and in favor of the oil producers. And if one asks what American Administration was responsible for that shift, one becomes bogged down hopelessly. Neither party, nor for that matter any set of individuals or groups, is in a position readily to blame others for the sea change.

So in the end the argument that *any* American Administration "lost Iran" seems to me a feckless and essentially irresponsible one. Iran (like China) was never ours to begin with. To the extent that there was ever substantial American influence on Iranian internal politics or the Shah's policies, that influence had dwindled by the early 1970s for reasons that had to do overwhelmingly with oil and its economics.

[10] See George Lenczowski, "The Arc of Crisis: Its Central Sector," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1979, pp. 805–10.

[11] I leave out, deliberately, a whole host of figments of the fertile Iranian imagination as to what the United States was doing, or not doing, at the time of the revolution. Some of these are perhaps catching on among the already-converted, on either side. And there will be more such "emigré talk," from the Shah on down. But with even minimum care and sorting by the American media, I doubt if any of it will assume any serious importance.

[12] Lenczowski, *loc. cit.*, pp. 806–07.

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IV

Up to this point we have been discussing the danger that either Nicaragua or Iran might lend itself to the kind of reckless charges of *past* responsibility that attended the communist takeover in China in 1949–50. And we have been talking in terms of the arguments that might be used between a Republican candidate (or those seeking the nomination) and either Jimmy Carter or some other Democratic candidate almost necessarily running within the confines of this Administration's record.[13]

The tone of the campaign and the relative fairness of arguments used on this point *are* important, especially at a time when the nation needs badly to pull itself together. A deeper question may be what effect a debate might have on the conduct of foreign policy during and after the election, whoever won. In the case of China, and later in the debate on Cuba in 1960, the upshot—as we have seen—was to cement American policy into a hard-line mold that took years to shake off, with results that certainly did not advance the national security. And while words spoken in a presidential election year were only part of each of these waves of national feeling, they did a great deal to build them to tidal proportions.

In the cases of Nicaragua and Iran, the first casualty could be observance of an old and classic rule of statesmanship: not to compound an adverse or potentially adverse situation by trying to hit it head on (in golfing terms to "play them as they lie"). This is always hard in a democracy, and American policy breached the rule in both China and Cuba, dealing with each of the incoming regimes almost from the start on the basis of worst-case assumptions about its true-red communist nature and above all its ties to the Soviet Union, and ignoring evidence that the new regime might be, if not less Marxist than its noises, at least so nationalist that it would in practice follow a path away from Soviet direction if given the chance. Such worst-case assumptions then became self-fulfilling; in each case, hostility toward the United States that might have been limited or even outgrown in, say, a five- or ten-year period, hardened into a generation of virulent enmity.

The present regime in Iran is not remotely communist, nor is there persuasive evidence that it was brought to power with

[13] Even if President Carter should be denied his party's nomination, the alternative candidates mentioned, notably Senator Edward Kennedy, would be most unlikely to repudiate what Carter has done, and certainly not from the Right.

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significant Soviet help. But it is stridently anti-American and seems at times to be spoiling for a quarrel; American enthusiasm for Khomeini was never widespread, and feeling toward him is already highly critical. Conversely, the Shah's errors and repression tend to recede into history; he looks better as Khomeini looks worse.

So some Americans are not only replaying what happened and the Carter Administration's role, but are suggesting American preferences for the future. In an exceedingly volatile Iranian political climate—with a long habit of reading and misreading supposed American actions and intentions, whether by the CIA or others—this can only be dynamite.[14] Any hint that the United States is exerting, or seeking, political influence in the unfolding drama in Iran has about a 99 percent chance of working against American interests. If the Republican Party should appear to be talking in this direction, the damage would be doubled—and if the Democrats tried to defend themselves by playing the same game, doubled again.

Almost certainly both sides, in their more relaxed moments, realize this, and almost all the comment to date has been prefaced by "hands off" disclaimers. But in the heat of political battle total restraint is not the rule. It has simply got to be this time.

In Nicaragua, the same problem is even more acute. There *are* radical elements in the new regime; the rebellion (unlike Iran's) did have substantial outside material help and advice, specifically from Cuba, and what Cuba does in the Hemisphere cannot be dissociated from the policies of its sole supporter, the Soviet Union. But to recognize these facts is one thing, to talk loosely or simplistically about them in public debate, at any responsible level, quite another. It would be the easiest thing in the world for Republican candidates to paint themselves (if they won) into a corner, and almost as easy for the Administration's supporters to seek to counter by showing how much they too are "on the ball" on the issue.

Yet, if the differences about past policy, especially human rights versus stability, are honest and valid subjects for debate, is it

[14] In my own view, this is the truly decisive reason why it would be most unwise for the Shah to be given asylum in the United States, at least as of today. One may, as I do, have considerable sympathy for him as a person, and regard him as a tragic figure whose high aims for his country were fatally undermined by his methods. And there is the old American tradition of political refuge. But the plain fact is that if the Shah were to settle here, politically minded Iranians of all stripes would draw the totally unwarranted conclusion that the United States was in some way looking to his restoration. The Left in Iran could ask no stronger propaganda argument, and it would have a lot of takers.

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utterly unrealistic to seek to limit the debate in the ways this analysis would suggest? Can Republicans conceivably argue their case without depicting the new regime in the harshest light? Is it conceivable that Republicans could argue that their party could not have got us into this bind, but that the only thing to do now is to play it cool?

These questions will be tested well before the campaign, as the Carter Administration presents to Congress, in some fashion, the substantial aid and reconstruction programs it is apparently planning for Nicaragua. The tone of debate at that time could go far to set the tone for the campaign itself. Alas, unlike the largely temporary damage inflicted by acerbic Senate comments on Panama in the Panama Canal treaties debate, we are not dealing with a Torrijos who is in firm control of his country and, in that special case, wanted the treaties badly enough to accept indignities for the sake of getting them ratified. Both moderates and radicals in Nicaragua will be listening intently to the thrust of American comment from the Hill. If the United States seems to be "giving them hell," their response could easily be (in the words once used by Sukarno of Indonesia) "the hell with your aid"—and the inevitable result would be a turn to Cuba and the Soviet Union and an accompanying turn to the radical Left, the very results both U.S. parties should be anxious to avoid.

So we face a stern test of the discipline of debate in the American political system. And the test will get tougher as 1980 unfolds.

V

But the gravest consequence of all, for the long term, could be the impact of a heated and intemperate debate in 1980 on the whole American approach to changes in the Third World. Whether there is some Soviet tide sweeping over the Third World is bound to be debated, even if Iran and Nicaragua are not as central as I have suggested they may be. So, at the risk of moving increasingly into the realm of personal opinion rather than attempted dispassionate judgment, let us look at broader issues and possibilities.

First of all, such a debate could tend to revive what an astute British observer, Denis Brogan, once called "the illusion of American omnipotence." Mr. Kissinger, in attacking the Carter human rights policy, has noted that: "We cannot keep proclaiming that we learned the dangers of universal intervention in Vietnam and then elaborate a doctrine which amounts to universal interven-

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tion."[15] The Carter Administration plainly saw major gains from its decision to make human rights a worldwide element in American policy—in giving the American people a renewed sense of idealistic purpose and in enhancing the American image abroad. But in so doing it risked confusions that would have unforeseen consequences and give ammunition to its opponents.[16]

However, suggestions that the United States can readily engage in covert or even military operations to affect the political outcome in individual countries run in the same direction even though on a more selective basis. Either a policy of preaching or one of manipulation implies a far greater American role than in fact exists today in almost all Third World situations.

In Iran and Nicaragua, when one comes right down to it, it was internal forces that were decisive. The great majority of the people in both countries had turned against their rulers, and change was inevitable at some point, though not necessarily in the form of the new governments of Khomeini and the Sandinista-dominated group respectively. And this was equally true, I would argue, in Chile in 1973 and certainly in Portugal in 1975, where the changes were, in simplistic terms, from radical regimes to right-wing or democratic socialist ones.

Misgovernment breeds opposition, and the results in all these cases conformed to a felt sense of the people that what was going on was intolerable. The amount of misgovernment in the world today is monumental, particularly in Third World countries, often in the first generation of independence, that face enormous economic and social problems. And the direct involvement of the United States worldwide is a fraction of what it was ten or 15 years ago, for reasons that are mostly sound and by now solidly accepted by both political parties. For the United States to act, or for American leaders to talk, as if the United States had great direct influence on the process of political change in the Third World would be to play the part of King Canute on a big scale.

Yet there *are* cases where the United States may have to consider action, notwithstanding the difficulties. Today, the concept of "spheres of influence" is rightly in disrepute: to attack Soviet activities in Africa as outside the "historic" sphere of Russian policy is to invoke nineteenth-century criteria that would hardly

[15] *Washington Post* interview, *loc. cit.*, footnote 1.

[16] I felt in 1975 that the American posture toward repressive regimes of the Left or Right needed a change from the total neglect associated with the Kissinger era. But I also argued that the change should be selective, taking into account not only the priority of other American security and economic objectives but the traditions of each particular country. William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975, pp. 51–60.

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sustain an active U.S. role in that area, let alone in the Middle East. Whether U.S. and Western interests are critically affected by change in the Third World must always be weighed, for each nation or area, in terms of present realities. And these may take in a complex of factors that include access to oil as well as the classic elements of grand strategy in the past.

But if the United States is to respect the integrity of the political process among Third World nations, as I believe it must, it can act only in defense of that process, that is when other nations hostile to American interests—notably the Soviet Union or its allies—are themselves intervening to impose governments or create disruption by force or subversion. In such cases, the United States (and other Western nations) may have to respond—very judiciously, as sparingly as possible, only when truly important interests are involved—but still to act. This, I take it, is the consensus that has evolved on the specific issue of CIA covert operations. The same kind of guideline concerning external intervention from other quarters seems to have been laid down in recent Administration statements on the possible use of force in response to threats in the Middle East in the wake of Iran.[17]

If such action, therefore, is even to be considered in the future—as I believe it must be—the criterion of clear-cut and demonstrable hostile foreign intervention is basic. No one in France or Italy doubted in 1947–48 that the Soviet Union was backing the disruptive and anti-democratic tactics of the local Communist Parties to the hilt; what the United States did, to counter Soviet activity, through scarcely covert means, was in the truest sense pro-democratic and in tune with the will of the French and Italian people. That the criterion was invoked in later cases on shakier evidence (for example, in the Dominican Republic in 1965) does not invalidate it; it simply means that the evidence must indeed be clear, especially to the people involved.

In the Iranian revolution and Nicaragua, there has not—to date—been any such persuasive evidence. To exaggerate the external role in campaign debate can only operate to blur an essential distinction that must continue to guide American action. Here, too, of course, times have changed, and there will always be the additional question whether the United States or Western nations are in a position to be effective. Soviet backing for the forces of Agostinho Neto in Angola in 1975 was plain enough, but I would argue that Secretary Kissinger did exactly what he now

[17] See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski's speech reported in *The New York Times*, August 3, 1979, pp. A1, A5.

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accuses the Carter Administration of doing in a different way in Nicaragua—starting something he could not finish, or certainly could not finish once he invoked, or condoned, the cooperation of South Africa. In grand strategy, as in chess, one does have to choose the terrain on which to stand and fight; no "lesson of Vietnam" should be clearer than that one.

And this in turn suggests a third aspect of American and Western policy in the Third World. American intervention in Chile in 1970–73, as in Angola in 1975, was based explicitly on the argument that *any* gain for the Soviet side was bound to have grave repercussions not only in the region or in kindred nations elsewhere, but in terms of the perceived global balance between the Soviet Union and the West, above all the United States.[18] Against this "globalist" line of argument stands a more "regionalist" view, that the people of the region affected are today, if not the best, the inevitable judges of what kind of political change should be prevented or assisted. This view does not dismiss the existence of Soviet threats, but it does insist that to act in the face of dominant regional opinion—as the United States was doing in Angola once the South African role became evident—is foredoomed to failure. Rhetoric aside, the policies of the United States and Britain on the issue of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from 1977 to the present have rested on a Realpolitik version of "regionalism"—that is to say, on hard practical judgments of what key black African governments would oppose or support.[19]

The "regionalist" view also seems to have been a supporting factor in the Administration's persisting on its anti-Somoza course in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas were assisted not only by Cuba but by Costa Rica, Panama and other neighboring nations; Somoza had few friends in the region, even though leaders of some key nations such as Mexico may have been decidedly skeptical of the outcome.[20] As to Iran, on the other hand, the shoe was on the other foot: moderate Arab governments in the area, in Saudi Arabia above all, were appalled at the United States standing by and letting the Shah go down; whether they assessed the practical possibilities of action realistically is, of course, an-

[18] See Richard R. Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 301–02.

[19] This interpretation is spelled out persuasively in a paper by William Foltz delivered at the Bilderberg Conference in Baden in the spring of 1979, and about to be published by *Politique Étrangère*, Autumn 1979, under the title, "Les Tendances de la Politique Africaine des Etats Unis, et les Conflits au Sud de l'Afrique."

[20] Although the Latin American nation involved is not directly identified in William Safire's column making this point, the context makes Mexico a sure assumption. *The New York Times*, July 5, 1979, p. A17.

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other question, and their ultimate judgment would surely have depended on what emerged from any American intervention—whether we "pulled it off." (The parallel to the attitudes of East Asian non-communist governments toward Vietnam is very much in point: from early strong encouragement they moved in the end to criticism and regret as the American effort foundered.)

So the Administration has not been wholly "regionalist" in its actual decisions. Nor have its "globalist" critics tried to argue that every case should be met with action regardless of the local balance of forces or regional norms and attitudes. When Ethiopia came under a Soviet-oriented regime and then defeated a Somali invasion and put down a revolt in Eritrea in 1978, there was a good deal of sniping at the Administration's alleged ineptitude, but no serious suggestion that the United States should have got itself directly involved other than to manifest more clearly a posture of concern and readiness to meet future more promising situations.

But there is a real issue here, at least of degree, and ample room for fair debate. A Republican Administration would almost certainly have been less influenced by black African opinion on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; the issue should be whether treating the situation primarily as one of Soviet threat would have produced better results—or might have invited the very Soviet intervention it opposed, and in circumstances where the United States, as in Angola, had no real follow-through unless it was prepared to engage American forces directly. My own bias is evident, but the issue is an honest one and can be debated as such. Sometimes the globalist-regionalist debate will overlap with the stability-human rights one, but not always.

In such a debate, the differences will of course extend far beyond questions of U.S. diplomatic tactics or political options. It is already being argued not only that the increased strategic and conventional military strength of the Soviet Union, and its newfound ability to make use of Cuban or East German proxies, have created a shift in the whole global balance of power, but that this is having a drastic effect on what happens in Third World situations. The proposition is unquestionably correct in at least the narrow sense that Soviet military actions in Angola and Ethiopia would not have been possible ten years ago. And it is now common ground between and within American political parties (at least at the leadership level in the Democratic Party) that the United States and the West must redress the military balance by increased military budgets. One can argue that the

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emphasis in such increases should be more on the conventional side than now appears likely from the Senate's debate on SALT II. And the issue of who was responsible for the drop in relative American military power can go on endlessly.

But the connection to Third World change is far from being a blanket or indiscriminate one. The Soviet Union sought opportunities to expand its influence in the Middle East (and elsewhere) long before the West had lost unquestioned military superiority; obviously its leaders believed that they could go a long way without running into possible military confrontations. Most of the difficult issues in the Third World today, it cannot be repeated too often, have come about for local and regional reasons that would have operated irrespective of the global military balance. Military factors are certainly relevant, but to emphasize them unduly is both untrue to the complexities of particular cases and runs the risk of inhibiting Western actions that are entirely possible still. And, whether by express "linkage" or otherwise, the United States and its Western allies still have a great many nonmilitary cards to play in ways that can affect direct Soviet or proxy interventions.

VI

There is one final point about the possible range of debate in the 1980 campaign on Third World changes adverse to U.S. interests. Even if it is confined to the genuine differences of approach I have tried to suggest in the body of this article, it will have left out something very important that badly needs saying about American policies in the Third World.

Up to this point, we have been discussing issues of American political policy and possible American "intervention"—using the term in its broadest sense to include both supporting and opposing established governments or forces of change. But to confine the discussion to the political/military sphere glosses over a whole vital area of American policy, namely, what we should be doing about the basic economic and social pressures and problems that beset Third World countries almost universally.

One does not have to go all the way, by any means, with Robert McNamara's thesis that such pressures correlate overwhelmingly with the incidence of violence and instability in the world today.[21] Nor need one accept all or even the bulk of the elements of the

[21]See his speech at the University of Chicago on May 22, 1979, "Development and the Arms Race," available in pamphlet form from the World Bank.

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New International Economic Order for which the Third World has been clamoring with varying degrees of vehemence since 1974. But misery does breed violence (as does disappointing progress), and there are, I believe, not merely the humanitarian arguments usually advanced for more forthcoming U.S. policies on this front, but concrete arguments of long-term national security.

This was, I think, well understood by Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy (to name but two); if either were to survey the present mix of American actions affecting the Third World, I surmise that almost his first questions would be: "What have you done to the economic side? How did you come so drastically to reduce foreign aid, without replacing it with any adequate program for trade and technical assistance?" And the explanations offered—domestic political opposition, cases of error and disappointment, and latterly our own economic difficulties—would not have persuaded them. For both, I believe, were convinced that it mattered for the United States to be in the forefront of what is now called the North-South relationship, not only so that we could (in Dean Acheson's phrase) "look ourselves in the mirror in the morning" but so that we could be perceived as a nation that cared and identified with the valid and deepest concerns of the Third World.

And they believed, too, from my experience, that such an effort tied in integrally to our national security interest that change in the Third World take place without the excessive violence that goes with desperation and rejection. What was done on the economic front was never explicitly weighed against the defense or military assistance budgets, in terms of contribution to the nation's true national security, but if it had been they would surely have felt that it was at least as cost-effective (and usually a lot less wasteful). What Eisenhower said in his 1960 farewell speech on the dangers of the "military-industrial complex" taking possession of our politics and our minds at least suggests what his reaction might be to our present composite of actions bearing on the Third World.

So it is not visionary idealism to hope that a similar note will be struck in the 1980 campaign. Without it, and actions flowing from it, whatever political policies the United States pursues in the Third World will lack a crucial dimension. Of course such policies are important: there are Soviet and other extremist threats in the Third World, and what is done to counter them is an inescapable basic part of the overall agenda. But unless Third World countries are again persuaded that the United States is a caring nation, day

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in and day out and even if there is not an Arab-Israeli crisis or some other specific reason for American aid, what we do in particular situations will always tend to be regarded as naked power politics of the kind to which the world is increasingly allergic.

The tendency in any political campaign is to "view with alarm," to attack what was done or not done. But on a broader historical view we may well be blamed by future American generations even more for what was not even attempted. The power, as well as the population, of the countries styled as members of a Third World is growing steadily and inevitably. How the United States relates to them, on *all* fronts, would indeed be an issue worth serious airing in 1980.

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William M. LeoGrande

THE REVOLUTION IN NICARAGUA: ANOTHER CUBA?

For two decades, the hemispheric policy of the United States has been haunted by the specter of "another Cuba." The fear that Cuba's revolutionary upheaval might be repeated elsewhere energized the Alliance for Progress and, when progress gave way to order, that same fear justified providing counterinsurgency assistance to a continent increasingly dominated by military dictatorships. Lyndon Johnson sent a force of 20,000 men to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to prevent "another Cuba," and Henry Kissinger unleashed the CIA on Chile for the same reason.

The collapse of the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua has made this fear more palpable than ever. The United States labored mightily over the past year to prevent the accession of a Sandinista government in Nicaragua, but in the end was reduced to reluctantly arranging the terms of transition from Somoza to a provisional government appointed by the guerrillas. Preoccupied with isolating the Sandinistas, Washington policymakers consistently underestimated their strength and exaggerated that of Somoza. Now that he is gone, the Cuba specter still hovers, threatening to obscure U.S. understanding of the dynamics of post-Somoza politics just as it obscured the dynamics of his collapse.

Nicaragua's future course will be determined fundamentally by internal forces—how the revolutionary coalition breaks down into contending political camps, the relative strengths of those camps, and the issues around which the political battles of the future are fought. No external actor will be able to control this process, but the United States can have an impact on it by affecting the alignments of the political contenders and the issues which divide them. Whether Nicaragua becomes "another Cuba" will depend in no small measure on whether the United States reenacts the mistakes it made 20 years ago in its relations with the *first* Cuba.

II

Nicaragua, like Cuba, was victimized early in the century by the new "Manifest Destiny" which guided U.S. hemispheric policy

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during those years.[1] It became a virtual protectorate of the United States in 1912 when the Marines were dispatched, ostensibly to protect American property and citizens during a period of civil strife. In fact, U.S. interest in Nicaragua was primarily strategic. Considered for a time as a possible site for the canal across the isthmus, Nicaragua's location remained strategically important for defense of the canal in Panama. U.S. control over the customs houses of Nicaragua was established less to insure the loans of U.S. bankers than those of Europeans, whose potential for intervention the United States perceived as a strategic threat.

Except for a brief interlude in 1925-26, U.S. troops remained in Nicaragua until 1933. The second occupation never quite succeeded in pacifying Nicaragua. Augusto César Sandino, a general of the Liberal Party, refused to accept the imposition of a Conservative president, and for nearly six years he fought a guerrilla war against the Marines, achieving international stature as a nationalist and anti-imperialist. When the United States withdrew under the banner of FDR's Good Neighborism, it left the task of ensuring stability to the American-trained National Guard under the command of Anastasio Somoza García. One of Somoza's first achievements was to lure the legendary Sandino to Managua on the pretext of arranging peace, only to have him assassinated. In 1936, Somoza forced the civilian president from office, arranged his own election, and thus began a family dynasty which ruled Nicaragua for 43 years.

The Somoza dynasty rested upon two pillars of support: the National Guard, transformed by patronage into a personalistic instrument of political repression, and the backing of the United States, ensured by the Somozas' anti-communism and their ability to maintain order. Though their reign did little to alleviate the tremendous poverty of one of the hemisphere's poorest countries, the Somozas proved adept at personal enrichment. At the end, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, son of the Guard's first commander, controlled an economic empire estimated to be worth nearly a billion dollars, including one-third of the nation's arable land and many of the major industries. So complete was his economic control that foreign investors avoided Nicaragua for want of any reasonable investment opportunities.

During the first three decades of the postwar period, opposition to the dynasty was weak and divided. The moderates in the

[1] For an excellent history of early U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, see Richard Millet, *Guardians of the Dynasty*, Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977.

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traditional opposition parties were paralyzed by the Somozas' close ties with the United States, and by their own fear of the more radical opposition—a fear which lured them, time after time, into unequal "alliances" with the government. The radical opposition, on the other hand, was contained by ferocious repression. Thus the future of the dynasty seemed secure when, on December 23, 1972, the earth began to move, changing not only the physical geography of Nicaragua, but its political geography as well.

III

The political aftershocks of the earthquake that destroyed Managua fatally weakened the structure of Somoza's rule. Turning adversity to advantage, Somoza and his associates enriched themselves shamelessly with the international aid intended for earthquake victims. With Somoza in charge of reconstruction, the city of Managua was rebuilt on Somoza's land, by Somoza's construction companies, with international aid funneled through Somoza's banks.

The extent of corruption, together with the expansion of Somoza's economic empire into areas of economic activity previously reserved for other members of Nicaragua's bourgeoisie, alienated large sectors of both the middle and upper classes. Among Nicaragua's lower classes, the economic adversity caused by the earthquake stimulated more radical opposition, manifested in the wave of strikes, demonstrations and land seizures that swept the country in 1972–73.

The moderate opposition coalesced around the leadership of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of the anti-Somoza daily *La Prensa*, and a social democrat who in 1974 organized seven opposition political parties and two labor confederations into the Union Democrática de Liberación. In the same month that Chamorro founded the UDEL, the nation's attention was fixed momentarily on a group which would eventually become the focal point of the more radical opposition—the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional.

Founded in 1962, the FSLN was one of the many guerrilla organizations spawned in Latin America by the example of the Cuban Revolution. It had scant success during its first decade, being routed by the National Guard in its only two serious military ventures. Though it gained strength in the rural north after the earthquake, in 1974 it still had fewer than one hundred members. Then, on December 27, 1974, 25 FSLN guerrillas invaded a Managua Christmas party, capturing 12 of Nicaragua's

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most prominent business and political leaders. The guerrillas exchanged their hostages for 14 political prisoners, one million dollars in ransom, and safe passage to Cuba. The boldness of the Christmas operation brought the FSLN national recognition, just as Fidel Castro's abortive 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks elevated him to national prominence in the struggle against Batista.

Somoza's embarrassment over the Christmas raid led him to embark upon a war of extermination against the FSLN. He declared a state of siege, created an elite counterinsurgency force within the National Guard, and obtained an 80 percent increase in U.S. military aid. The National Guard then proceeded to conduct a reign of terror in the northern departments of Zelaya, Matagalpa and Segovia, where the FSLN had been most active. For two years, peasants in those areas were subjected to a systematic campaign of torture and mass execution. To deprive the FSLN of support, 80 percent of the rural population was uprooted and herded into resettlement camps. The countryside then became a free-fire zone.

Such gross violations of human rights appalled Nicaragua's moderates and earned the Somoza government well-deserved international opprobrium. In January 1977, Nicaragua's Roman Catholic bishops joined in a pastoral letter accusing the National Guard of "humiliating and inhuman treatment ranging from torture and rape to summary execution." Reports by both Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State confirmed the bishops' charges.

Thus, when the Carter Administration unveiled its new human rights policy in 1977, Nicaragua became one of its principal targets, constituting a near-perfect showcase for the policy. The FSLN, never a serious threat to the Somoza regime, had not been heard from since their Christmas operation. The absence of any apparent security problem in Nicaragua meant that U.S. policy there, unlike policy toward Iran or South Korea, could be safely guided by the moral imperative of human rights undiluted by national security concerns. Reductions in U.S. military assistance to Nicaragua on human rights grounds emboldened Somoza's moderate opponents, who had historically been immobilized by the unflagging U.S. support which the dynasty had enjoyed.

Then, in October 1977, the supposedly defunct FSLN launched a series of small-scale attacks on National Guard garrisons in five cities. Though the attackers were easily driven off, the assaults shattered the myth of Somoza's invulnerability and provided

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additional fuel to the burgeoning opposition's moderate and radical wings. Coincident with the attacks, 12 prominent Nicaraguan professionals exiled in Costa Rica (el Grupo de Los Doce) praised the Sandinistas' "political maturity," and asserted that the FSLN would have to play a role in any permanent solution to Nicaragua's problems.

The willingness of the more progressive moderate forces to open a dialogue with the FSLN was due both to their own exasperation over the ineffectiveness of electoral opposition, and to a significant shift in strategy by elements of the FSLN itself. Ideological differences over the proper strategy for defeating Somoza emerged within the FSLN in 1975, and after the FSLN's founder, Carlos Fonseca Amador, was killed in combat in November 1976, the Sandinistas split into three factions, or "tendencies." The traditional strategy of rural-based guerrilla warfare was upheld by the Prolonged People's War Tendency (Guerra Popular Prolongada—GPP), while the Proletarian Tendency (Tendencia Proletario—TP) advocated a shift to political work among the urban proletariat. Both groups agreed, however, that the time was not ripe for major military actions, and both rejected extensive cooperation with "bourgeois elements."

A third group, the Insurrectional Tendency (Tendencia Insurreccional, known popularly as the Terceristas), shared neither of these views. Believing that opposition to Somoza had become nearly universal, its leaders favored exemplary military action to spark popular insurrection. Most significantly, they also advocated the unity of all opposition forces, whatever their class character, around a program of social reform and democracy. It was the Tercerista faction which carried out the October 1977 attacks, and it was they who set about building links to the moderate opposition through Los Doce. Still, as 1978 began, the FSLN had neither the political nor the military strength to offer a serious challenge to the Somoza regime.

On January 10, 1978, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro was assassinated in Managua, and the nation erupted in a paroxysm of outrage and spontaneous violence. After two weeks of riots in Managua, Nicaragua's business leaders called a general strike with a single demand—Somoza's resignation. The two-week strike was 90 percent effective. Midway through it, the FSLN added its endorsement, and the Terceristas launched military attacks in several cities. But the political initiative clearly lay with the moderate opposition.

For the next six months the country was rocked by sporadic

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violence, most of it uncoordinated and organized by a widely disparate array of opposition groups. During these crucial months from March to August 1978, the political initiative slipped inexorably from the moderates to the FSLN. The Sandinistas spent those months gathering their forces, stockpiling arms and organizing the urban and rural poor. The moderates spent them waiting for the United States to push Somoza out of power. Unable to bring Somoza down by themselves and afraid of the Sandinistas' radicalism, the moderates expected the United States to act for them. They were encouraged in this belief by the Carter Administration's earlier condemnation of Somoza's human rights record, and by the shared interest in avoiding a Sandinista victory.

As civil violence became endemic, U.S. policy was caught in the pull of opposing imperatives. Should the United States stand by its advocacy of human rights and democratic reform in the face of Somoza's deteriorating political position? Or should human rights be subordinated to the political stability long provided by a brutal but reliable ally? Complicating this choice was the Carter Administration's self-imposed prohibition on interventionism in the Hemisphere and uncertainties as to whether Somoza could, in fact, restore order. To some extent, differing evaluations of the situation tended to be bureaucratically based. The ability of the Administration to devise a coherent policy was further diminished by the potent "Nicaragua lobby" in Congress, and its willingness to hold unrelated legislation hostage to the Administration's actions. This interplay of forces resulted in a policy which was more a product of bureaucratic compromise than of a clear assessment of U.S. interests. In fact, there was hardly a policy at all.

In April 1977, the United States restricted both military and economic aid to Somoza on human rights grounds; in September, the restrictions were relaxed. The government's harsh repression of the January 1978 riots sparked by Chamorro's assassination prompted the United States to impose new restrictions and to call for a "dialogue" between Somoza and the moderate opposition. Six months later, President Carter sent Somoza a letter congratulating him on his improved human rights record.

This last action in particular led much of the moderate opposition to conclude that their strategy of forcing Somoza's resignation with the help of U.S. pressure was untenable. Their only viable option, then, was to join in cooperation with more radical elements. The result was the creation of the Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio Opositor—FAO), the first coalition uniting

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the moderate and radical wings of the anti-Somoza opposition.

In August 1978, the FSLN seized the National Palace while the congress was in session, taking 1,500 hostages. The Sandinistas' audacity captured the popular imagination and with it the leadership of the anti-Somoza struggle. As the attackers and 59 newly freed political prisoners drove to the airport for a flight to Panama, thousands of Nicaraguans lined the streets to cheer them. The palace assault was followed swiftly by a new general strike, and in September the FSLN repeated its action of the previous October by attacking the National Guard in several cities. This time, however, the guerrilla actions sparked mass insurrections in Matagalpa, León, Estelí, Chinandega and Grenada. To "save" the cities from the rebels, the National Guard was forced to destroy them from the air. It took nearly three weeks and over 3,000 dead before the Guard prevailed. When the Sandinistas withdrew, taking thousands of new recruits with them, the Guard "mopped up" with hundreds of summary executions. After September 1978, no compromise that would retain Somoza in power was possible.

The spectacle of an army waging war against its own citizenry prompted a reevaluation of U.S. policy by convincing officials that Somoza would never be able to restore political stability. Moreover, the FSLN's unexpected strength and support raised the specter of an eventual Sandinista victory unless some sort of "political solution" could successfully replace Somoza with a moderate government. From the fall of 1978 onward, the single goal of U.S. policy was to prevent the succession of an FSLN-dominated government. Under OAS auspices, the United States organized a mediation effort aimed at creating an "interim government" composed of the FAO and Somoza's National Liberal Party; the National Guard would remain intact. The plan envisioned no role for the FSLN, and the guerrillas denounced it as *Somocismo* without Somoza.

Such a strategy might have had some chance of success in January 1978. By 1979, it was hopelessly unrealistic. The U.S. mediation effort destroyed what little remained of the moderates' political initiative. By pressuring the FAO to abandon its call for Somoza's immediate resignation and negotiate with the regime, the United States destroyed the moderates' unity and their credibility. When the mediation began, the FAO included 16 opposition groups; by the end, fewer than ten remained. As it became increasingly isolated, the FAO could only have recovered if Washington had made up its mind to force Somoza out of office. This it was not willing to do.

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Somoza played the mediation masterfully. By stalling for time, he was able to rearm and reinforce the National Guard, demoralize and fragment the moderate opposition, and give the United States the impression that he was negotiating in good faith. When he rejected the final mediation proposal for an internationally supervised plebiscite in January 1979, his position appeared much improved. His gamble, in essence, was that if the United States faced a clear and unequivocal choice between Somoza and the Sandinistas, it would eventually come to his aid. He was only partially mistaken.

Despite U.S. threats that a collapse of the mediation would affect the "whole range" of its relations with Nicaragua, retaliation was largely symbolic. The four-man U.S. military mission was withdrawn, and the embassy staff was cut by half. The surprising mildness of these sanctions derived from a variety of factors. Washington intelligence analysts were predicting that Somoza's National Guard could, through sheer firepower, defeat any feasible FSLN offensive. Thus policymakers may have felt more secure sticking with an unpopular but powerful Somoza than ousting him in favor of the politically divided and isolated moderates. Somoza, at least, would prevent a Sandinista victory. At the same time, Representatives Charles Wilson (D-Tex.) and John Murphy (D-N.Y.) were threatening to torpedo the Panama Canal treaties' implementation legislation if the Administration moved openly against Somoza.

In June 1979, the three factions of the FSLN launched the "final offensive" against the Somoza dynasty. Within weeks, they controlled most of the nation's major cities, virtually all the countryside and half of Managua. The new offensive heightened U.S. fears of an FSLN victory and prompted a retreat from the "noninterventionist" low profile which characterized policy after the collapse of the mediation. Addressing the Organization of American States (OAS) on June 22, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance finally put the United States on record as favoring Somoza's resignation. The rest of his proposal, however, was largely oblivious to political realities in both Nicaragua and the OAS. Making no mention of the Provisional Government for National Reconstruction appointed only days earlier by the FSLN and National Patriotic Front (a more militant coalition group than the FAO), Vance called for a "broad-based representative government," and an OAS peacekeeping force to ensure a ceasefire. Though the peacekeeping force was roundly condemned, the final OAS resolution called for Somoza's departure and legitimated the

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next phase of U.S. involvement by calling on member states to "facilitate an enduring and peaceful solution" to the civil war.

With all of Nicaragua engulfed in battle and the FSLN forces gaining steadily, the United States began an attempt to construct a constitutionalist solution. Somoza would resign in favor of a constitutional successor who would then appoint a council of prominent independent Nicaraguans and turn power over to them. The council would mediate between Somoza's Liberal Party, the National Guard and the opposition to create an interim government composed of all these forces. That government, with the National Guard still intact, would then prepare elections in 1981.

The unreality of this convoluted scheme is truly astonishing. The only real difference between it and the U.S. position during the earlier mediation was a willingness to force Somoza's resignation. Had the United States been willing to demand that resignation nine months earlier, such a solution might have been feasible. By July, however, even the most conservative opposition groups had already endorsed the provisional government which the United States insisted on studiously ignoring. The constitutionalist plan collapsed when the United States found that none of Nicaragua's moderates would endorse or participate in it.

Finally, with the FSLN on the verge of a military victory, the United States abandoned its attempts to construct a government which would exclude any significant Sandinista participation. The accession of the FSLN-backed provisional government was accepted as inevitable, and the United States sought simply to negotiate the terms of transition in order to minimize FSLN influence. In this endeavor, it had two levers: Somoza would resign at U.S. direction, and the United States would provide massive economic aid to an acceptable government. In exchange, it wanted the addition of two more moderates to the provisional government's five-member junta, and a guarantee that neither Somoza's Liberal Party nor the National Guard would be dismantled.

Recognizing full well that the United States was negotiating with it only out of necessity following failure to undermine its support, the junta was not disposed to accede to these demands. Nor could it have done so politically. The provisional government derived its authority from the FSLN, which had appointed it and agreed to abide by its authority. Every important action taken by the junta was cleared in advance with FSLN field commanders. If the junta had shattered its own delicate political balance by

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adding moderates, or if it had agreed to retain the hated National Guard, it would have signed its own death warrant.

Thus despite pressure from the United States and several Latin American countries which had aided the anti-Somoza opposition, the junta would do no more than guarantee the lives of Somocistas and National Guardsmen, and leave open the possibility for "honest" members of the Guard to join the new national army. The battlefield situation, plus the moderation of the provisional government's program and cabinet, finally led the United States to accept the junta's terms.

On July 17, President Anatasio Somoza Debayle went into exile in Miami. With him went the entire senior command of the National Guard, as well as its morale. The Guard proceeded to disintegrate ignominiously, and within 24 hours had ceased to exist. Thus was realized the very eventuality which U.S. policy since January 1978 had sought to avoid—a complete Sandinista military victory.

How could U.S. policy have failed so dismally? Despite bureaucratic conflicts and congressional pressures, the failure cannot be attributed to the lack of a clear policy objective, at least not after Chamorro's assassination. Nor can the failure be fatalistically attributed to the internal dynamics of Nicaraguan politics. There was nothing inevitable about the final outcome in Nicaragua; indeed, when U.S. policy became fully geared to preventing an FSLN victory, the FSLN was by no means the dominant element in the anti-Somoza opposition.

As events unfolded in Nicaragua, the United States consistently tried to fit a square peg of policy into the round hole of reality. By failing to assess accurately the dynamics of Somoza's decline, the United States produced proposals which were invariably six months out of date. When the political initiative lay with the moderate opposition, the United States acted as if it still lay with Somoza. When the initiative shifted to the radicals, the United States acted as if it lay with the moderates. And when, at the last moment, the United States recognized that the radicals held the initiative, it seemed to think it could cajole them into returning it to the moderates.

Such misperception is not explicable merely in terms of an intelligence failure, any more than it was in Iran. The pace of events in Nicaragua was clear to anyone who wished to see it, and many did. A large part of the problem was the selective perception of policymakers who seemed to believe (or hope) that Somoza could restore order long after that became impossible, that the

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moderates were strong enough to form a post-Somoza regime excluding the radicals, and finally, that the radicals could be induced to surrender their leadership of the opposition on the very threshold of victory.

The source of these misperceptions was the fear of "another Cuba," and the questionable conviction that the radical opposition was intent on creating one. Now that Somoza has departed in "worst-case" fashion as far as U.S. policy was concerned, there is a great danger that policy toward the new regime will be plagued by assumptions and perceptions which are as unrealistic as those of the past two years. If this happens, the goal of preventing another Cuba will end up as did the goal of preventing an FSLN victory.

IV

Both the composition and program of Nicaragua's Provisional Government of National Reconstruction reflect its intent to lead a multi-class cooperative effort to rebuild a nation devastated by war. The challenge it faces is formidable; the task of reconstruction is mammoth and the political forces the government seeks to unite are diverse and inherently conflictual. The anti-Somoza coalition which forms the basis of the new government was held together only by its opposition to the dictatorship. As the contending political groups marshal their forces and forge their alliances for future battles, the provisional government will become a focal point for the inevitable conflicts generated by the dual processes of economic recovery and political renovation.

The new government's executive is a five-member junta appointed on June 16, 1979 by the FSLN and the National Patriotic Front. With two radicals, two moderates and one left-wing social democrat, the junta is the delicately balanced result of intense negotiations within the anti-Somoza camp. It includes only one Sandinista, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, a veteran member of the FSLN and currently a Tercerista representative on the FSLN's National Directorate. The other radical, Moisés Hassan Morales, heads the United People's Movement (Movimiento Pueblo Unido—MPU), a grass-roots community organization of students, workers and urban poor. The junta's moderates are Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of the martyred editor, and Alfonso Robelo Callejas, former head of the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise, Nicaragua's largest umbrella organization for the business community. Sergio Ramírez Mercado, a socialist academic and member of Los Doce, has already emerged as the informal

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leader of the junta because of his pivotal position between the junta's Left and Right.

The 18-member cabinet appointed by the junta is more moderate in composition than the junta itself. Most of its members are well-known professionals and business leaders, many drawn from Los Doce. Legislative authority is vested in a 33-member council composed of representatives from all the political, social and civic groups which participated in the anti-Somoza struggle. The council's composition is as delicately balanced between moderates and radicals as is the junta's.

The political and socioeconomic programs adopted thus far by the provisional government, with their essentially social-democratic thrust, reflect a political compromise between radical and conservative forces rather than a consensus for social democracy. Thus, the government's reconstruction program offers both a guarantee of private property and a promise of profound revolutionary social transformations, while remaining purposely vague on the limits of each.

The specific policies outlined are strongly developmentalist and redistributive. If the government is to meet its developmental goals (especially in the reconstruction period) while preserving the private sector, it must retain the cooperation of Nicaragua's bourgeoisie. Yet the government's redistributive goals will require a substantial shift of national income from the upper to the lower classes and significant state regulation of the private sector. As to how these two sets of goals are to be reconciled, the program of the provisional government is silent.

This is where the major political struggles of Nicaragua's future lie. As rebuilding commences, the provisional government must eventually confront the central issue of the Nicaraguan revolution: What is to be the pace and depth of social transformation? The way in which various political and social forces define their positions on this issue and vie with one another for control over the revolutionary process will define the political battles of the months to come. Before we turn to the specific issues around which these battles are likely to be fought, we must first survey the strengths and weaknesses of the contenders.

V

Throughout the insurrection, U.S. policymakers habitually referred to the nonsocialist opposition as "the moderates." Yet those so labeled actually span the political spectrum from unabashedly reactionary to left-wing social democratic. The most conservative elements remained in the Broad Opposition Front until the end;

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the more progressive deserted the FAO for the rival National Patriotic Front, formed after the collapse of the first mediation.

Because the moderates are so diverse ideologically, they are unlikely to constitute a cohesive political force. Now that Somoza has departed, the two major coalition organizations will probably dissolve, leaving the moderates fragmented in a welter of civic and business groups. Debilitated by years of *Somocismo*, it is doubtful that any of the old political parties survived the civil war as functioning organizations. Thus, the moderates' greatest political weakness in the post-Somoza period will be precisely what it was during the insurrection: the absence of any effective political organization or mass base of support. New moderate political parties may form, but they are likely to be as numerous as the ideologies to which the moderates subscribe.

The moderates are not without significant political resources, however. The upper class controls a substantial portion of the means of production and the middle class possesses important technical skills. The new government will need their cooperation in rebuilding the war-torn economy, and that fact will give them considerable influence over economic policy.

The other advantage enjoyed by the moderates is the support of the United States and the many Latin American governments which aided the anti-Somoza struggle. Nicaragua will need an estimated four billion dollars to recover from the devastation of the civil war, and these countries have pledged to provide substantial assistance. The United States, for one, has made its aid contingent upon the moderation of the new regime. Of course, having the backing of the United States is a Janus-faced asset for Nicaragua's moderates. If the United States should offend Nicaragua's heightened sense of national pride by demanding explicit policy concessions in return for aid, association with the United States could become as great an albatross for Nicaragua's moderates as it did for Cuba's 20 years ago.

Nicaragua's radicals are as diverse ideologically as its moderates, though they are better organized. United in their desire to see a socialist transformation of Nicaraguan society, the radicals differ on how to accomplish this, how rapidly to attempt it, and what sort of political system ought to result from it. The immediate goal of the FSLN, which is, of course, the preeminent group on the Left, is to maintain sufficient unity among its three existing factions to ensure an eventual transition to socialism. This will be no easy matter, for despite its March 1979 unity pact, the FSLN's internal differences remain sharp.

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As the most moderate FSLN tendency, the Terceristas will probably advocate continuing their earlier strategy of cooperating with nonsocialist elements; just as unity was necessary to depose Somoza, so, too, will it be necessary to rebuild the country. Of all the FSLN factions the Terceristas are most likely to uphold the moderate program of the provisional government, endorse gradual change and pursue an electoral road to socialism. A number of the leaders of this faction (including the legendary "Comandante Cero," Eden Pastora) are non-Marxist social democrats and radical Christians committed to pluralist democracy. Because the Terceristas were responsible for the FSLN's more audacious actions (e.g., the Christmas operation and the seizure of the National Palace), they are the largest and best known of the three tendencies. Yet their very heterogeneity could prove to be a liability.

The Prolonged People's War Tendency (GPP) and the Proletarian Tendency (TP) have undergone less ideological dilution. Both are avowedly Marxist and more likely to advocate an early transformation of the national revolution into a socialist one. The GPP, the larger of the two, has concentrated its political work among peasants in the north, and retains its commitment to the guerrilla army as a politico-military vanguard; the TP has focused on organizing the urban proletariat, and advocates the creation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. The war brought thousands of new recruits to both factions, but their leaders can hardly be certain of the ideological commitment of this augmented rank and file. Both factions will use the immediate future to consolidate. For the moment, however, all three are committed to supporting the program of the provisional government and strengthening the unity of the FSLN.

Despite its internal divisions, the political advantages enjoyed by the FSLN are enormous: a near monopoly of arms, organization, administrative control and popular legitimacy. The disintegration and defeat of the National Guard leaves the FSLN as the only effective military force in Nicaragua, and it will soon become the new national army. The FSLN is also the best organized political group in the nation, perhaps the only one with the capacity to mobilize mass popular support. Certainly it is presently the only one capable of administering the country.

Somoza's grip on the government was maintained primarily with patronage, and what remains of the administrative bureaucracy will be trusted by neither the provisional government nor the FSLN. Yet the first order of business for the new regime must be the restoration of order and the distribution of essential goods

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and services. The military structure of the FSLN appears to be the only apparatus available to take on these administrative tasks. Moreover, the FSLN has had three months of experience administering a liberated León. If it does become the de facto administrative apparatus of the provisional government, the junta will necessarily have to coordinate all its policy decisions with it.

But the FSLN's most important political advantage is the least tangible one: the legitimacy of the revolutionary regime rests with the FSLN because the Sandinistas made the revolution. The provisional government recognizes this full well. During the last days of the civil war, it made no important decision without first gaining approval by radio from FSLN commanders in the field. The prologue to the government's initial program is careful to note that it was approved by the FSLN. FSLN commanders such as Ortega, Pastora, Tomás Borge and Jaime Wheelock are already better known than any member of the provisional government. When teenagers in Nicaragua's cities held off the National Guard with hunting rifles, they called themselves Sandinistas, and when victory was won, the cheers and banners which filled Managua were the slogans and emblems of the FSLN.

Despite its divisions, the FSLN's virtual monopoly of so many essential political resources means that it will be decisive in resolving any serious political conflict. No conceivable coalition of other forces can outweigh it. Thus the basic dynamic of Nicaraguan politics in the near future will most probably be centered within the FSLN, in the debates among its three factions. The fortunes of the various moderate groups will depend largely on how their actions influence those debates—either reinforcing the Terceristas' arguments for gradualism or undermining them.

VI

The pressure on the provisional government to pursue a radically redistributive policy will be enormous. Apart from the radicalism of the FSLN, it must also contend with a politically mobilized and increasingly organized lower class whose grievances against Somoza were as much socioeconomic as political. Though first priority must go to the immediate problems of feeding and housing 500,000 refugees and reactivating the economy, Nicaragua's workers and peasants are not likely to tolerate having their economic demands deferred for very long. The government's calls for self-sacrifice will be heeded only if the populace perceives the sacrifice as egalitarian, and even that will require redistributive policies that may stir upper-class resistance. Given the promises of

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employment, housing, health and education contained in the government's program, the government appears to realize that it could not survive for long by presiding over a return to the socio-economic status quo. Nor is there any indication it would wish to do so.

We can predict with some confidence, then, that the policies of the provisional government will tend to favor Nicaragua's workers and peasants. Some of the moderates, no doubt, will accept that as unavoidable, absorbing the cost as the inevitable price for preserving the private sector. More conservative elements, however, are likely to see the class character of the government's policy as the first steps toward outright socialism. They would resist such policies, either individually or collectively, with the only weapon at hand—their control over the means of production. Some such resistance is almost inevitable.

The provisional government's response will depend upon the extent of the resistance. If it is restricted to a narrow sector of the bourgeoisie, it may pose no serious economic threat to the plans for reconstruction. At some threshold, however, the provisional government would be faced with very difficult choices. If it were to ease the pace of social reform in an attempt to restore business confidence, it might alienate the FSLN, forfeit its popular support, and thereby bring about its own demise. Yet the only alternative would be to neutralize the resistance of the upper class by depriving it of its control over the means of production—i.e., by suddenly initiating a rapid transition to socialism. The attendant economic dislocations would be considerable, but the broad state sector which already exists (administering Somoza's former holdings) would make this solution a feasible one.

Whatever the response of the provisional government, any significant upper-class resistance to the government's redistributive policies is likely to provoke a sharp radicalization of the revolution. A substantial redistribution of income is the minimum program for even the Terceristas, and resistance by the upper class will tend to reunify the FSLN around a more radical strategy. If the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie forces the FSLN to choose between its promise to respect private property and its commitment to social transformation, they will quickly become a class without a country.

The provisional government has one strategy it can pursue to minimize the sort of class conflict outlined above: it can use the proceeds of the "national patrimony" (the economic empire of Somoza and his cronies) to finance its social policies, thus satisfy-

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ing lower-class demands without endangering incentives for upper-class investment. The upper class would still have to bear heavy state regulation, but would probably perceive that as more tolerable than provoking a political crisis. There are already indications that the provisional government intends to pursue such a course; if it does so with any success, the Nicaraguan political equation will become a good deal more complex.

Given a consistent policy of social reform, the Terceristas will almost certainly hold to their current strategy of gradualism and multi-class cooperation. As long as that strategy is fruitful, the GPP and TP will probably mute their demands for more radical policies in order to preserve the unity of the FSLN, and because all three factions recognize the need for the private sector's cooperation in the task of reconstruction. This would not resolve the differences between radicals and moderates, but those differences would tend to be manifested over political issues rather than economic ones.

Unlike its economic program, the junta's plan for political reconstruction is unambiguous. It promises a series of elections over the next few years to choose municipal governments, a national legislature and finally a president. The program guarantees freedom of the press, speech and association, including the right to organize political parties irrespective of ideology. Two political issues are likely to emerge: (1) What should be the timing of the elections, and what impact will they have on the "momentum" of the revolutionary process? and (2) What will be the role of the FSLN?

The FSLN's current strategy is to press for a gradual broadening of redistributive policies and an eventual transition to socialism. The political strategy of the moderates will be to contain this process. One way to contain it would be to call for elections as early as possible, using the electoral interlude to regroup politically, divert and diffuse the radicalism of the masses, and possibly regain the political initiative from the FSLN. The FSLN's reaction to such a gambit is uncertain: the more moderate Terceristas would be most likely to accept the electoral challenge, but the GPP and TP could well advocate cancelling the elections altogether.

Assuming elections do get under way, how will the FSLN, a politico-military organization originally created to wage revolutionary war and establish a revolutionary regime, fit into an electoral democracy? As it becomes the new national army, how can its military role be reconciled with its role as one political

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party contending among many? If elections produce a particularly *un*revolutionary government, from whom will the FSLN-qua-army take its orders, the government or the FSLN's National Directorate? It is hard to imagine that Nicaragua's moderates will ever reconcile themselves to perpetual radical control over the armed forces. At some point, they will surely demand the depoliticization of the military. Yet it is even harder to imagine that the FSLN would acquiesce to that.

Despite many uncertainties as to the precise course of future events in Nicaragua, only two outcomes are at all likely. If the provisional government can successfully retain the support and cooperation of both the moderates and the Terceristas, the currently unstable social-democratic equilibrium can be consolidated. Nicaragua would then emerge with an electoral democracy, and the issue of whether radical redistribution gives way to gradual socialist transformation could be settled at the ballot box.

If the provisional government loses the support of either the moderates *or* the FSLN, the ensuing political conflict will move the revolution sharply to the left. In a "no-holds-barred" struggle with the radicals, the moderates simply do not have the political resources to prevail. The outcome would be a socialist transformation which would be neither gradual nor peaceful.

VII

Our ability to shape the course of Nicaragua's political future in ways congenial to U.S. preferences is severely limited, both by the suspicion accruing from four decades of U.S. support for Somoza, and by the nationalist dimension of Nicaragua's revolution. However, our ability to aggravate Nicaragua's political conflicts and demolish bilateral relations by a poorly conceived policy is virtually unlimited. There is a danger that the wishful thinking and selective perception which plagued U.S. policy during the insurrection will now be transformed into a "worst-case" mentality which sees in every progressive measure adopted by the provisional government evidence of "another Cuba."

In this regard, there are striking parallels between the current situation in Nicaragua and the situation in Cuba 20 years ago. In both countries, nationalism long frustrated by a history of U.S. political and economic hegemony burst forth in revolution, deposing a military dictator notable only for his brutality, corruption and friendship with the United States. Internal support for both revolutions transcended the boundaries of class and ideology, yet

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both triumphed by the military might of the opposition's more radical elements. Cuba's Provisional Revolutionary Government was no less moderate in its initial composition than Nicaragua's new government, and its policies were no more radical. Almost as soon as it came to power, Cuba's anti-Batista coalition began to disintegrate over the issue of how deep and extensive social reform ought to be. Buoyed by U.S. hostility to every reform measure, Cuba's moderates were intransigent in the belief that the United States would never allow their political defeat.

The irreducible truth of Cuba's revolution, however, was that it abolished the ability of the United States to dictate Cuban reality. A policy of hostility toward the revolutionary government effectively disarmed and isolated Cuba's political moderates, and their resistance to social reform produced social revolution. More significantly, U.S. economic sanctions and military threats forced Cuban socialism, on pain of extinction, to align itself with the Soviet Union.

The deterioration of U.S.-Cuban relations was rooted in the U.S. response to both peripheral and fundamental issues.[2] The peripheral or "indicator" issues were events that U.S. policymakers interpreted (often mistakenly) as indicating that the Cuban government was irredeemably radical and anti-American. The trial and execution of several hundred *Batistiano* police and military officials was the first event of this sort. The second was Cuba's determination to broaden its diplomatic and trade relations to include socialist countries. Neither of these policies posed any real threat to U.S. interests, yet the United States reacted acrimoniously to both.

The fundamental issue which generated U.S.-Cuban hostility was the unwillingness of the United States to accept with equanimity the redistributive social reforms adopted by the revolutionary government. To be sure, such reforms damaged the interests of U.S. investors in Cuba, but they did not damage the *national* interest. The only serious threat to U.S. national interests came when Cuba sought the protection of the U.S.S.R. in the form of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

A reenactment of the mistakes made by the United States in its relations with Cuba could easily lead to a similar disintegration of relations with Nicaragua. In the immediate future, bilateral relations will revolve around six issues: (1) the trial of Somocista

[2] See Lynn B. Bender, *The Politics of Hostility: Castro's Revolution and United States Policy*, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University Press, 1975.

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officials; (2) Nicaragua's establishment of relations with the socialist bloc; (3) the extent of Cuban aid to Nicaragua; (4) the U.S. reaction to the pace of Nicaraguan social change; (5) the conditions imposed by the United States on its reconstruction aid; and (6) Nicaragua's policy toward guerrilla movements in Honduras and El Salvador.

The first three of these issues are peripheral; none of them will give any valid indication of Nicaragua's future course, and none should be allowed to damage U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. Given the ferocity and brutality with which the National Guard waged war, the trial of certain officials as war criminals is not unreasonable. Indeed, it may be the only way to avoid a wave of personal vendettas. If the trials exhibit an honest effort to ascertain the facts, and if the punishments fit the crimes, the United States should not view the trials as human rights violations. Similarly, the establishment of normal diplomatic and trade relations between Nicaragua and the socialist countries should not be interpreted as hostile or detrimental to U.S. interests. It is simply the natural policy for a nonaligned country.

Nicaragua's relations with Cuba, however, may prove to be a more volatile issue. Cuba has already agreed to provide the new Nicaraguan government with substantial aid, including not only supplies but medical and educational personnel as well. The herculean task of reconstruction makes the provisional government hard-pressed to reject help from any quarter. Nicaragua's acceptance of Cuban aid may prompt vociferous denunciations from Somoza's supporters in Congress, but U.S. policymakers would be well advised to pay less heed to such voices than was paid to them during the insurrection. Cuba's assistance to the new government will be no more decisive for Nicaragua's future than Cuba's modest aid to the rebels was decisive in the victory of the revolution.

The fundamental issue for future U.S. relations with Nicaragua will be precisely the same as it was for relations with Cuba: How will the United States react to fundamental social change? At the outset, the United States should recognize that there will inevitably *be* such changes and they will be, at a minimum, radically redistributive. Such reforms will not *necessarily* be the precursors of a socialist transformation, and it would be a mistake for the United States to oppose them as such. Indeed, whether redistribution gives way to elimination of the private sector will depend in part on how the United States responds. A policy which is tolerant, even supportive, of social change would be in the best

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interests not only of the Nicaraguan people but of the United States as well.

If, despite U.S. urgings, the Nicaraguan revolution becomes a socialist revolution, the precepts of nonintervention and tolerance of ideological pluralism will face their most stringent tests since the 1970 election of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende. A reflexive policy of hostility might be domestically popular and viscerally satisfying, but it would probably have as little effect as the sanctions directed against Cuba in the 1960s. Moreover, a close examination of U.S. interests suggests that a policy of staunch hostility would be counterproductive. Even if Nicaragua adopts a socialist model of development, i.e., becomes "another Cuba" domestically, it does not follow inexorably that it would become "another Cuba" in its foreign alignments. Given the paucity of Nicaragua's natural resources and of U.S. investments there, the principal threat to U.S. interests is not socialism in Nicaragua, but a Nicaragua closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Coexistence with a socialist Nicaragua might not be pleasant for the United States, but it would be a good deal less damaging than driving Nicaragua into the Soviet camp.

As Nicaragua's revolutionary process unfolds, there will be a great temptation for the United States to use its reconstruction assistance as leverage to ensure moderation. There is also grave danger in this. Since it will be politically impossible for the provisional government *not* to pursue a vigorous program of social reform, U.S. pressure to the contrary can only inflame Nicaraguan nationalism without slowing the pace of change. Indeed, it would make more fundamental change all the more likely. A threatened withdrawal of U.S. aid is not even apt to deter a socialist transformation if Nicaragua's internal politics become so polarized that the FSLN adopts that course. In such a situation, any U.S. Administration would face tremendous domestic political pressure to retaliate with a cutoff of aid. A thoroughly radicalized Nicaraguan government would then have little choice but to turn to the socialist camp for economic assistance.

To avoid the pitfalls inherent in any attempt to use reconstruction assistance as an economic bludgeon, U.S. policymakers should remove the temptation altogether by establishing, in cooperation with other donors, a multilateral aid fund under OAS administration. What little we would lose in economic leverage would be more than compensated diplomatically by diminishing Nicaraguan suspicions of U.S. intent.

One strategic concern of U.S. officials is that a radical govern-

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ment in Managua will embark on a campaign of exporting revolution to its Central American neighbors. This fear for the security of the conservative military regimes in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala is a realistic one, but its formulation betrays a distressing myopia. Nicaragua may well provide sanctuaries and even limited arms to guerrillas from Honduras and El Salvador, just as Costa Rica provided such assistance to the anti-Somoza opposition. For Nicaragua's new leaders to do otherwise would be for them to turn their backs on their own revolutionary experience.

Nicaraguan sanctuaries and arms, however, will not produce revolution in Honduras or El Salvador. If Cuba's experience in the late 1960s proved anything, it proved that revolutions cannot be exported—they are invariably domestic products. Yet the example of Nicaragua's revolution will surely stimulate opposition to military dictatorship, not just in Central America but throughout the Hemisphere. It is truly unfortunate to find U.S. policy still focused narrowly on how to ensure the stability of such regimes by insulating them from the political fallout of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The value of stability is not inherent; it depends on the quality of the society over which stability reigns. The fear of "another Cuba" has caused the United States to lose sight of this truism in the years since the Alliance for Progress faltered and died. Coming so soon in the wake of Iran, the Nicaraguan revolution ought to have reminded us that stability enforced by bayonets is fragile indeed. Yet one has the uneasy feeling that, instead of searching for a way to replace the Hemisphere's military dictatorships short of violent upheaval, U.S. policymakers are already narrowly preoccupied with preventing "another Nicaragua."

VIII

Twenty years ago, the United States and the newly victorious government in Cuba faced one another with mutual suspicion and latent hostility. Certainly, both parties contributed to the spiralling process of animosity which ensued. Yet it is equally certain that the United States could have done much to avoid the deterioration of relations simply by being more sensitive to the nationalist and reformist aspirations of revolutionary Cuba.

Today, the United States faces another revolutionary government and again there are mutual suspicions and uncertainties. Relations have begun on a more solid footing because the United States joined the anti-Somoza forces before the proverbial train

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left the station, but we were still the last aboard. Thus far the United States has opted for a constructive "wait-and-see" policy which promises to judge the new Nicaraguan government on the basis of its actions rather than on U.S. preconceptions. Yet there is still the danger that such judgments will be colored by unrealistic expectations of how the new regime ought to behave.

The changes pending in Nicaraguan society are major ones, and they will probably be less incremental than the United States would like. They will engender sharp debate in Nicaragua, and probably political conflict as well. The most conservative forces, the forces with which the United States feels the greatest kinship, are not likely to fare well in these debates. Their future depends upon their willingness to accommodate themselves to a new Nicaragua in which their political might and economic muscle are no longer as potent as they once were.

The United States faces a similar dilemma. If "another Cuba" means a regime less pliant to U.S. interests, Nicaragua has already become another Cuba. If "another Cuba" means a radically reformist regime which puts the interests of the general populace ahead of the interests of the upper classes, Nicaragua will almost inevitably become another Cuba. If these are the facets of Cuban reality to which the United States objects, the prospects for friendly U.S.-Nicaraguan relations are dim indeed.

Yet neither of these prospects threatens the vital interests of the United States. Neither leads inexorably to a Nicaragua aligned with the Soviet Union, which is after all the sort of "another Cuba" which the United States ought to be most concerned about. The linkage between internal reform and external realignment toward the U.S.S.R. is likely to be forged only by U.S. hostility to the domestic changes wrought by Nicaragua's revolutionary process. That, at least, was our experience with Cuba. If the United States responds to change in Nicaragua with support, or at least tolerance, we can still avoid repeating the sorts of errors that proved so strategically costly 20 years ago. To do otherwise is to *invite* another Cuba.

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William G. Hyland

BREZHNEV AND BEYOND

The Brezhnev era is clearly ending. This October he will mark his fifteenth year as the head of the Party, a span at least four years longer than Nikita Khrushchev's official term. In December, he will be 73 and next spring he will, if he holds on, pass Stalin as the oldest Soviet leader ever to hold the top Party position. He has already established the precedent of being both chief of state and Party leader; he has matched Stalin in being promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union. By almost any standard, the past 15 years have to be regarded as his "era." Now the advancing age and physical infirmities of the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party suggest that a presuccession period is under way and that the process of summing up the Brezhnev period can begin.

When Khrushchev was overthrown in October 1964, Leonid Brezhnev was the leading candidate to survive the hazards of Soviet politics and come to dominate the leadership. Although some observers grouped him with President Nikolai Podgorny and Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in a new triumvirate, Brezhnev was in the advantageous position of Party leader. Other contenders along the way—Alexander Shelepin and Pyotr Shelest, the Ukrainian Party leader—were eventually removed; and even his supposed old comrade Podgorny was roughly pushed aside in 1977 so that Brezhnev could acquire the unique position of government and Party leader. But much earlier, perhaps by 1970, Brezhnev was clearly in a commanding position. And he seems to have succeeded on a program that might be called conservative or orthodox.

What Brezhnev has achieved has been a restoration of the *status quo ante* Khrushchev: he has strengthened the conservative elements in the power structure; the Party bureaucracy has been stabilized; and the military and the security organs have gained in authority. He has carefully avoided the experimentation of structural reforms in the economy despite pressure to adopt new

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approaches. Economic performance has not been impressive but nevertheless has been satisfactory in meeting the regime's priority of military growth.

His foreign policies have lacked the flamboyance of Khrushchev's and this has tended to soften Soviet defeats (e.g., Egypt). The overall theme has been one of persistence: building Soviet power in the Far East to counter China, playing the card of détente with Europe and the United States. Taking advantage of a decade and a half of turmoil and upheavals in the West, Brezhnev has relentlessly invested in Soviet military growth and in recent years has reached out for new strategic advantages in Africa and Southeast Asia. He will pass on a stronger legacy than he inherited: the U.S.S.R. is truly a global superpower, with near-term opportunities and significant geopolitical strengths.

II

Most of the characteristics of the Brezhnev regime emerged during the first few years after the coup against Khrushchev in 1964. In a fundamental sense, any anti-Khrushchev cabal—with or without Brezhnev—was bound to react against the Khrushchevian policies and, in particular, against what seemed to be his excesses. He had kept the Soviet Party and government in a state of turmoil for the seven years after his impressive defeat of the Molotov-Malenkov "anti-Party" group in 1957. Sputnik diplomacy, threats against Berlin, the split with China, the Berlin wall, the Cuban crisis followed in dizzying succession; simultaneously, the First Secretary railed against Stalin, insisted on reducing the size of the army, reorganized the economy, split the Party into industrial and agricultural sections and proclaimed a Party of the "whole people," offered a new Party program, removed Stalin from the mausoleum and insisted that he would build "communism" by 1980.

The period cried out for retrenchment. But there were also major dilemmas. Khrushchev unleashed political forces that could not be easily checked: a greater liberalization in the arts, some leeway for ideas on economic reform, a threat to the traditional priority for heavy industry, and, most fundamentally, a pervasive anti-Stalinism. The new regime could not simply put all of these genies back into the bottle. Moreover, anti-Khrushchevism bound together a small coalition in 1964, but it did not guarantee a consensus on an alternative program. There were diverse interests in the coalition; some could be reconciled; others required confrontation. The balance between conciliation and confrontation

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ultimately reflected the policy choices of the party leader, for if there was one overarching element it was the desire to reestablish a central authority and discipline. In the Soviet system no institution other than the Party could fill the role.

Thus, it was not surprising that the revival of the Party's primacy became a hallmark of the Brezhnev era. The potentially explosive division of the Party into contending agricultural and industrial factions was quickly ended. Khrushchev's projected rapid turnover of Party leaders at all levels was put aside and then reversed so that the older comrades could take some comfort in their tenure and job security. The Party of the "whole people" was quietly forgotten. Power was drawn gradually back toward the Moscow center. And the trend was symbolized by a revival of the terminology of the old days: Politburo for Presidium, General Secretary for First Secretary. The Party apparatus was making a comeback and Brezhnev was leading it.

Since bureaucracy thrives on defined hierarchies, orderly procedures and a commitment to the status quo, there is little room for ideological innovation. Indeed, innovation is the plague itself. Thus, it was to be expected that little new would be added to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism. The participants in the XXIII Party Congress (1966) would find the proceedings of the XXV Party Congress (1976) quite familiar; they could speak in the same idiom, from the same vantage point; indeed, they were, to a great extent, the same people.

If there was a symbolism in the early years of the Brezhnev period, it was the fact that in February 1966, on the eve of the XXIII Party Congress, a significant anniversary went almost unnoticed: the tenth anniversary of the XX Congress and Khrushchev's "secret" speech denouncing Stalin. It was given a passing reference here and there but evoked no ringing reconfirmation. In fact, the same XXIII Party Congress in effect settled the issue of Stalin: he was neither the total villain of the Khrushchevian period nor the putative hero of the brief rehabilitation of 1964-65. In what came to be the typical style of the new regime, a middle ground was found that left the issue ambiguous. One might cite Stalin's leadership during the war. But one could still criticize the "cult of personality," as long as the indictment was not broadened to criticize the "period"—which, of course, would raise questions about the legitimacy of the very people who had risen to positions of power during those years. (Brezhnev had been a candidate member of Stalin's last Politburo.)

Stalin is no longer in the mausoleum. His bust sits slightly to

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the left, a historical curiosity too prominent to be ignored, not commanding enough to reawaken the terror, but still a chilling reminder of what the system could produce.

If the limited rehabilitation of Stalin was a bitter blow to the Khrushchevites, a more definitive reversal was the systematic repression of dissent in the cultural and artistic community. It was Khrushchev who made Solzhenitsyn famous by permitting his novella *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch* to be published in *Novy Mir*. The new regime indulged in no such quirks of experimentalism. It moved in the opposite direction: the arrest and trial of Andrei Sinyavskiy and Yuli Daniel in February 1966, a shocking and disturbing reminder that the state organs could and would still be used harshly and drastically.

The conservative-orthodox revival was also gradually extended to the Soviet economy. Khrushchev left a little-appreciated gift: a fine harvest (following, of course, a disastrous one in 1963). This created a short period of grace in which priorities could be sorted out. Almost immediately the claimants began to contend. The economic reformers argued for greater rationality and profitability; the agronomists for massive investments; the military—though disputing among themselves about the nature of war—united to demand a large share of the pie; the heavy industrialists invoked the hallowed priority of "Group A"; and there was the unarticulated demand to raise the standard of living—which in a period of gradual economic slowdown could only be at the expense of other sectors.

Brezhnev had his own priorities, though he was careful to press them gradually: heavy industry would have to be the foundation, then defense, agriculture, and finally the people's well-being. He laid out this scheme on the anniversary of the 1917 October Revolution, over which he presided for the first time, in November 1964. After much twisting and turning, this is about how matters came out. For a time the economic reformers made a bid for influence in their proposals of September 1965, and Kosygin seemed their champion, but Brezhnev's commitment was always hedged. The reforms withered away.

For a brief time it seemed that defense was to be an economic casualty. The first Kosygin-Brezhnev defense budget included a 500-million ruble reduction, because of the "easing of the international situation," Kosygin claimed. Even Marshal Sokolovsky spoke vaguely of more cuts in the size of the armed forces. But this trend was checked and then reversed. By July of 1965 Brezhnev was warning against any savings at the expense of

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defense and Kosygin was echoing him. The trend was indeed toward an enlarged defense. The professional soldiers began to reappear: Marshal Zakharov as Chief of Staff; General Shtemenko, the brains of Stalin's general staff, rehabilitated in time for the Czech invasion of August 1968. Scarcely concealed debate on a wide range of military issues broke out, but it was a debate among hawks.

Brezhnev, with his ties to the military before, during and after the war, became their champion. (He had risen to Major-General during the war as a political commissar; in 1953-54 he was Commissar of the Navy and was later associated with the missile industries.) But he was too wily an operator to rest his political base on the thin reed of professional officers. There is little doubt he sought military support and institutionalized a new role by promoting his old comrade Marshal Grechko to the Politburo in 1973; but after the Marshal's death, he bypassed the professionals to promote Dimitri Ustinov to Defense Minister.

Brezhnev understood that Khrushchev had not been undone by his rough handling of a few Marshals but, more basically, by the perennial nightmare of Soviet agriculture. Khrushchev's quick fix of exploiting the virgin lands in the mid-1950s was a stroke of genius that temporarily produced real grain, not imaginary quotas; his lieutenant in the virgin lands had been none other than Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev knew enough about agriculture to recognize that he could not keep tinkering with the system; his approach was direct—more investment in agriculture, in fact, much more investment. His plan was announced in March 1965. He succeeded in slowing the decline, but good weather was, as always in Russia, the real arbiter; over the years Brezhnev has enjoyed somewhat more than his share, though the current bad harvest is an ominous reminder of Khrushchev's fate.

By the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution in November 1967, the transition had been made to the more prudent, orderly and consistent era of Khrushchev's successors. "Comrades," Brezhnev told the Party on that great occasion, "today our society combines the wisdom of maturity and the energy of youth." Maybe so. But clearly it was the wisdom of maturity that would be rewarded, not the energy of youth. The Party and its leadership were destined to grow old together. A decade later the top level of the political leadership was still largely intact, simply ten years older. The party's leading institutions had settled down, the turnover was embarrassingly small, and in 1979 over half of the "elite" was over 60 years old.

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The price of stability was the threat of stagnation. In the 1950s the economy grew at five to six percent. In the 1960s, the growth rate dropped to the neighborhood of four to five percent. And in the 1970s the growth rate continued to slide to around four percent with ominous predictions of one to two percent in the 1980s.

Similarly, the leadership has not been revived with new blood. Brezhnev was 45 when Stalin appointed him as a candidate member of the Politburo in 1952. (He was immediately removed after Stalin's death and made commissar of the Soviet Navy.) With Brezhnev soon to be 73, his nominal successor, Andrei Kirilenko, is slightly older; Mikhail Suslov, the grey eminence, is already over 75; the indestructible Kosygin is only a year younger. Two recent promotions seem deliberately intended to avoid promotions of younger leaders. Nikolai Tikhonov is the only first deputy premier of the Soviet government; he was appointed at age 74. And a new entry in the succession contest, Brezhnev's former aide, the Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, is 67. Thus, the class of 1964 that threw out their comrade and mentor is coming to its end—living testimony, however, that orthodoxy and stability pay off in a system which has long since lost its revolutionary fervor.

III

What can be said of the balance sheet? It could be argued that the period has been a disastrous one. The Soviet Union's most talented artists have been forced out. A generation of political leaders has been lost. Little has been done to prepare for the coming economic stagnation; the Soviet Union falls further behind the industrialized countries; the temporary political stability will be paid for in the currency of upheavals and struggles in the next period. Russia is encircled by enemies.

A better case can be made for the proposition that the Brezhnev era has been a highly successful one. The political situation has been stabilized on a middle ground between the various excesses of previous periods. The rise in the general standard of living has been impressive, especially by "socialist" standards. Internal political dissent has been relentlessly suppressed. And, above all, Russia has at last emerged as a great power of global proportions, at least the military equal of its principal adversary in the West.

A balance sheet of Soviet foreign policy is also a mixed one, but Brezhnev can point to some solid achievements. Khrushchev ran a gigantic strategic bluff and failed in Cuba in 1962. Brezhnev

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then set about accumulating real military power, carefully but constantly. And in the process he reshaped Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev's monument was the break with Mao. He forced it at every turn, challenging Chinese interests, disparaging Mao's philosophy and policy, refusing to run risks for China (in the Taiwan Straits), quarreling over politics and ideology, and finally pulling out the Soviet economic technicians and stopping military assistance. With Khrushchev gone, it was not surprising that Chou En-lai embarked for Moscow in November 1964 on a reconnaissance which, however, only confirmed that Khrushchev had articulated the fears of his comrades. A reconciliation was not to come from the new Soviet leaders. They eschewed Khrushchev's rantings, but gave the basic policy the real muscle of a military buildup along the frontier. Eventually, Soviet forces in Asia came to outnumber the Red Army garrisons in Eastern Europe.

The war in Vietnam might have been a cause worth bridging the differences for; but in practice it greatly aggravated the conflict between Moscow and Peking. Against this background the Czech crisis and the new doctrine that appeared in 1968 under Brezhnev's name suggested a Soviet right to intervene in China. A war scare in the spring and summer of 1969 dissolved into negotiations without Chinese preconditions—an initial Soviet coup; but in time the Chinese outmaneuvered the Russians and the talks stagnated. Brezhnev and his comrades then found themselves waiting for Mao to pass on. For a time in early 1977 they tested his successors, but without result. In the fall of 1978, the Soviets began to cement their ties to Vietnam and thus to apply new pressure on China. By early 1979 the relationship was slightly ambivalent; some signs of tactical flexibility appeared in Peking after the clash with Vietnam and the two sides are now groping for a new negotiation. But the basic fact is China's determination to rise to the ranks of a great power by the end of the century—the last thing a Soviet leadership can abide.

If the Soviet Union has failed to solve its eastern problem, it has made progress in the West. For years, Stalin, Molotov and Khrushchev insisted that the status quo in Europe had to be accepted and recorded in at least a symbolic act. This was the "fact" created by the Second World War. Stalin thought it had all been arranged; Khrushchev tried to force it through a crisis in Berlin. Brezhnev and company sought to achieve it by "détente," first in the treaty with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in August 1970, and then in the "Final Act" at Helsinki in 1975.

The irony was that even this ratification in the Finnish capital

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came at a time when the strict division of Europe was of less practical significance than the pan-European links that were appearing here and there. Rather than discouraging and weakening Soviet adversaries by nailing down the status quo, Helsinki began a process of change in Europe in which the Soviet Union held some high cards, but was by no means in command.

Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe continues and severe challenges do not appear likely. Yet there is a malaise in the relationship. The more liberal regimes—Poland and Hungary—continue to move gradually into positions that elude strict Soviet discipline. And all of the East European governments are forced by economic necessity to look increasingly westward. And, finally, in the more orthodox regimes—East Germany and Czechoslovakia—internal divisions seem to be always just below the surface. Overall, a modus vivendi seems to have been achieved since 1968, but it is an uneasy one.

The elusive nature of Soviet policy, however, is best demonstrated by the fluctuations in their relations with the United States. In 1964, when Khrushchev departed, there was still something of a "détente"; the atmospheric test ban of 1963 was supposed to be an opening move in a broader development of "peaceful coexistence." Brezhnev might have pursued it, but Vietnam intervened. The U.S.S.R. could scarcely proceed with serious negotiations while U.S. Marines were landing in South Vietnam. But by carefully containing its support for Hanoi and keeping lines open to Washington (e.g., at the Glassboro summit in 1967), Moscow managed to support Vietnam without paying any serious price in relations with the United States. Indeed, it was able to use the period to invest in a major arms buildup without provoking an American reaction. Nevertheless, in 1968 both Washington and Moscow were able to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty and plan for a summit, only to see it collapse as Soviet tanks rolled into Prague. But Vietnam also enabled Brezhnev to avoid paying a price for his Czech policy or his new "doctrine." Within a year, the old themes—a summit, arms control, European security—were revived. Indeed, in 1969 it was Nixon, not Brezhnev, who was criticized for stalling.

The détente that finally emerged, however, was rooted first in a rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow. The appearance in the fall of 1969 of the first Social Democratic government in Germany in 40 years was a watershed. At a time when tensions with China were growing, the offer by Willy Brandt to initiate a new Eastern policy was a major opportunity no Soviet regime

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could pass up. Initially the détente was limited to Europe, and tensions with the United States persisted. There were sharp clashes over the Middle East and Cuba, and not until after the Polish riots in December 1970 did the Soviets begin to move toward a more broadly based détente. The Brezhnev "peace program" was unveiled at the XXIV Party Congress in March 1971, which committed Brezhnev personally to a new line. The SALT deadlock was broken in May 1971, and after the secret Kissinger trip to China, the Berlin negotiations were quickly settled in late August, and a summit with Nixon was agreed upon and announced.

Despite the severe complication introduced by the mining and bombing of Haiphong, Brezhnev went through with the summit in May 1972, purging one of his anti-détente opponents (Pyotr Shelest) in the process. Of course, Brezhnev expected dividends. At a minimum he foresaw significant economic benefits, American credits and trade and participation in large developmental projects, especially in the Far East. He certainly hoped for a shading of American policy away from China, and repeatedly warned Nixon of the Chinese threat to both the United States and Russia.

What he achieved was well short of expectations. In Europe his détente seemed fairly firmly based, but one of its architects, Willy Brandt, disappeared. Coincidentally with Nixon's own departure (and partly as a consequence) the expected economic benefits from the United States were denied; then the attempt to patch up SALT was thwarted by a combination of new issues not resolved at Vladivostok, the intervention of American domestic politics and the U.S.S.R.'s own policy of interventionism in Africa.

As détente weakened and relations with China failed to improve after Mao's death, it must have appeared to Brezhnev and his colleagues by 1977 that what might be happening was a new form of encirclement. The relationship with Washington was strained by a new Administration that wanted to break with the policies of its predecessor, but chose not to challenge Soviet adventures in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and South Yemen. The Sino-Japanese talks finally made a breakthrough in 1978 and a treaty was signed with American encouragement. China was avidly pursuing European economic links, including arms supplies. U.S.-Chinese relations were proceeding toward normalization.

Brezhnev tried to break this trend by underwriting a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which had the aim of exposing Chinese impotence but ended with some question of Soviet willingness to run risks. On the other hand, the Vienna summit in June 1979 showed how far the policy of détente had faded as a counterweight

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to Sino-American accommodation. Brezhnev seems to have made little effort in Vienna to revive a relationship that went beyond the necessity of concluding SALT II. Leaving aside his health, the overall impression he and his colleagues created was one of extreme caution in avoiding the kind of commitment he had made in the early 1970s. The subsequent contention in the United States over the SALT II treaty almost certainly justified the hesitancy of the Soviet leadership to become too closely tied to an uncertain policy and to another American president.

While triangular relations have been in flux, the turmoil in the Third World has developed in a manner that provided setbacks as well as new opportunities for Soviet policy. The Middle East, of course, was the principal area of Soviet involvement, other than India; but Khrushchev's successors failed to consolidate the breakthrough he achieved. At first the Brezhnev group encouraged a new adventure in the 1967 War, which led to the humiliation of their clients. Then they abetted Egyptian rearmament and a confrontational program in the early 1970s, only to suffer a defeat by Israel in the semi-war of deep penetration raids in 1969-70, and then in 1972 a major humiliation in being evicted by Sadat (ironically because of Brezhnev's conciliation at the Moscow summit with Nixon, which convinced Sadat the Soviets would never deliver a negotiated settlement, or back a new attack). But the Soviets were back in the picture in the 1973 War, and despite their exclusion from the subsequent shuttle diplomacy and partial settlements, Moscow has managed to retain a position in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

But it was in Africa that the new breakthrough occurred. The United States was defeated in Angola in 1975—a partially self-inflicted defeat but one that nevertheless was a watershed for the Soviet position, which led in 1977 to new Soviet strategic footholds in the Horn of Africa. Cuban mercenaries were the new-found instrument. Coups in Afghanistan and in Yemen, whether windfalls or careful orchestrations, were in any case important if temporary gains, magnified by the removal of the Shah. By 1978-79 the red star seemed in the ascendancy and Washington perceived an "arc of crisis," also magnified by the energy crisis and the aggressiveness of OPEC.

Underlying all of these episodes was a hard, irrefutable fact. The Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev had step by step increased its military position to a point where the balance of power, for decades dominated by the United States and its allies, was in danger of shifting to the U.S.S.R. One raw fact demon-

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strated what was occurring. The Soviet Union was still putting over ten percent of its entire economic effort into the military, and, according to the CIA's latest estimate, its defense spending in 1978 was $44 billion more than that of the United States.

There was no way around the fact that a consistent commitment at this general level for over more than a decade would not only pay off in the near term but would create a base for continuing expansion. Leonid Brezhnev would leave his successors some major ambiguities in his dealings with the West, a legacy of bitterness and suspicion in his dealings with China, and a number of openings elsewhere that skillful Soviet handling might turn to permanent gains. But above all he would pass on an inheritance of military power unrivaled in Russian history since the days when the Czar strode into Paris at the end of the long march from Borodino.

How will Brezhnev's successors handle this legacy?

IV

In one sense the succession has already begun, as Brezhnev probably limits his involvement in daily affairs. But the succession period proper is likely to be a prolonged one with at least two phases.

The first phase should be an interim settlement. The fact that the members of the top layer of the Politburo are of roughly the same age means that the decline and eventual disappearance of Brezhnev will leave the remaining members increasingly in charge as a kind of corporate board of elders. The current favorite to succeed Brezhnev is Andrei Kirilenko, a man whose career has been so routine as to defy political characterization. Other than the fact that he has survived and prospered under his old colleague Brezhnev, it is difficult to add much to Kirilenko's formal credentials: a Party man, rising out of the Ukrainian apparatus, blessed by a stroke of luck in being associated with Brezhnev in the Dnepropetrovsk Party machinery. For about a decade he is thought to have been the "second" secretary, filling in behind his boss, taking up the slack in administrative chores.

The point about Andrei Kirilenko is that, at age 73, he scarcely qualifies as the solution to the succession problem. Even if he is in fairly good health, it is difficult to visualize him as the leader for more than a few years. It is also difficult to conclude that Kirilenko could dominate a politburo that includes Kosygin, Suslov, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Andropov. It is simply not feasible for him to overawe or overpower this Politburo of senior officials. More likely

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would be a form of collective leadership, which is inherently unworkable in an authoritarian system with a strong tendency toward centralization. In any case, it is unlikely that this group will repudiate its own record and launch radically new policies.

A second succession is certain to take place, though it may be more of an evolution than an abrupt shift. As the aging Politburo gradually disappears, replacements will be made; at first the collective will make decisions on personnel, but second-echelon appointments will increasingly be made by the first or second secretary.

Before 1985 a new leader will probably emerge, still within the formal framework of the collective leadership, and probably someone who presently occupies a position in the Soviet elite—if only because the system works against rapidly rising dark horses. Who will it be? The general requirements would be an official serving in the center in Moscow, with experience mainly in the Party rather than the government, probably including service in the secretariat, and some experience in directing a major Soviet Republic, or at least a large oblast or subdivision therein. Possibilities among the current crop would be Gregory Romanov (56), the first secretary of the Leningrad Party; Vladimir Shcherbitskiy (62), the leader in the Ukraine; Peter Masherov (60), the leader of the Byelorussian Party; and two members of the current secretariat: Vladimir Dolgikh (54), who specializes in industry, and the youngest and newest member of the hierarchy, Mikhail Gorbachev (48), an agricultural specialist from Stavropol. While the Kremlinologist could make a few deductions about the policy preferences of this group, they are in reality largely unknown, especially compared to Brezhnev and Kosygin when they took over in 1964.

But does it matter who emerges? A cold-blooded analysis of Soviet history might conclude that "objective" factors determine the trends, but one cannot help but feel that individuals do matter. Suppose Stalin had been shot in 1934 and Kirov had lived. Or suppose Zhdanov had not died in 1948, but had survived Stalin. Suppose Frol Kozlov had not suffered a stroke in 1963, and, instead of Leonid Brezhnev, had been the coup leader against Khrushchev. Or one could speculate on what might have happened if Molotov and Malenkov had defeated Khrushchev in 1957. Personalities do have an impact, but our problem is that we cannot really divine the nature of that impact. Certainly Khrushchev was not a good candidate for leading a de-Stalinization drive. And some very important Kremlinologists dismissed Brezhnev in 1964.

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Nevertheless, the "second" succession will be more than a shifting of Central Committee clones. In the 1980s we will finally arrive at what could be described as a generational change. The man who takes charge will certainly never have known pre-revolutionary Russia and probably not even the pre-Stalin Soviet Union. All of his education in secondary schools will have occurred during the Stalin period and his higher education after World War II. He might have been about 15 to 20 years old at the end of the war. Most of his adult political career will have been after Stalin's death, and his more significant Party or government assignments will have been in the post-Khrushchev period. The political characteristics of this generation can be the subject of extensive sociological speculation. But the central point is that two successions will create a tendency toward political turmoil as the new internal power balance is worked out. True, the succession will occur in circumstances of greater stability compared to the death of Stalin and the coup against Khrushchev—both of which created an atmosphere of crisis. But after a period of relative steadiness under Brezhnev, a period of change seems highly likely.

The economic situation will be basic. No analysis foresees a bright outlook. A slowdown in general economic growth in the 1980s seems virtually certain. The dispute among experts is really over the rate of slowdown, rather than the general trend. And the causes are fundamental: a declining labor force, declining productivity and diminishing and more expensive resources.

Basic solutions are therefore called for. One way out is the revival of economic reforms to decentralize decisions and create new incentives, which could have a major impact on the quality of Soviet output and on overall efficiency. This, of course, has been obvious for well over a decade. But it has been resisted on political grounds. Given a new leadership probably somewhat unsure of its mandate and its political base, the likelihood of a round of economic-political experiments seems quite remote. If so, the economic crisis could worsen.

Among the other options, cutting back on defense is the one most intriguing for outside observers. There are some misconceptions about the pressures created by high defense spending. In the current SALT II debate, the idea has become current that the Soviets are up against a threshold which will not allow much more defense spending. But we are dealing with fairly wide margins of possible error in U.S. estimates of Soviet defense expenditures. The United States officially estimates that about 11 to 13 percent of Soviet gross national product goes into national

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defense, but even this two-percent spread allows a margin of about 10 billion rubles. Moreover, strategic attack accounts for only about 10 percent of the defense budget. So an increase of five percent in the overall budget could be turned into an increase in spending for strategic attack of 50 percent! Thus the Soviets could make a substantial strategic impact with only a slight burst in spending. And given expenditures for research and development that exceeded the United States by $100 billion in the past decade, the U.S.S.R. has a solid base to draw on.

Nevertheless, the defense share will loom as too inviting a melon to be ignored by the Politburo when resources become scarce and expensive, and there is a demand for investment to revive growth. Any sector commanding high quality resources and over ten percent of the economy is a tempting target. But the costs of challenging the defense establishment are even greater than tinkering with reforms. What new leader would try to consolidate a bid for power on a platform of reducing defense? True enough, both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, for brief periods, did take that position. In Khrushchev's case he kept toying with the defense establishment, but Brezhnev eventually unleashed it. Given the respective political fate of each, a successor is not likely to take on the added burdens of a quarrel with the military. The most we could expect would be limiting its growth to somewhat slower rates, which over time, of course, could have some significance.

In short, one can foresee a leadership more or less tied to conservative elements, doomed to maneuver within narrow limits, caught up in an economic crisis but unable to adopt policies that would constitute a decisive solution.

In such circumstances, a new leadership might be tempted to make up for its domestic problems with foreign successes. Certainly, the paradox of the U.S.S.R. is that it has created enormous military strength, but has not been able to translate this strength into permanent political gains—either through confrontation or détente. Reflecting on the 1970s, it may be that a new leader will conclude that his predecessors were too timid, too hesitant or too erratic. After all, the Soviet Union could insist on certain "rights" as a superpower; but the situation that actually evolved in the 1970s found the U.S.S.R. faced by a tentative alliance of all the major power centers: Europe, America and Japan holding the key to much-needed technology, and all three developing lines to China, the U.S.S.R.'s "main" enemy.

A new leader may conclude that the Soviet Union should indeed claim its place in the sun. Unaffected by the World War

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II experience and only vaguely aware of the period of Soviet weakness in the 1930s and 1940s, a new generation might be willing to press its claims with much less regard for risks, with greater persistence and determination but resting its policy on a solid foundation of military power. If, in fact, the United States and NATO do embark on a program of remedial military measures by the early 1980s and if China continues with its modernization plans, then there might be the added hazard that a Soviet leadership could also conclude that time was running out, and that the optimal moment for a geopolitical breakthrough had arrived.

This is not to say, of course, that the Soviet Union will seek war or act recklessly. Rather, the Soviet calculation of the balance of forces will probably seem favorable and a new leadership, perhaps younger and more vigorous, may have the imagination required to turn this calculation to the U.S.S.R.'s advantage.

Yet there are some factors working against the early emergence of such a policy. First, there is the likelihood that any new leadership, after the passing of the Brezhnev generation, will not have much experience in foreign affairs. For a time Khrushchev deferred to Molotov, and Brezhnev allowed Kosygin to conduct foreign affairs for a few years after 1964. But an inexperienced leadership will be only a temporary state of affairs.

A second and more fundamental inhibition will be the degree to which the Soviet Union is tied into the global economy. Present trends suggest that for a long period the U.S.S.R. will need to import technology, grain and perhaps even oil. The sources of technology—the United States, Japan and Western Europe—are also, of course, the main victims of any Soviet effort to establish a predominant global position. These countries thus will have it within their power to shape Soviet policy choices in a succession period, but only if they are prepared to go beyond a commercial policy and to regard their economic strength as a means of influencing the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy. And the United States must reexamine the aims of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson prohibitions against trade and credits.

Third, there is the probability that trends in strategic and regional military balances will be perceived by Brezhnev's successors in Moscow as progressively more favorable in the 1980s, so as to permit them ever greater freedom of action in exploiting local crises or opportunities, especially in the vital areas of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. If this should be the case, then the most difficult period for the West is still some years away (when

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the succession settlement may still be open). Unfortunately, those perceptions are being affected by American decisions taken *now*—whether in the growing debate over defense, or the fate of SALT II, or the question of economic relations.

And this raises one of the most difficult tactical problems: how to conduct Western policy in a succession period. Should we make concessions to Brezhnev to block more dangerous policies, or do we thereby contribute to the emergence of such policies? Or should we simply wait for a clear change in leaders? In 1953, Churchill sensed confusion and uncertainty in the Kremlin and began a campaign to bring the new Soviet leaders to the negotiating table; the Soviets were apprehensive and John Foster Dulles and President Eisenhower were skeptical and wanted to build up Western strength. It may be that a major opportunity was lost, and that the process could repeat itself.

The West is correctly concerned about growing Soviet strength and has begun what may be its own rearmament program. We are increasingly suspicious of promises of Soviet change in the distant future, and we cannot paralyze our policy by subjecting it to the vagaries of Kremlin politics. What we seem to face is the necessity of a dual policy: in the near term to strengthen our position in anticipation of a period of potential challenge in the early to mid-1980s (and perhaps thereby deter the challenge), but to leave open the option of accommodation that might prove attractive to a Soviet leadership that will face the fundamental internal problems that are certain to appear in the late 1980s.

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William Korey

THE FUTURE OF SOVIET JEWRY: EMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION

With the Polish partitions, czarist Russia acquired a Jewish "problem" which it sought then and in subsequent epochs to solve by a variety of often contradictory means, ranging from integration to repression. Czar Alexander III's principal adviser, Konstantin Pobedonostev, projected a kind of apocalyptic vision of the final resolution of the festering issue: one-third of Russian Jewry would perish; one-third would be totally assimilated; one-third would emigrate. The "problem" would vanish when Jewry ceased to be. If macabre, the formulation proved to be remarkably clairvoyant. The Nazi invasion brought about the liquidation of approximately one-third of Jewry inhabiting the Soviet Union. With the twin polarities of assimilation and emigration currently pulling at Soviet Jews, the likelihood of a Jewish future in the U.S.S.R. is exceedingly dim, probably nonexistent.

In the working out of that destiny, the United States has played and continues to play a key role. During the epoch of Pobedonostev's preeminence, the House of Representatives called upon the Administration to "exercise its influence with the government of Russia to stay the spirit of persecution as directed against the Jews," while Secretary of State James G. Blaine would formally justify American intervention in the internal concerns of Russia on the grounds that "the domestic policy of a State toward its own subjects" may be "at variance with the larger principles of humanity." Since 1869, when President Ulysses S. Grant first intervened on behalf of Russian Jewry, 11 Administrations have concerned themselves with the "problem." Today and for the immediate future, that concern, through the Jackson-Vanik Amendment tying levels of U.S.-Soviet trade to Soviet policies on emigration, ineluctably focuses upon the future of Soviet Jews.

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II

Roy Medvedev, writing in *samizdat* almost a decade ago, already noted the advanced state of assimilation among Soviet Jews. The largest number of Jews, he observed, "feel they are Russians" and retain only some "external features and family names" to recall their lineage. There was yet a second group of Jews, Medvedev found, "who want to maintain their national independence, their language and culture and, if we are talking about believers, then also their religious affiliation." But this group, his analysis disclosed, confronted "an extremely sad sight" resulting from the absence of any means for the preservation of Jewish identity. Forced assimilation of Jewry has been, of course, an objective of the Kremlin, especially since 1948. The obliteration of virtually all the ethnic-cultural institutions, along with the Jewish intellectual leadership (the execution of 23 people in Lubyanka prison on August 12, 1952), the rejection of all proposals for any kind of Jewish schooling, and the determined effort to suppress a specific Jewish consciousness—all had, to a considerable extent, reduced self-identity, except in selected geographical areas, to the mere awareness of the nationality listing, *yevrei*, on internal passports.

An indication of the extent of assimilation that had taken place by 1970 was the severe decline, as compared to the previous census, in the number of persons who reported themselves to the census-taker as Jewish. The decline was over 100,000—from 2,268,000 to 2,150,000. And, as compared with estimates of the size of the Soviet Jewish population, which ranged from two-and-a-half to three million, the number of Jews who refused to specify accurately their nationality ran into the hundreds of thousands. The census data further indicated a deepening degree of linguistic assimilation. Only 17.7 percent indicated that a Jewish language was their principal form of communication. It was the lowest percentage by far of any nationality in the U.S.S.R. And it would have reached a far lower level were it not for vigorous pockets of resistance in the Baltic and western borderland areas.

A third and final group of Soviet Jews, as seen by Medvedev in 1970, were those who "express a persistent desire to emigrate to settle permanently in Israel." While yet small, their numbers—the perceptive historical analyst cautioned—would mount if Soviet policy were distinguished by anti-Semitism. The latter, he wrote, was "the chief factor, and main reason for the rebirth of Jewish nationalism and Zionist tendencies in the U.S.S.R.," and "if we want the number of 'repatriates' not to be too sizable, we

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must change decidedly the position of all the Jews in the U.S.S.R., abolishing and prohibiting all the discriminatory measures regarding this national group."

Indeed, the dynamic that is propelling the current polarity of emigration (as well as that of an intensified assimilation) is an overt state-sponsored discriminatory policy which has struck at the central functional role of Jews in Soviet society. That functional role had been related to the scientific-technological apparatus. If Jews had been excluded since the mid-1940s from party and state leadership positions, from diplomacy, foreign trade, military affairs and any other security-sensitive fields, they nonetheless occupied a prominent position as specialists and scientific workers in the economy.

The 1970 census showed, for example, that 68 percent of all Jews in the Russian Republic were defined as "specialists" while only 19 percent of Russians were defined in this way. In the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Latvia, approximately 50 percent of all Jews were defined as "specialists," greatly outranking in this category every other nationality in these republics. Especially illuminating were data about Moscow's scientific community, which contained one-quarter of all "scientific workers" of the U.S.S.R. As of January 1971, approximately 11 percent of the Moscow scientific community were Jews—a striking figure. Nationwide, the same proportion stood at six percent.

What made possible the functional role of membership in the country's technological elite was a higher education system which, though circumscribed by quotas since the early 1940s, was nonetheless sufficiently flexible and open to talent to permit the entrance to Soviet universities of great numbers of Jews. The 1970 census showed that more than one-third of the Jews of the Russian Republic had completed a higher education while but four percent of Russians had attained the same. In the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Latvia, one-quarter of the Jewish community acquired a university degree, far exceeding the percentages of other nationalities inhabiting the respective areas.

The results were especially impressive at the highest educational level. As of January 1974, nine percent of all holders of the Candidate of Science degree—approximately similar to an American Ph.D.—were Jews, who numbered less than one percent of the entire population. In absolute figures, Jews were outdistanced only by Russians and Ukrainians. On the even higher level of Doctor of Science, 14 percent of degree holders were Jews. They were exceeded, in numerical terms, only by Russians.

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Higher education with the consequent entrance into the intelligentsia became a way of life for Jews. To realize this aspiration in Soviet society they were prepared, as an acute observer noted, to "sacrifice" their Jewish heritage and forego their "national distinctiveness." Frustration would be all the greater when the path to higher education was blocked. The result would be a personal and family crisis that was, in the words of the prominent Soviet writer and physicist Alexander Voronel, "tantamount to the loss of the meaning of life."

III

A fundamental change in Soviet policy toward Jews came about in 1967–68 as a consequence of both the Six Day War in the Middle East and reformist trends in Czechoslovakia and Poland which had stirred a sympathetic response among Soviet intellectuals. Poland's top communist ideologist, Andrzej Werblan, in a major essay published in June 1968, defined the character of the new policy by stating that Jews have a "particular susceptibility to revisionism" (i.e., reformism or liberalism) and to "Jewish nationalism in general and Zionism in particular." The formulation, with its finding of anti-communist diseases genetically inherent among Jews, was clearly racist; certainly it drew upon no classical Marxist tradition.

Werblan found that a "bad political atmosphere" flowed from a "concentration of people of Jewish origin" in universities and other cultural institutions. What was required was a "correction of the irregular ethnic composition" through discriminatory devices and ultimately—in 1969—expulsion of Jews, even the most assimilated, from Poland.

The Werblan thesis, even though applied to the Polish student uprisings in March 1968, was written on the "initiative" of the Soviet Party Central Committee in Moscow. This was revealed by a knowledgeable Polish dissident source at an academic conference last year. Poland was to be "the first laboratory of official anti-Semitism in the Eastern bloc," he added. The experiment would almost simultaneously find an echo in Moscow. Not surprisingly, the brilliant Soviet humanist, Andrei D. Sakharov, noted at the very same time as the publication of the Werblan article that the Soviet Academy of Sciences was beginning to apply anti-Semitism in its "appointments policy." Indeed, from the academic year 1968–69 onward the admission of Jews to Soviet universities began declining for the first time in Soviet history.

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From 111,900 enrolled Jewish students in 1968–69, the number fell to 105,800 in 1970–71. By 1972–73, it plunged to 88,500, and by 1976–77, to 66,900. In the course of an eight-year period, Jewish enrollment was down by an incredible 40 percent. Especially tight was the admission to Moscow State University. A highly knowledgeable source reported that no more than two to four Jews would be admitted annually to this flagship institution. In 1977–78 it was rumored that not a single Jew was admitted. At the prestigious university in Novosibirsk, a somewhat similar, highly restrictive policy also has prevailed. Jews are kept out of the best higher educational institutions, according to recent *samizdat* disclosures, by specially selected examiners who give members of this ethnic group unusually difficult oral entrance examinations in mathematics and physics.

At the postgraduate level, the effect of discriminatory quotas was even sharper—from 4,945 Jewish students in 1970 to 2,841 in 1975—well over 40 percent during a more compressed time frame. Professor Gregory Freiman, a prominent Soviet mathematician, has very recently provided us with details of how the discriminatory mechanism operates at the postgraduate level, including the bracketing of Jews into a distinctive group which is subjected to special handling and the assignment of much tougher questions to Jews than to non-Jews in examinations.

How far Jewish enrollment in higher education will plummet cannot be determined. A Soviet ideologist, Vladimir Mishin, in an important work published in 1970, justified limiting the number of students of each nationality in higher education to the percentage the nationality constitutes in the total population. This would suggest that fairly soon (perhaps already in the 1977–78 or 1978–79 university enrollment figures) the number of Jews will drop from 66,900 (about 1.4 percent) to approximately 44,000 to coincide with their percentage (0.9) in the population as a whole. (Such proportional representation deliberately excludes Russians, whose enrollment, both absolutely and by percentage, continues to rise.) But the deepening of bias against Jews flowing from the emigration process may push the quota limitation beyond precise percentages to a point verging on near-exclusion. Georgi Arbatov, a leading adviser to the Politburo, warned several years ago that pressure for emigration would place those "who want to stay [in the U.S.S.R.] in an unfavorable light."

The sharpening of quotas is already affecting future career opportunities for Jews. Prior to 1972, the number of Jews who entered the scientific-technological intelligentsia was two to three

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thousand a year. Since then it has dropped to about one thousand a year. The percentage of Jews in the intelligentsia has been cut in half from the early 1960s (from 11 to 5.5 percent). If absolute figures of Jewish participation in the technological elite continue to remain fairly high, it is because many are holdovers from a previous era. A striking feature of Jewish scientific workers is the fact that their average age is far higher—perhaps by as much as ten years—than the general average age of Soviet scientific workers.

Discrimination extends to top administrative levels in higher institutions and specialized research institutes. A secret 1970 Party directive discourages the employment of Jews at "responsible levels" in various closed and security institutions. Indeed, such institutions, Roy Medvedev revealed, will exclude even those listed as Russian in their internal passport but whose mother or father is Jewish.

But it is the drastic restriction in education that exerts the strongest impact upon Soviet Jews. The most frequently reported reason for emigrating that interviewers from the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) hear from refugees in Rome is the sharp limitation upon educational opportunities for Jewish children and young people in the U.S.S.R. A typical comment recorded by an HIAS official goes like this: "My son (or daughter) was refused admittance to the university or to a technical institute because he (or she) was Jewish. That is why we left."

IV

The new racism was not restricted to university admission and job opportunities. It entered into a massive propaganda program directed presumably against Zionism but which incorporated all of the basic anti-Semitic stereotypes. The assault was, in fact, upon Jewish tradition, Judaism and Jewry itself. Zionism, like "cosmopolitanism" in 1948–49, became the code word for Jewry, thereby legitimizing the new racism, spurring it forward and generating an atmosphere that augured an even more threatening future for Soviet Jews, including the potentiality of open violence.

The propaganda campaign was launched two months after the Six Day War. As reported in considerable detail in various published studies, the principal themes of that hoary forgery dating from turn-of-the-century czarist times, "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion," were distinctly recognizable in the vast outpouring of vituperation that would follow in newspapers, journals, books and on radio and television, and from lecture halls. What

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emerged from the calculated perception of Zionism is the enormity of the power and evil with which it is presumably endowed. Its power, as in the "Protocols," is cosmic, bordering on the divine, although a divine that is satanic in character. Diabolical and displaying transcendent conspiratorial and perfidious talents, Zionism strives for domination over all other peoples and nations in keeping with the Biblical "chosen people" concept. That concept, whether consciously or unconsciously distorted, was the centerpiece of the virulent propaganda drive.

The years 1977 and 1978 constituted both the apotheosis of the decade-old drive and the point of departure for an even more ominous future. On one level, the audience for the media campaign was increased to the fullest extent possible. Anti-Semitic volumes were published in massive editions two to three times the size of even the fairly large editions of previous years. Saturation of the media, including television programming, made the U.S.S.R. the world's principal center for anti-Semitic propaganda. On a second level, the campaign catered to and exploited the deepest public fears and traumatic memories of the Soviet public. Zionism was equated with espionage, war and even Hitlerism. On a final level, and most significantly, the campaign provided for the first time a Leninist rationale carrying the imprimatur of the prestigious Soviet Academy of Sciences. If the campaign, much of it Nazi-like, nourished bigotry among the populace, it also deepened fears and anxieties among Jews.

With the force of anti-Jewish discrimination buttressed by intensified and vitriolic propaganda, driving broad segments of Soviet Jewry toward emigration, it is scarcely surprising that Soviet Jews want to get out. Some 200,000 have already left, and the average monthly rate in 1979 of about 4,000 suggests that 50,000 will have emigrated by the end of the year. But these figures only touch the surface. Approximately 16,000 affidavits for exit visas have been sent *monthly* during this past year to Soviet Jews from relatives in Israel responding to the formers' requests. This first step in the emigration process emboldens the recipient and virtually predetermines an exodus after an indeterminate time period elapses.

The greatly stepped-up number of affidavit requests testifies to the distinguishing feature of Soviet Jewry today—a people on the move. Estimates place the total number of unused affidavits currently in Jewish hands in the U.S.S.R. at well over 300,000. Even if overstated—precision in estimates is impossible for reasons that are too complex to examine here—still the potential for

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emigration is vast. An important additional consideration is the possibility of a change in the Kremlin's attitude toward the "refuseniks" (that is, people who have been refused exit visas more than once). Should apparent promises, given in May 1979 to Australian Labor leader Robert Hawke, be kept—that rational procedures on exit visas will be established and that no one will be denied a visa after a five-year wait, even on security grounds—then a major bottleneck affecting the emigration process will be removed.[1] The stigma and torment of a refusenik's life, reinforced by uncertainty about ever being allowed to leave, have made even the most determined among Jewish scientists hesitant about applying for a visa.

V

Soviet policy toward the emigration of Jews is determined by a variety of factors only one of which is the intensity of the desire to emigrate. If the door for emigration was opened slightly in 1971 and even wider in 1972–73, it was due in large measure to other critical factors. The ardent Soviet pursuit of détente and trade with the West, especially the United States, was of decisive importance during those years, for it made the Kremlin take account of Western public opinion and pressure, which helped shape the context within which negotiations for détente and trade would take place. Since 1968, U.S. Administrations along with congressional sentiment—as in previous epochs—had made the treatment of Russian Jewry a serious concern of U.S. policy. While the impulse to emigrate within the U.S.S.R. was crucial, it would have found no outlet within a powerful totalitarian state unless the latter's external interests as well as other domestic interests were also satisfied by its fulfillment.

Lagging productivity rates within the U.S.S.R. enhanced the drive for détente and trade. The Soviet Union sought to acquire from the West large-scale advanced technology, including computers and electronics in addition to a variety of other goods and equipment, in order to achieve the objectives of its faltering economic plans. And the acquisition of these commodities required massive credits from the West, an aspiration which was ineluctably linked to the reduction of tensions which détente would bring about. Thus, a certain degree of Jewish emigration was finally allowed in order both to diminish a potentially explosive situation within the U.S.S.R. generated by a disaffected and

[1] As of summer 1979, no breakthrough has occurred in this area.

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alienated activism among various categories of Jews, and to pacify an outraged Western public opinion that would have certainly circumscribed and possibly even prevented negotiations for détente and trade.

Under circumstances of détente, Soviet trade-offs for perceived benefits, whether atmospheric or substantive, became possible, provided the costs to the Kremlin were not of a vital nature. The essential marginality of the Soviet Jewish problem is crucial here. The activist movement sought no internal change and therefore posed no challenge to the fear-ridden holders of Kremlin power. What the movement sought was the right to opt out of the Soviet system, which may very well have been supported by segments of the police apparatus who, like Werblan, sought to excise a perceived dangerously indigestible element from the body politic. If, initially, security organs feared that the Jewish exodus could exert some sort of uncontrollable domino effect upon other Soviet nationalities and, therefore, might have been inclined to exercise a restraining force upon it, experience over time would suggest that such fears were completely unwarranted. This may explain why emigration procedures have been eased in recent months.

While the Soviet authorities have, since 1971, accepted the principle of Jewish emigration, they have nonetheless imposed brutal and callous restraints designed to limit and manage the emigration process in order to soften any internal negative impact and increase potential benefits for the Soviet state. Eased emigration procedures, later effected, became a bargaining chip for realizing Soviet desiderata. The central issue was not the principle of emigration, but rather the harassment and intimidation that kept the rate of emigration low. The 1973–74 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, with its linkage of trade and credits to the removal of such obstacles, had precisely this objective in mind.

Its advocates assumed correctly that Kremlin policymakers always weigh the gains to be derived from a particular action against losses. In the case of the Jackson Amendment, the losses of currently available Jewish skills would be weighed against (and outweighed by) an increase in trade (through the granting of most-favored-nation tariff treatment) and, far more important, large-scale credits. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger acknowledged to the Senate Finance Committee on December 3, 1974, that the Kremlin had agreed to accept the Jackson Amendment. Assurances were given at the highest levels of both governments. And these assurances were made despite the fact that Soviet officials had repeatedly denounced the amendment as an intrusion

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into its domestic affairs. What wrecked this initial understanding was the Stevenson Amendment (to the Export-Import Bank Bill) which placed a ceiling of $300 million on credits to the U.S.S.R. over a four-year period.[2]

The Stevenson Amendment carried a seriously damaging provision, from the Soviet viewpoint. It stipulated that the U.S.S.R. could seek above-ceiling Eximbank credits, which might then be extended on grounds of a presidential declaration of national interest. But such action would also require congressional approval, and Senator Adlai Stevenson explained that approval would depend not merely upon eased emigration procedures, but upon Soviet moderation with respect to Middle East questions, arms control and force reduction talks. Any request for above-ceiling credits could subject Kremlin policy to interminable congressional debate with the outcome clearly uncertain.

On December 12, 1974, a Senate-House conference accepted the Stevenson Amendment (the House version of the Eximbank Bill had not carried the amendment). The Senate considered the conference report for several sessions, running until December 16. By then, there was little doubt that the amendment would pass. On that day, the Kremlin hastily assembled a one-day closed meeting of the Party Central Committee. It is reasonable to speculate that the then Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny led a strong attack upon the understandings reached between Washington and Moscow. He had earlier strongly warned that it would be "intolerably shortsighted" not to take "full account" of attempts at interference in "internal state policy." When Kissinger had been asked in his testimony whether Podgorny was among those who had given assurances on the Jackson-Vanik provisions, he had answered in the negative. (Leonid Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin were those mentioned by Kissinger as having taken a positive stance on the issue in various discussions with Presidents Nixon and Ford and himself.)

Two days after the Central Committee meeting, Ambassador Dobrynin met with Secretary Kissinger and, in a reportedly stormy session, lashed out at the credit ceiling. At approximately the same time, the Soviet news agency TASS issued a vigorous

[2] Kissinger rightly described the amount as "peanuts." Credits could be obtained elsewhere. Moreover, 1974 turned out to be a bonanza year for the U.S.S.R. As a result of the quadrupling of oil prices which the U.S.S.R., as an exporter of oil, could exploit advantageously, it ended the year with a rarely achieved surplus of one-half billion dollars in its balance of payments.

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denial that the Kremlin had offered any "assurances" regarding emigration. The two initiatives were undoubtedly designed to prompt vigorous Administration lobbying against the Stevenson Amendment. It was too late for a reversal in the House, as it had already accepted the conference report on December 18. The Administration made a last-minute desperate effort to halt the amendment in the Senate. But on December 19, that chamber also approved the conference report.

The failure to blunt the congressional drive for credit ceilings inevitably produced a hostile Soviet reaction. Beginning on December 21, 1974, the Soviet media mounted a vast propaganda attack not only against the Stevenson initiative but against the Jackson-Vanik legislation as well. The delicate balance of understandings reached with the Kremlin was apparently perceived as having been seriously tilted in a direction hostile to Soviet interests. Kissinger later commented: "I think what may have happened is that the Soviet Union looked at the totality of what it could gain in this trading relationship as against the intrusions in its domestic affairs." With the balance sheet seen as unfavorable, the U.S.S.R., on January 10, 1975, unilaterally scrapped the October 1972 trade agreement with the United States that had promised most-favored-nation status. The action in effect constituted a rejection of Jackson-Vanik. During the next three years, the emigration rate remained fairly low, running at an annual rate of about 15,000, half that of 1972–73.

VI

Specific current aspects of U.S.-Soviet détente throw light upon the acceleration of the emigration rate to its present level that began in mid-1978. Rapprochement between the United States and China, even as Soviet relations with China have worsened, no doubt has encouraged the Kremlin to seek to improve its political links with the United States and the West. Of great significance, too, for Soviet policy-makers is U.S. ratification of the SALT II agreements. The Kremlin, sensitive by now to the legislative processes in the United States, including ratification procedures in the Senate, could certainly be expected to enhance its public image by easing earlier emigration practices.

In recent months, the U.S.S.R. has resumed its pursuit of a much higher level of trade with the United States. The desire for most-favored-nation tariff status and trade credits ineluctably brings to the fore the Jackson-Vanik Amendment with its requirement of eased emigration procedures. While linkage between

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emigration and trade is the core of the amendment, flexibility in the application of the linkage principle is the key to avoiding a challenge to the self-esteem of a great power. The waiver provision appended to the amendment could become the focal point of such flexibility, for it does not obligate initially unrestricted emigration.

What is required under the waiver provision are assurances about future performance concerning eased emigration procedures. And to make certain that such performance is realized, the annual-review requirements of the waiver clause must be firmly upheld. It is also essential to restore the careful balance between costs and benefits initially contemplated in 1974 before the Stevenson Amendment was adopted. Insistence upon low and sharply restrictive credit ceilings is scarcely helpful in winning Soviet acceptance of the waiver provision's conditions. Senator Stevenson has recently proposed raising the ceiling to two billion dollars. While welcome, his related proposals would seriously weaken the purpose and effectiveness of the Jackson Amendment, most notably by changing the annual review to a five-year review, thereby striking at the critical issue of performance.

Weighing gains against losses is not only an activity that operates in the sphere of economics. It also applies to the area of world opinion. At stake is prestige and the image a government strives to project. In this context, the Helsinki Final Act takes on particular meaning. Its "Basket Three" provisions incorporate critically important standards with respect to emigration. Signatories are obligated to "deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family." Applications for exit visas are to be dealt with "as expeditiously as possible." The signatories are to ensure that the fees charged in connection with exit visas "are at a moderate level." Most vital is a section that goes to the heart of the question of harassment. Signatories are to treat exit visa applications in such a way that they do "not modify the rights and obligations of the applicant or of members of his family."

With the Madrid conference of the Helsinki signatories scheduled for November 1980, virtually on the heels of the Moscow Olympics (in which the U.S.S.R. has invested heavily for obvious cosmetic purposes), the Soviets would appear to be anxious to avoid the further tarnishing of their image. The Kremlin's earlier trials of Helsinki Watch Committee members and the imposition of harsh sentences upon them, most notably upon Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky, have aroused intense public anger. Criticism has centered on a fundamental abridgment of the Helsinki

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provision legitimizing the right of citizens of signatory powers to "know and act upon" their rights. Additional public airing of the violations of the Helsinki Final Act can be expected well before the Madrid conference, especially if the violations are egregious. Under the circumstances, continued Kremlin tolerance of a higher level of Jewish emigration is not unlikely.

VII

The Jewish people who are currently "on the move" are strikingly, if not unexpectedly (given the nature of Soviet discriminatory practices), comprised of the younger, more vigorous elements of the population. In 1975, for example, 49 percent of the emigrants to Israel were under 30, and 33 percent were in the 30-59 age bracket. In 1977, 50 percent were under the median age of 31. An analysis of the emigrants who came to the United States during 1978 shows that 27 percent were 20 and under, and almost 50 percent were between 21 and 50 years of age. (For the much smaller sample of 1977, the percentages were about the same.) Only 15 percent were 61 or older.

The contrast between these percentages and the age structure of Soviet Jewry reflected in the 1970 census is especially telling. Approximately 15 percent of the Soviet Jewish population is under the age of 20 (a percentage which is somewhat less than one-half of the same age bracket in the emigration group). And approximately 25 percent of the Soviet Jewish population is over 60, and therefore beyond "working age" (as compared with 15 percent of the emigrant population).

Even before the emigration of the 1970s began, Ivor T. Millman, a British specialist on Soviet demography, believed that Soviet Jewry was in "a state of physical decline." He based this on several considerations. First, 43 percent of Soviet Jewry was over the child-bearing age of 50 years (as compared with only 21.5 percent of Russians who were over 50). Second, because the Nazi genocidal program had been particularly oriented against Jewish children and women, the average age of Jews was generally and significantly higher than Russians. Third, Jews tend to marry later than Russians and Ukrainians, leading to reduced fertility rates. Finally, Jews have a lower reproduction rate than the overall Soviet population.

With the exodus of the younger, more vigorous element, the physical decline of the remaining Jewish population in the U.S.S.R. will be speeded up. Its numbers, as will no doubt be reflected in the 1979 census data when published, will be far

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smaller than the 2,150,000 of 1970. To those who have gone into exodus there must be added a sizable aging, fear-ridden group who will desperately strive to suppress all traces of Jewish identity by claiming that they are Russian. It may not be at all easy. The problem of internal passport identification cannot be effectively hurdled. And Soviet anti-Semites are not inclined to accept even the assimilated Jew. A leading Soviet hate-monger, Vladimir Begun, some months ago, was asked: "What is the future of the Jewish people, then? Assimilation?" He responded: "I don't believe in assimilation. There always remains something Jewish in a Jew anyway." When queried as to what Jews should do, Begun replied: "Live quietly and that's it."

The unusually variegated Soviet Jewish community will have become rather extensively homogenized, largely Russian. The bulk of the Jewish population from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia have left and the beginning of significant inroads have been made among Bokharan and Dagestani Jews. Considerable Ukrainian Jewish emigration has also developed. Most of those who remain will reside in Moscow and Leningrad, with sizable numbers in Kharkov and Kiev. The Jewish autonomous region of Birobidzhan will become an increasing anomaly with less than a five percent Jewish population.

With the large-scale exodus of Baltic and, to a lesser extent, of Western Ukrainian and Moldavian Jews, the percentage of Jews speaking Yiddish (and daring to tell the census taker) is certain to drop to a very modest figure of perhaps five. (That was the percentage in Leningrad in 1970; the figure was slightly higher in Moscow.) Remaining Yiddish publications and repertory groups will largely be designed as showcases for foreigners, certainly not for a viable Jewish culture. Since the base of the Jewish population and especially of its Yiddish-speaking element will have shrunk, the authorities will all the more reject any call for restoration of Jewish cultural institutions.

This does not mean that the demand for Jewish culture should not be raised in international forums; on the contrary, it should and must. That there still remained, as late as 1976, a fairly sizable constituency seeking a Jewish heritage and identity even as it also rejected emigration has reportedly been demonstrated by Professor Veniamin Fain. He based his conclusions, designed for a Moscow seminar in 1976, upon a limited random sampling. Moreover, international standards, as well as laws, provide a sanction for demands which appeal on behalf of cultural and linguistic rights of minorities. Such rights are clearly spelled out

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in the UNESCO Convention on Discrimination in Education and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—both of which the U.S.S.R. has ratified—and in the Basket Three provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. It is even possible that, in view of continuing emigration, the Soviet authorities might tacitly accept the teaching of Hebrew on the grounds that it is linked to the emigration process.

Yet reality cannot be blacked out. The trends scarcely generate a sanguine perspective about the preservation of Jewish identity even over the fairly short run of several decades, let alone the perpetuation of a remnant of Jewish culture. The direction of the dynamic trends, reinforcing each other, is toward the fulfillment of the Pobedonostev prophecy.

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Dankwart A. Rustow

TURKEY'S TRAVAILS

No nation that has maintained close relations with the United States for the last generation is so little understood by well-informed Americans as is Turkey. Even West Europeans, from their closer vantage point, are rarely better informed. In part, this lack of understanding may be due simply to limited contact. There is in the United States no sizable Turkish-American community, hence no ready Turkish constituency in American public opinion. In Western Europe, Turks are present in large numbers—but as guest workers living with their families, apart and unassimilated in the more crowded parts of the cities, and eager to save enough of their wages for the ultimate return home to Turkey.

Perhaps, too, it requires a larger effort of the imagination than most of us are accustomed to making to grasp the seeming contradictions of a country that is part in Europe, part in Asia, bordering on the Soviet Union in the north and the Arab countries in the south; a developing nation that is a dedicated and vociferous democracy; a Muslim population in a secular state; not to mention a country with a Central Asian language written in the Roman alphabet.

Moreover, the Turks themselves are proud, sometimes too proud to explain themselves to others, or to undertake the frank and detailed exposition of their case that committees of the U.S. Congress or visiting missions of the International Monetary Fund may seek as a basis for their actions. And Turkish pride has deep roots.

II

Unlike most countries in the early phases of industrialization, Turkey has no history of having been a foreign colony. Its governmental tradition dates back to the infancy of the Ottoman state in the thirteenth century, and includes three or four centuries during which Ottoman Turks dominated most of southeastern

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Europe as well as most of the Muslim Middle East. In the contemporary era, Turkey's political independence was reasserted after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, as Kemal Atatürk founded the modern Turkish Republic. And although Atatürk's Turkey undertook an ambitious program to westernize its culture, its foreign policy retained an element of deliberate isolation. Indeed, a somewhat self-conscious and assertive nationalism remained one of Turkey's most notable cultural imports from the West. Today Turkey is truly a nation-state: of its present population, 99 percent are Muslims, and 90 percent speak Turkish as their native tongue; conversely, over 90 percent of all Turkish speakers are citizens of the Turkish Republic.

Yet Turkey's very location is international, and suggests multiple connections rather than splendid isolation. The close links with Europe that have developed in the last generation through participation in the European Recovery Program, membership in the Council of Europe and formal association with the European Economic Community were a logical outgrowth of the cultural westernization of Atatürk's generation. In the 1940s and 1950s, close ties with the United States and membership in NATO were welcomed as a counterweight to the Soviet threat from the north; more recently, as some strains developed in the relationship with the United States, there has been a limited rapprochement with the Soviets. Turkey has also special and obvious ties with the Islamic countries, including its Arab neighbors, and a sense of affinity with the developing, and predominantly neutralist, Third World. With its Greek neighbor to the west, relations have alternated between close friendship and overt hostility; for some years now, Turkey and Greece have been embroiled in bitter disputes over the future of Cyprus and over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea.

Internally as well, Turkey's situation is complex and in some respects paradoxical. Since Atatürk's day, secularism has been deeply embedded both in the constitution and laws of the country and in the political consciousness of its elite. One natural result of the introduction of political democracy in the 1940s was the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism as a minor but persistent theme. The decision to become a democracy has not been seriously questioned since it was made in the 1940s. Yet in the last two decades there have been two distinct episodes of military intervention in politics, and today the excesses of terrorism, as well as prolonged parliamentary deadlocks threaten to make the country at times all but ungovernable.

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Finally, the economic welfare of Turkish citizens has improved dramatically in the last quarter century, with per-capita income rising from around $300 to its present level of over $1,000, and with growth rates as high as nine or ten percent annually in the early 1970s. Yet this economic growth turned out to be extraordinarily vulnerable to the global oil crisis of 1973–74 and the consequent recession of 1975; and, for the future, it is heavily mortgaged by a still rapid rate of population growth. As a result, Turkey has found itself in a severe balance-of-payments crisis, its economy has been reduced to desperate straits, and an emergency rescue effort has had to be mounted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

So, today, mention of Turkey raises many difficult questions. Are its Western alignments and close ties to the United States about to be weakened to the point of near-neutrality in favor of expanded ties with the Soviet Union, the Arab world, or perhaps some possible future alignment of Islamic nations? Can the Cyprus question be resolved so as to bring Greece as well as Turkey fully back into the NATO fold? What prospects are there for putting the economy once again on a sound basis? And is there hope of reestablishing responsible and effective government—or is Turkey likely to be mired down in group conflict and terrorism, to become, perhaps, "another Iran"?

These questions obviously interlock, and cannot be answered without some attention to the recent historical background. And, for Americans, the best place to start such a historical summary is the story of how Washington and Ankara first came to establish such close political ties.

III

U.S.-Turkish relations started off auspiciously after World War II. There was a strong residue of Turkish goodwill toward the United States, based in part on the long record of American philanthropic and educational activity in the country. By the 1930s, Robert College in Istanbul had become one of the most prestigious centers in Turkey for training its growing commercial and technical elite. American championship of national self-determination after World War I was in welcome contrast to the imperialist ambitions of European powers, and as Turkey faced the prospect of foreign occupation and partition in 1919 there was even some sentiment in favor of establishing an American mandate over the country.

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In the specific situation of the late 1940s, there was an almost perfect coincidence of U.S. and Turkish interests in the face of communist activity and Soviet expansionism. In Greece, communist guerrillas were fighting to get control of the government. In Iran, the Soviets were delaying their military evacuation after World War II, and instead encouraging the formation of two local "People's Republics" hard on the Turkish border. And this pincer-like movement from Greece and Iran was combined with direct Soviet pressure—for retrocession of the eastern Turkish region of Kars (which had been Russian territory from 1878 to 1920) and for "joint defense" of the Bosporus and Dardanelles (which would have meant Soviet naval bases on the strategic Turkish straits). Having maintained her neutrality and territorial integrity against great odds while surrounded by belligerents in World War II, Turkey unflinchingly rejected all such Soviet demands—while hoping for Western backing in any ensuing contest.

In Washington, communist activity in Greece and Iran and Turkey were seen as an extension of Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe, and as a direct challenge to Allied efforts to establish a peaceful global order through the United Nations. When Great Britain, in 1947, declared itself unable to carry the burden of military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey, Washington was ready to fill the gap. The President's message to Congress became known as the Truman Doctrine—the first clear statement of the policy of containment of Soviet expansionism.

The policy in its first application was a success. The communist threat in Greece was averted, Soviet moves in Iran were thwarted, and Moscow renounced its demands on Turkey. Indeed, the Soviet-Turkish frontier remains the only area where Moscow's power has never expanded beyond the 1921 borders of the Soviet Union. Turkish gratitude was expressed, among other ways, in the prompt and generous response to the call for troops in the U.S.-sponsored U.N. "police action" in Korea. As Professor Fuad Köprülü, then Turkey's Foreign Minister, explained at the time: "If I do not give help today, how can I dare ask the United Nations for help when I am in need of it tomorrow?" This commitment to mutual security was carried forward in 1952 with U.S. sponsorship of the admission of Greece and Turkey as full members of the Atlantic Alliance. In Korea, Turkish soldiers had distinguished themselves for valor in close combat and for resistance to "brainwashing" when taken prisoner. Within NATO, Turkey contributed the most numerous and most poorly paid land forces. As a U.S. general testified before Congress in 1952:

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"I know dollar for dollar you are getting more in Turkey than you are any place else in the world."

Yet this early coincidence of U.S. and Turkish interests soon blurred out of focus. The very success of the containment policy in its first chosen arena allowed both partners to turn their attention to other matters—Turkish leaders mostly to domestic problems in a developing democracy, U.S. diplomats and military planners to other confrontations with communist power as far away as Berlin or Vietnam, or as close to home as Cuba.

The extension of the containment policy to the Middle East in the 1950s, moreover, was beset with basic difficulties that had not been present earlier. At the time of the Truman Doctrine, British power was still solidly entrenched in many parts of the Middle East, from Suez to Cyprus to the Persian Gulf and Aden. American policy thus was buttressing the outer defenses of a region still under Western hegemony. But by the time Secretary of State John Foster Dulles tried to link the anti-communist *cordons sanitaires* of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (1954) with a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) based on the Baghdad Pact (1955), the situation had fundamentally changed. The British were in full retreat throughout the Middle East and were leaving behind an array of newly independent states, all of them weak and most of them at odds with their neighbors. The resulting checkerboard alignment in the Middle East and North Africa created many opportunities for an intrusive power such as Russia aiming at the destabilization of existing political relationships. Conversely, it created innumerable problems for an outside power such as the United States which, without itself assuming any imperial commitments, was trying to promote peace, stability and a common regional defense.

Dulles' "Northern Tier" concept of Middle Eastern defense implied a pivotal role for Turkey as a member of both NATO and CENTO. Yet by the time CENTO was formed (with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Great Britain as members, after Iraq had opted out), the Soviets already had established close relations with Egypt, and were about to do so with Iraq. (Indeed, the effort to include Iraq in the Northern Tier scheme only hastened the abrupt transition in that country from a pro-Western to a pro-Soviet regime.) CENTO thus went little beyond a set of separate and parallel U.S. agreements on military aid with each of its Middle Eastern members. Perhaps Washington's failure to join CENTO as more than an associate member reflected some second

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thoughts about the purposefulness of the arrangement.

As the strategic constellation in the Middle East imperceptibly shifted, so too did the nature of U.S.-Turkish relations. The close bilateral relationship, which had been accepted as an obvious imperative on both sides in the face of the Russian threat of the late 1940s, came gradually in the 1950s to be viewed as a convenient means to other ends. For financially hard-pressed governments in Ankara, the U.S. foreign and military aid programs became a cornucopia of subsidies. For Washington, the Turkish government became a ready source of diplomatic assistance with complex tasks—as when pacts of friendship and mutual military assistance among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia (1953, 1955) created an indirect diplomatic connection with Yugoslavia's President Tito into which the United States did not care to enter directly; or when Turkish approaches to Pakistan and Iraq (1954–55) satisfied Dulles' requirement that the initiative for a common defense of the Northern Tier must come from within the region itself. Instrumental, manipulative relations such as these work tolerably well while the interests of both sides remain compatible. They are subject to sudden strains and recriminations when interests unexpectedly diverge—as when Washington in 1962 considered trading Russian missiles in Cuba for U.S. missiles in Turkey without consulting Ankara; or when Turkish intervention in Cyprus (threatened in 1964 and carried out in 1974) upset U.S. assumptions about Greece and Turkey as the solid southern flank of NATO.

IV

In the mid-1940s, as Turkey and the United States were establishing their close strategic alliance, Turkey also embarked on a fundamental transformation in its domestic politics from authoritarianism to democracy. The two changes of foreign and domestic course were not unrelated: a fuller commitment to democracy—the government of President Ismet Inönü hoped—would encourage firmer support from the victorious Western democracies against any aggressive designs the Soviets might have.[1] It was too

[1] During a lengthy interview in Ankara in 1954, I asked ex-President Inönü what part, if any, foreign policy considerations had played in his decision to announce the transition to democracy in 1945. He became quite irritable and reminded me in reproachful tones that I myself had detailed for him the precedents in the history of the Turkish Republic that had pointed to that outcome. With a contemptuous gesture he dismissed "all that slander that has been spread about me, as if I had been swimming with the stream." After a pause, he visibly relaxed, and with a sly smile added: "And suppose I had been swimming with the stream; that, too, is a virtue."

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early, in mid-1945, for anyone to anticipate what close relations the United States would soon develop with assorted dictatorships such as those of Perón, Rhee, Franco, Diem, Thieu and the Shah.

But there were also sufficient domestic reasons for making the transition from a one-party leadership regime to free competitive elections in a multiparty system. The Turkish War of Independence (1919–22), in which Kemal Atatürk laid the foundations for today's Turkish Republic, had been fought in the name of popular sovereignty, and there had been two previous experiments with legalized opposition. In World War II, Turkey had preserved its neutrality at the cost of prolonged maximum mobilization and a disruption of trade—and hence shortages, inflation, widespread hardship and incipient unrest both among urban workers and rural peasants. Inönü's decision to allow the formation of opposition parties was meant, most immediately, as a safety valve for such internal pressures. And after some initial hesitation in Inönü's own party, the decision was reaffirmed after 1947 with commitments to full freedom of expression and scrupulous honesty in elections that proved effective enough to secure a landslide victory for the opposition in 1950.

The new system of liberal and competitive politics soon acquired a strong momentum of its own. Whatever foreign policy dividends Turkish leaders had expected from the transition to democracy, its actual effects over the years have been subtle and varied. Democracy has hastened the revolution of rising expectations, and hence stimulated Turkish demand for imports, foreign aid and loans. Democracy has also spread to the rural and urban masses what used to be the privileged possession of a small educated elite—the Western values of progress, pragmatism and freedom of individual expression; hence it has served as a potent stimulus to economic growth. As foreign policy issues such as Cyprus or the terms of military cooperation with the United States have been taken up in the press, in parliament or in election campaigns, the effect of democratic debate in Turkey has been what it would be in most countries: to reinforce attitudes of nationalism and self-assertion.

For the first decade at least, the deepening of democratic attitudes within Turkey and the strengthening of ties with the United States proceeded apace. Cooperation with the United States was one point that was not in dispute between the rival parties. U.S. military aid and Turkish participation in the Marshall Plan had begun during the administration of Inönü's Republican People's Party (RPP) in the 1940s. Under the Demo-

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cratic Party (DP) administration of Premier Adnan Menderes (1950–60), Turkey sent troops to Korea and joined NATO and the Baghdad Pact, became a recipient of American military, economic and technical assistance on a large scale, and underwent a remarkable period of agricultural and rural development. Indeed, so close did day-to-day relations between the Menderes government and the United States become in the later 1950s, that there was a noticeable cooling in relations when Menderes' Democratic Party was overthrown by military coup in May 1960.

That coup was due entirely to domestic causes. Menderes' Democrats had been elected and reelected by enthusiastic rural majorities but had increasingly antagonized their urban following of workers, intellectuals and the press. A temporary economic recession in the late 1950s caused some acute hardship and much dissatisfaction, to which Menderes responded by progressively curtailing the opposition's freedom of expression. Newspapers were harassed or bought off with government advertising. Opposition parties were suspended or their assets confiscated on various legal technicalities. By 1959 the government engaged bands of toughs to break up opposition meetings—and found itself unable to maintain order without calling on the active intervention of the military. The armed forces, reluctant to serve as Menderes' tool of political repression, at length responded by overthrowing him in the bloodless coup of 1960.

A minority of the ruling military junta, under Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, favored installing an authoritarian military regime under some sort of corporatist form of government. But the majority under General Cemal Gürsel saw its task as bringing to trial the leaders of the previous regime, initiating the drafting of a new constitution with better democratic safeguards, and returning power to civilian hands. The return to civilian government in the fall of 1961 enjoyed wide popularity, even though the execution of ex-Premier Menderes and two of his closest political associates caused much lingering resentment. The party which emerged as the successor to Menderes' Democrats pointedly called itself the Justice Party.

The withdrawal of the military from the political stage, moreover, was only gradual. To date, all the presidents of the Second Turkish Republic have been former high military commanders, and several times during the early 1960s the Justice and Republican People's Parties were forced into incongruous coalitions by warnings from the armed forces about the likely consequences of "instability" or "irresponsibility."

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In March 1971, the military went beyond this background role and, in what became known as the "coup by communiqué," forced the resignation of the Justice Party cabinet under Süleyman Demirel, which had proven itself unable to cope with a wave of urban terrorism–or, as the generals' communiqué put it—"driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest." Unless a "strong and credible government" was formed, the generals warned, "the armed forces are determined to take over the administration of the State."

A proclamation of martial law for the major provinces reduced the level of urban violence, but arbitrary arrests of liberal intellectuals and restrictions on the press antagonized wide circles. The three cabinets of civil servants and backbenchers that ruled Turkey from 1971 to 1973 were approved unofficially by the armed forces commanders and, after much dickering, by rather sullen parliamentary majorities. Despite—or just because of—these multiple approvals, none of them proved either "strong" or "credible." In 1972, moreover, Bülent Ecevit deposed the 78-year-old Ismet Inönü in a bitter contest for the leadership of the Republican People's Party—and Ecevit's program of democratic socialism and his uncompromising stand against military intervention turned out to be crucial elements in his victory. In April 1973, the military and parliament agreed on a bipartisan caretaker government to guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections scheduled for the fall. From that election, Ecevit's rejuvenated RPP emerged as the strongest single party, increasing its voting strength by nearly half. In retrospect, the two-year episode of "coup by communiqué" is conceded by all concerned to have been a failure—an experiment even less desirable, if anything, than that of temporary direct rule by the military in 1960–61.

The return of parliamentary government in 1973 provided almost the first opportunity for full application of the constitution of 1961. Drafted in response to the erosion of democratic freedoms in the 1950s, it provides an elaborate set of checks, balances and guarantees. The parliament consists of a National Assembly, elected for four years unless it dissolves itself earlier, and a Senate, indirectly elected for staggered six-year terms. The judiciary is independent of the executive, and is making increasing use of its powers to review the constitutionality of laws and the legality of government measures. There are elaborate guarantees of the freedom of the press, speech, assembly and association—and any visitor to Turkey in the mid-1970s could testify to the spirited use made of those freedoms by a sensationalist press.

There are four main political tendencies which have been

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contending for power since 1973. The largest is the Republican People's Party of Bülent Ecevit, supported by trade unions, small farmers and urban intellectuals on the basis of a program that it describes as one of democratic socialism, with some emphasis on economic planning and elements of the welfare state. The runner-up is Süleyman Demirel's Justice Party, supported mainly by business groups and by large commercial farmers; its emphasis is on laissez-faire in theory and concrete benefits to various economic groups in practice. The besetting weakness of the constitution of the Second Republic is an electoral system of proportional representation, which has allowed neither of the major parties to muster a majority in parliament, and which thus has given a wholly disproportionate influence to minor parliamentary groups or—worse—deadlocked the parliamentary process and paralyzed the government altogether.

On the right of the major parties is the National Salvation Party (NSP), which tries to keep alive the religious issue, but skillfully combines its Sunni-Muslim symbolism with an emphasis on economic development and intransigence on the Cyprus question; its popular vote declined from 12 percent in 1973 to nine percent in 1977. On the extreme right is the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) of Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, who began as an advocate of Pan-Turkism (the political unification of Turkey with Turkic-speaking populations in Iran, the Soviet Union and China), led the authoritarian minority in the 1960 junta, and today emphasizes discipline, sacrifice, personal leadership and uncompromising hostility to communism. The NAP's vote rose from three percent in 1973 to six percent in 1977; it is also supported by uniformed paramilitary cadres.

On the far left, there are the Turkish Labor Party, a Marxist-Leninist group oriented toward Moscow, other communist groups oriented toward Peking and Tirana (there is a small Albanian minority in Turkey), and a variety of secret terrorist groups, at least one apparently connected with the Palestine Liberation Organization. None of these has been strong enough in the 1970s to be voted into parliament, and most of them are explicitly antiparliamentary. They enjoy some degree of sympathy in parts of the press. Together with the right-wing Nationalist Action Party, the left-wing militant groups are responsible for most of the shootings that have become an almost daily feature of Turkish life, for the strife among students that has closed university doors for months at a time, and for the growing politicization of the high schools.

In parliament, extraordinary amounts of time are spent patch-

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ing together coalitions that might secure majority support. The 1973 bipartisan caretaker cabinet stayed in office for three months after the elections it had been charged to administer. In 1974–75, a nonpartisan government of civil servants remained in office for three and a half months after losing its bid for parliamentary confidence 17 to 372. After the 1977 election, Ecevit's RPP, having secured 41 percent of the popular vote, tried for one month to form a government, but fell short of a majority by 12 Assembly votes.

Of the seven governments in office since 1973, only four thus far have met the requirement of majority endorsement in the Assembly. Two of these were coalitions of Demirel's Justice Party with the Salvationists and Nationalist Action on the right. One of them remained in office for over two years (1975–77) by avoiding major decisions while the economic situation steadily deteriorated; it was not uncommon to hear a policy pronouncement by Premier Demirel flatly contradicted the next day by Deputy Premier Erbakan of the NSP. The other avoided parliamentary defeat for six months (July–December 1977) mostly by preventing a parliamentary quorum.

The remaining two were formed by Bülent Ecevit and his RPP. One was a coalition with Erbakan's Salvationists (January–September 1974), which Ecevit dissolved after the Cyprus intervention of the summer of 1974 in the vain hope of forcing an election that might give a majority to his party alone. The second is Ecevit's government that took office in January 1978, with the crucial support of a dozen recent defectors from Demirel's Justice Party—nine of whom had to be given ministerial posts in Ecevit's greatly enlarged cabinet. It fell to this cabinet under Ecevit to conduct the delicate negotiations about refinancing Turkey's towering foreign-exchange debt and reestablishing military cooperation with the United States. It remains in office at the time of this writing, with precarious parliamentary support.

V

The biggest cloud over U.S.-Turkish relations in recent years has been the Cyprus question, which in turn is largely a legacy of the way Great Britain effected its imperial withdrawal from the Middle East in the 1950s. The question would never have arisen in the form it took in the 1960s and 1970s if the island had not been a British crown colony in the 1920s. As such, it was exempt

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from the provisions on Greek and Turkish population exchange agreed upon in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which settled the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–22 (known to Turks as their War of Independence) and removed most outstanding issues between the two countries.

In the event, the Cyprus question built up gradually following Britain's retreat from Palestine in 1948 and Suez in 1954, and it was brought to a head by the Greek-Cypriot guerrilla movement of General George Grivas, which aimed at *enosis*, or union with Greece. Conscious of the precarious position of the island's 18 percent Turkish minority, the Ankara government at first emphasized that it had no complaint about British rule. Yet when, regardless of these protestations, Britain invited Turkey as well as Greece to confer about Cyprus, Turkey took an increasingly nationalistic line. Alleged Greek atrocities against Cypriot Turks became a staple of the Istanbul mass-circulation daily *Hürriyet*, and "Partition or Death" became the slogan of a "Cyprus Is Turkish" association unofficially supported and lavishly financed by the Menderes government.

In the end, British, Greek and Turkish representatives worked out a scheme under which Cyprus was declared independent without partition in 1960. The constitution carefully balanced representation for the Greek and the Turkish communities, with mutual veto powers on major issues. A Treaty of Guarantee authorized Great Britain, Greece and Turkey to station troops on the island and to intervene jointly or separately, by military force if necessary, if the constitutional status quo was violated.

Alas, the delicate arrangement that had been devised over the course of years broke down in a matter of months—unimplemented. The flag contrived for Cyprus as a "new nation" was perhaps symbolic of the difficulties. Blue, red or green were out as the colors of Greece, Turkey and Islam; crescents, stars, crosses or stripes were excluded for similar reasons. At last the resourceful designers came up with a map of Cyprus in yellow on white; yet since the Greek and Turkish flags were accorded equal status, few residents of Cyprus ever made use of the pale contrivance. Only the flamboyant personality of His Beatitude Archbishop Makarios, whom his Greek-Cypriot compatriots elected President of the Republic, gave some plausibility to Cyprus as an independent nation. Finding the prospect of *enosis* incompatible with his personal ambition, he developed instead a potent appeal to Third World and anticolonialist sentiment in the U.N. General Assembly.

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Makarios and his Greek Cypriot followers having set aside the unworkable 1960 constitution, Turkey was ready by 1964 to use its right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee, and informed Washington to that effect. But a blunt letter from President Johnson to Premier Inönü warned against using American-made equipment in any such expedition; if Turkish action on Cyprus provoked Soviet counteraction, Washington would have to consider carefully whether the common defense obligation under NATO applied.

This amounted to threatening one's ally with the common enemy, and Ankara called off the invasion at the last moment. In Washington, Johnson's letter of June 5, 1964, remained a secret among five or six officials; in Ankara, Inönü was obliged to share it with his cabinet—and when the text leaked to the Turkish press it did severe damage to U.S.-Turkish relations.

On July 15, 1974, the Greek military forces on Cyprus, on orders from the Athens junta, backed a right-wing extremist coup under Nikos Sampson that would have forced *enosis* and done away with any semblance of constitutional government even among Cypriot Greeks. Archbishop Makarios himself barely escaped with his life through a back door of the presidential palace. This time the Ankara government, composed of the Republican-Salvationist coalition under Ecevit, invoked its right of intervention without awaiting any reaction from Washington. From July 20 to 22, Turkish forces occupied the northern, mainly Turkish-inhabited portion of the island. The result was the collapse of the Sampson coup and, a few days later, of the right-wing junta in Athens which had instigated Sampson's desperate scheme; after seven years, Greece once again had a democratic government. But the cautious Turkish military had fallen short of their operational assignment, and from August 14 to 17 resumed operations to occupy a total of 40 percent of the island's territory.

For the past five years there have been two de facto governments on Cyprus, one the Turkish Cypriot government headed by Rauf Denktaş and the other the Greek Cypriot government of Spiros Kyprianou, who succeeded Makarios. Although Turkish forces continue their occupation, calm has returned to the island, and as a result of the continuing war in nearby Lebanon, there even has been an exodus of some business firms from Beirut to Nicosia. The Turkish government officially proposes a bizonal federation. Yet in practice there has been little serious negotiation either between the Denktaş and Kyprianou governments on Cyprus or between Ankara and Athens. In Turkey, the National Salvation Party,

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which held the balance of parliamentary power in much of the 1973–77 period, and the Nationalist Action Party have taken an uncompromising stand.

The issue between Greece and Turkey is complicated by a second dispute over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea, where prospecting for offshore oil began in the early 1970s. This dispute centers around which country has rights to the continental shelf in an area where the continental shore is all part of Turkey, but an almost continuous string of islands only six to 40 miles off that shore is an integral part of Greece.

In February 1975, the U.S. Congress responded to Turkey's use of American weapons in the Cyprus action of 1974, and to continued Turkish occupation of parts of the island, by imposing an embargo on U.S. arms deliveries to Turkey under existing military aid agreements. The Turkish government, in turn, responded by suspending military operations at the score or so of bases and intelligence facilities maintained under the 1969 U.S.-Turkish agreement on defense cooperation. Turkey, however, fully maintained its membership in NATO, and this has meant regular Turkish participation in NATO's military exercises and continued operation in Turkey of American military units (including nuclear weapons) assigned to NATO's "quick-response alert" forces.

Both the Ford and Carter Administrations repeatedly tried to have the embargo lifted, but ran into strong resistance from Greek-American sentiment, ably represented in Congress by such eminent figures as Senator Paul S. Sarbanes and Representative John Brademas, the Democratic whip in the House. Finally, in September 1978, the embargo was lifted, the vote in the House being as close as 208 to 205. The Ankara government of Bülent Ecevit responded by decreeing the reopening of U.S. military installations for one year, pending the negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement.

VI

Soon, however, the Cyprus and embargo issues were overshadowed by Turkey's acute payments crisis, which in turn was the consequence of economic developments of the previous decades.

Turkey's rapid economic growth began with the agricultural revolution of the 1950s—itself a consequence of the interplay between democratic politics in Turkey and economic and technical assistance from the United States. Irrigation, application of chemical fertilizers, introduction of farm machinery and conver-

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sion from pasture to cereals produced a spectacular rise in yields. Secondary roads, grain-storage facilities and government support prices stimulated marketing, and, for a few years, Turkey even became one of the world's major wheat exporters. Schools and mosques were built in the larger villages, cement factories and sugar refineries near the rural towns. Educational progress was equally remarkable, and has continued at such a pace that between 1965 and 1975 the literacy rate increased from 48 to 62 percent.

By the mid-1960s, moreover, Turkish workers began to migrate to Germany and other West European countries in growing numbers, to take over some of the less skilled jobs in industry and some of the simpler chores in the public services; by 1974, the number of Turkish workers in Europe had grown to 800,000. High European wage rates combined with the frugal habits of the Turkish workers to ensure a growing stream of financial remittances to the home country. Turkey's receipts from this source rose from $300 million in 1970 to $1.5 billion in 1974. In 1974 and 1975, these private remittances brought in as much foreign exchange as did all of Turkey's merchandise exports.

The late 1960s and early 1970s thus were periods of unprecedented prosperity and economic growth for Turkey. The gross national product rose at annual rates of seven, eight or even ten percent. There was a massive shift away from agricultural employment, and from rural to urban residence. The market for consumer goods expanded rapidly. The value of imports more than doubled from 1970 to 1973 (in current dollars), and nearly doubled again from 1973 to 1974; still Turkey's international reserves nearly tripled between 1971 and 1973.

But in retrospect this prosperity turned out to be extremely precarious. The global recession of 1972–75, aggravated by the oil crisis of 1973–74, put a limit on European demand for foreign workers. Additional privileges conferred on Turkish guest workers abroad, whether under pressure from trade unions or from the Turkish government—such as the right to bring along their families or to compete with German workers for reemployment—reduced the workers' savings ratio, and hence their remittances. More recently, the declining value of the lira acted as a further deterrent to remittances.

Improvements in public health and rural living standards had led to a record birth rate, and although that rate declined from 4.5 percent in the late 1950s to 3.7 percent in the late 1970s, a corresponding decline in the death rate kept the proportion of net

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population increase steady at 2.5 percent to 2.7 percent annually. This means that the Turkish population, which grew from 21 million in 1950 to 40 million in 1975, may be expected to double again by the early years of the next century. This population pressure is reflected in very high rates of unemployment: 12 percent in 1974, 14 percent in 1977, and estimated at about 20 percent in mid-1979. It also means that a large proportion of the annual economic growth must simply go into feeding a larger population. Although Turkey's per capita income has tripled in the last three decades, at $1,000 it is still only two-thirds that of Portugal and less than half that of Greece.

Turkish agriculture in 1977 contributed only 21 percent to the GNP, down from 46 percent three decades earlier; but it still employs as much as 58 percent of the active population. The shift, moreover, has been not so much into industry as into services—a miscellaneous category including bank presidents, street vendors, lawyers, construction workers and bootblacks—which employ 28 percent of the population but generate 58 percent of the GNP.

The demand for Turkish workers abroad and for Turkish agricultural and mineral exports began to decline sharply in the recession of 1972–75, at the very time when consumption standards had adjusted to the comfortable level of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and when the prices of petroleum and other imports began to rise dramatically. In 1970, merchandise exports had paid for two-thirds of the import bill, with remittances covering the remainder; by 1976 exports paid for only 40 percent and remittances for 20 percent of the mounting import bill. For some years, the gap was covered by lavish borrowing, at high interest, in the Eurocurrency market; and for still more years, the accumulated international reserves of the past were drawn down to service the mounting debt. But by mid-1977 the Turkish Central Bank had difficulty meeting monthly payments on commercial transactions, and all foreign borrowing ceased. By 1979, Turkey found it hard to meet payments for its monthly petroleum imports, and coffee, filter cigarettes and similar goods had become black market items.

In May 1978, the International Monetary Fund offered Turkey a $450 million loan, but release of the second installment was being held up over disagreements as to when or by how much the Turkish lira should be devalued. In January 1979, President Carter and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed on the need for governmental aid to Turkey and by May the OECD could announce a major aid package, with contributions from the United States, West Germany and 12 other countries. Here, too,

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there were difficult negotiations, including disagreements between the Carter Administration and Congress about the size of the American contribution and how much of it should be in the form of aid or of a loan. Naturally, Turkey in its extremity welcomed help from any quarter, including an offer of a $250-million loan from Libya in 1979, and a trade agreement with the Soviet Union, renewed in June 1978.

VII

It would be foolhardy to attempt to forecast in detail future developments in any situation as laden with tensions as Turkey's internal politics. Yet one possibility that can be ruled out with some confidence is that of Turkey becoming "another Iran," for the two countries, adjacent on the map, are far apart in their political and social structures.

A revolution of the Iranian type is one likely sequel to a heavy-handed, repressive regime that has come close to eliminating all political alternatives: a collapse from internal causes (e.g., Iran in 1978–79 or Portugal in 1974) or from defeat in war (Russia in 1917, China in 1949). By contrast, Turkey has no Czar or Salazar, no Shah or SAVAK secret police: its recent political ills are not those of repression, but of excess of expression. And, of course, Turkey has been spared Iran's mixed blessing of billions and billions of dollars in sudden oil revenues.

With Russia so close, one of the most worrisome aspects of the Iranian revolution has been the centrifugal tendency already apparent in Azerbaijan, Persian Kurdistan, and the Arab-speaking oil region of Khuzistan. The Persian-speaking majority in Iran scarcely exceeds 60 percent, and the ethnic minorities in all the outlying regions have long traditions of separatism. In contrast, Turkey's only two linguistic minorities—the Kurds (seven percent) and Arabs (1.2 percent)—are gradually being assimilated by the intense internal migration that is so characteristic of present-day Turkey. Those who remain behind in their southeastern or southern regions are of some weight in local, and hence national, politics: several prominent party politicians are known to be of Kurdish origin. Although there has been some sporadic Kurdish unrest, it has not in the last half century taken the form of organized separatism as in Iran, or of prolonged civil war as in Iraq.

Another fundamental contrast is that Iran is a Shi'i and Turkey a Sunni country, and since the Sunni-Shi'i split goes back to the

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earliest days of Islam it is far more pervasive than any division between say, Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, and Protestants, among Christians. Turkish political groups that are committed to (or perhaps flirt with) Islamic fundamentalism, such as the National Salvation Party, thus are emphatically Sunni in orientation and would feel profoundly repelled by any regime of Shi'ite ayatollahs. The elaborate hierarchy that made the Shi'ite clergy the best organized opposition to the Shah is absent among Sunnis. Shi'ism, moreover, became identified over the centuries with Iranian nationalism in its tenacious self-assertion against Arab and Mongol conquest, and more recently Western imperialism.

By contrast, Turkish nationalism is of far more recent origin and took the form of a militant secularism. Even the demagogically skillful National Salvation Party, as we saw, never received more than 12 percent of the vote. There is in Turkey a group of Alevi Muslims (a religious tendency related to Shi'ism) estimated at perhaps five percent of the population, but the Alevis lack any comprehensive religious organization, and in Turkey they have mostly been strong supporters of the Republican People's Party, in whose commitment to Atatürk's secularism they see the best guarantee against Sunni discrimination.

For better or worse, all Turkish political tendencies, ambitions, frustrations and animosities are out in the open and not, as in the Shah's Iran, suppressed. And one of the genuine virtues of democratic openness is that it provides some guarantee against political surprises or abrupt change.

Barring, therefore, any dramatic upheaval as in Iran, the likeliest prospect for Turkey is the continuation of one or another political pattern of its recent past. For instance, a military intervention of the 1960 or 1971 type, though unlikely, cannot be ruled out. More probably, there will be intermittent periods of martial law to cope with the deadly violence that right-wing and left-wing extremists have directed against each other; or with local flare-ups in response to unemployment, such as the recent rioting in Kahramanmaraş. A Republican-Justice Party coalition, such as the military imposed in the early 1960s and like those sometimes advocated today in Istanbul business circles, is impossible while Ecevit and Demirel remain in the lead, and implausible without them; at any rate, such a combination of opposites is as likely to result in political paralysis as in decisive, broadly based action.

Prime Minister Ecevit's performance after January 1978, caused some disillusionment among his supporters, who accused him of passivity and indecision. Yet neither his slender parliamentary

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majority nor the parlous condition in which he found the nation's economy permitted quick, dramatic solutions. And hairbreadth majorities and complex maneuvers are likely to remain part of the Turkish parliamentary and government process—unless the country's lawmakers in some future interval of calm reflection manage to replace the current system of proportional representation with something more like the British-American single-member plurality system with its known tendency toward solid parliamentary majorities. Meanwhile—and ironically—the continuing negotiations for the rescheduling of Turkey's foreign debt may provide some modicum of expectation for political continuity. For what ambitious and adroit politician would not prefer his predecessor to have made the painful decisions on devaluation and austerity?

In view of the magnitude of the problems confronting Turkey, the solid if undramatic progress of the last year and a half should not be underestimated. In the face of clear need, as in December 1978, Ecevit's government did show itself capable of overcoming its distaste for martial law. And following the decision taken by President Carter and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on Guadeloupe in January 1979, 12 other OECD members joined in pledging varying sums for Turkey's financial rescue by May. The austerity measures and devaluation imposed are not on the scale demanded by the IMF; yet there is every expectation that the painful and laborious process of rescheduling Turkey's debt will be accomplished. Once the level of devaluation has been finally agreed upon and implemented, one may expect an automatic increase in workers' remittances, which in turn should ease the foreign payments and import situations. That, in turn, may become the prelude to greater employment and reduced inflation, that is, to gradual, all-round recovery.

Next to the foreign debt, the most immediate problem on Turkey's diplomatic agenda is likely to be a new defense cooperation agreement with the United States. Fortunately, the lifting last year of the congressional arms embargo has cleared the way for this—while earlier the U.S. military found itself in the paradoxical position of having interrupted the existing pattern of cooperation, yet hoping that Turkey would agree to new forms of such cooperation, such as overflight rights for some show of American air strength in the Iranian crisis, or U-2 overflights to monitor future Soviet compliance with SALT.

In future U.S.-Turkish negotiations it would be well to distinguish clearly between American contingency planning for possible

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crises involving oil and the Middle East on the one hand, and NATO's common defense against the Soviet Union on the other. It would be unreasonable to try to use Turkey as an American springboard for unspecified Middle Eastern actions, and no conceivable Turkish government could be expected to give its U.S. ally *carte blanche* in this regard.

On the other hand, governments both of the Justice and the Republican People's Parties have supported Turkey's continued role within NATO. There is no reason to suppose that the internal political tensions within Turkey or its recent agreements with the Soviet Union will weaken Turkish commitments to NATO—any more than terrorism in Italy or Spain, de facto Communist participation in Italy's government, or West Germany's Ostpolitik have weakened the basic commitments of those allies. It cannot be emphasized enough that, despite the strong Turkish public reaction to the U.S. arms embargo, Turkey did not follow Greece's example then or France's earlier example in withdrawing from the military aspects of NATO.

Whatever the details of future U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation within and beyond NATO, it would be unproductive to link these matters to the Cyprus question—which ought to be tackled concurrently and in its own right. In any future negotiations about Cyprus, it is perhaps too much to expect anyone but Turks to remember the crucial contribution which Turkish intervention in 1974 made to the restoration of democracy in Greece, and thus indirectly to Greece's pending admission as the tenth member of the European Community; or that Turkey's action at the time was based on its right of intervention under the Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee.

With a view to the future, it is more important to recall that the unitary constitution of 1960, with mutual veto powers for the Greek and Turkish representatives in a Cypriot parliament, was never implemented and was, indeed, inherently unworkable. A workable arrangement, at a minimum, would have to recognize what remained the central reality through four centuries of Ottoman and eight decades of British rule—the coexistence on Cyprus of two separate communities. A bizonal federation such as the one envisaged by Turkey would leave each community to administer its own affairs without interference or legal veto from the other, while allowing the two separate entities to work out their common economic and political concerns, and their future federal institutions, by mutual consent.

The major practical question would seem to be one of an agreed

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reduction of the Turkish zone from its present de facto size of 40 percent of the island to something corresponding to the Turkish proportion of population and pre-1974 land holdings. It is well to note that the Ankara government has never rejected such a reduction, nor indeed a withdrawal of Turkish troops—but it would expect to effect both as a result, not as a precondition, of negotiations about the island's political future.

In future U.S.-Turkish relations, perhaps the spirit of negotiations will be even more important than any concrete details. It would be unprofitable for Turkey to assert publicly, as one of its former prime ministers and governors of the Central Bank did privately: "You must pay our bills because you need us." To link the future use of intelligence facilities in Turkey directly to questions of military and financial aid would reduce Turkey's status from that of an ally to that of a mercenary, and would be as unhelpful as it has been for Americans to try to link negotiations over U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation to progress in negotiations over Cyprus.

Turkey's liveliest cultural links have long been with Europe rather than with the Middle East, and they are being reinforced today by Turkish guest workers returning from Western Europe and by businessmen eager to promote closer association between Turkey and the European Community. Turkey has been a member of the Atlantic Alliance for 27 years, and the Russian threat, however dormant, has not diminished in its potential. Turkey's society and politics are profoundly committed to democratic elections, freedom of expression and political equality. Although the possibility of full membership in the European Community remains a distant prospect for the 1990s, it provides a further guarantee against authoritarian upheavals—for the Community in its dealings with Spain, Portugal and Greece has left no doubt that none but democracies need apply.

The diplomatic agenda between Washington and Ankara today is more intense and varied than it has been for a quarter century, creating opportunities both for much friction and for a large amount of give and take. With sympathetic understanding from both sides, it can also become the basis of a new and sounder relationship in the future.

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Harold van B. Cleveland
and Thomas F. Huertas

STAGFLATION: HOW WE GOT INTO IT – HOW TO GET OUT

Ten years ago a combination of rising inflation and incipient recession signaled the end of the Soaring Sixties. Yet few contemporary observers perceived that the end of the long postwar expansion was at hand, or that the coming decade would perhaps one day be labeled the Sagging Seventies.

The contrast between the two periods is indeed marked. During the great postwar boom, from 1958 to 1973, the average annual rate of growth of the gross national product, adjusted for inflation, exceeded five percent in the seven largest industrial countries, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. This growth rate was high not only compared to the period since 1973, but also historically. Yet from 1973 to 1979, the average annual growth of the same seven economies fell to only two and one-half percent. And, as growth collapsed, inflation surged. Prices in the same countries, which had advanced at only three and one-half percent in the earlier period, speeded up to eight percent from 1973 to 1979.

Persistent, high inflation and low, halting growth, along with high unemployment, unstable exchange rates and sluggish investment are the symptoms of an economic disease that economists call stagflation, a rare malady that had not previously afflicted the industrial West. Because its onset dates from the first show of muscle by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the winter of 1973–74, many observers have been led to lay the problem at OPEC's door.

The conclusion is plausible, especially right now when OPEC's latest round of oil-price hikes promises to aggravate the current recession in the United States, much as the first oil shock deepened and prolonged the worldwide recession of 1974–75. But a closer look suggests a different conclusion. The most important causes of

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stagflation in advanced industrial countries are not external. They are rooted in economic policies followed by these countries since the early 1960s and, more fundamentally, in the social values and political priorities those policies express. In short, our worst economic wounds are self-inflicted. Their healing therefore depends on our own efforts.

To understand stagflation, one must understand the postwar boom that preceded it. Broadly speaking, from the early 1950s until the early 1960s, a favorable conjuncture of factors on the supply side of the industrial economies made possible a period of unusually rapid growth without much inflation. Thereafter these unusual sources of growth faded, but growth of GNP was strong into the early 1970s, mainly because the United States employed highly stimulative monetary and fiscal policies in order to finance simultaneously domestic social programs and the Vietnam War. Although these policies brought about an unusually rapid rise in output and employment throughout the industrial world, they also led to accelerating inflation, a breakdown of the international monetary system and erosion of public confidence in money and its management. The end result was stagflation. The public's loss of confidence in the management of money is, we believe, the core of the stagflation malady.

Trust in money, once undermined, is not easily restored. Yet the prestige of governments and their command over economic resources is directly affected by what the market thinks of their currencies and the voters of their economic management. Here is a potential source of international discipline over national monetary policies. It could in time help to rebuild that trust. Such, at any rate, is the hopeful thesis of this essay.

II

In its first phase, which lasted through the 1950s, the postwar boom owed its unusual vigor to the special opportunities for growth created by the preceding two decades. Depression and protectionism in the 1930s, followed by rearmament and five years of destructive war, had held down investment and slowed the advance of nonmilitary technology, creating an unusual abundance of labor relative to the stocks of capital and technology. Economic conditions were therefore ripe for a powerful upswing in capital spending, induced by the prospect of high profits and returns on investment.

To realize this potential for a growth "miracle," fundamental changes in the political and institutional environment were re-

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quired. For expansion was constrained by wartime and postwar controls on prices, wages and foreign exchange and by uncertainty born of unsettled political conditions and the cold war. Moreover, inflation had to be checked, exchange rates stabilized, currencies made convertible again, and national markets reopened to foreign competition. The postwar climate of military insecurity had to give way to peaceful coexistence. Hostility to private enterprise in Western Europe had to be dissipated. Remarkably, by the end of the 1950s all this had been accomplished.

Particularly important was the restoration by the late 1950s of domestic price stability in the United States. This crucial achievement enabled other industrial countries to "import" price stability by eliminating exchange controls on current transactions and pegging their currencies firmly to the dollar. This was accomplished by 1959, under the aegis of the monetary system designed at Bretton Woods 15 years earlier.

Under that system, the U.S. commitment to keeping the dollar convertible into gold served to assure other countries that the Federal Reserve would put price stability ahead of competing considerations in determining the supply of dollars, as in fact the Fed did until the mid-1960s. Since other central banks were committed to pegging their currencies to the dollar, the supply of dollars largely determined the supply of other currencies. Thus U.S. monetary policy exerted a powerful stabilizing influence on price levels in other countries. The result was a low, predictable rate of inflation throughout the industrial world.

A market economy works best with a reasonably stable price level and in a climate of economic liberalism. It works badly in an environment of inflation and political uncertainty, particularly when the inflation is highly variable and is partially suppressed by controls. Much of the postwar surge in economic growth in the industrial countries is explained by a transition from the second of these states to the first. Credit for making the transition possible goes in no small measure to the United States and its special role and influence in the postwar world—the American guarantee of Western security and monetary stability and the U.S. dedication to restoring an open, liberal economic system.

However, the unusual sources of growth that got the postwar boom off to a running start were inherently self-limiting. By the beginning of the 1960s, they were largely exhausted. Remaining barriers to investment, to trade and to domestic labor mobility were low. The backlog of unapplied technology had been largely used up. Little scope remained for major institutional reform that

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would accelerate growth in the industrial countries by allowing their economies to realize their full potential.

Nevertheless, growth continued to accelerate into the 1960s, thanks again to the United States and the stimulative fiscal and monetary policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, which gave the fading postwar boom a powerful shot in the arm from the demand side. Through the newly established system of fixed exchange rates, the stimulus spread to the rest of the industrial world.

President Kennedy's election pledge was to "get the country moving again." So far as monetary policy was concerned, this meant urging the Federal Reserve to depart from the cautious policy it had followed in the 1950s, and which had, by 1960, restored domestic price stability. Accordingly, U.S. money growth accelerated gradually through the first half of the 1960s.

At first, the effect was almost entirely favorable; output accelerated and unemployment fell while prices hardly rose. After a decade in which U.S. monetary management had been preoccupied with price stability, the public at home and abroad did not anticipate that the speedup in money growth would sooner or later raise the price level. Then, after Lyndon Johnson's election as President in 1964, U.S. monetary and fiscal policies became still more expansive. The shift reflected important changes in social values and economic priorities that developed during the 1960s. Americans, aware of their new affluence, began to take rapid economic growth for granted. Their collective conscience became more sensitive to the plight of the hard-core unemployed and others whose share in the new affluence was slight.

The moderate policies of growth during the Kennedy years accordingly gave way to policies designed to achieve very low rates of unemployment and to social programs designed to redistribute income in a massive way: Johnson's Great Society and his War on Poverty. With the budget costs of the war in Southeast Asia also escalating, accelerated monetary expansion became unavoidable, for the President was unable, politically, to finance an unpopular war by raising taxes or by noninflationary borrowing, and he was unwilling out of personal conviction to choose between guns and social justice. This fateful decision—or failure to decide—led with tragic inevitability to the collapse of the postwar boom and the condition of stagflation we now endure.

The end game was long and eventful. The Indochina War and social programs continued to compete for funds, and the first Nixon Administration and the Democratic Congress ratified Pres-

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ident Johnson's decision to authorize both. In 1969, as inflation accelerated, the Federal Reserve resisted this approach, tightening money sharply. The economy slumped. Inflation, however, barely abated. By 1970, the public's expectations of inflation had been ratcheted up to the higher pace of inflation prevailing since 1965, and the slowdown in money growth was too brief to alter these expectations materially. In consequence, when the Federal Reserve's policy again turned expansive in 1970–71, the resulting recovery was weak. Rising prices absorbed much of the stimulus to demand caused by more rapid money growth.

Now the Administration was in real trouble. The 1972 presidential election was approaching, and the sluggish recovery and high unemployment figures had become a major political liability. The Administration therefore prevailed upon the Federal Reserve to increase the rate of U.S. money growth still more. Although this policy did speed the recovery, it also undermined the basis of the fixed exchange rate regime. By virtue of the size of the U.S. economy relative to the other members of the Bretton Woods system, domestic demand and supply conditions in the United States tended to determine the prices of goods traded on world markets. Thus, U.S. monetary policy occupied a unique position in the Bretton Woods system. It set the rate of inflation in the United States; and through the commitment of other countries to peg their currencies to the dollar, it also tended to fix the rate of inflation in other countries.

In the early 1960s this arrangement had produced price stability in the industrial world. By the late 1960s, however, the other members of the Bretton Woods system were discovering the dark side of their fixed exchange rate agreement with the United States. They were learning that a fixed rate system is compatible with any rate of inflation, as long as it is common to all the currencies in the system. As soon as the United States began to finance the Vietnam War and the Great Society simultaneously through printing money rather than through taxation or borrowing, they found that the Bretton Woods system functioned as an engine of worldwide inflation.

With inflation escalating, the need to create additional international liquidity or world money seemed apparent to many participants in the international financial arena in the late 1960s. Without additional reserves it was felt that countries could not continue to expand trade, investment and employment. The world supply of money became increasingly a function of the demand for money—a demand swollen by rising prices.

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Gradually, however, different concepts emerged. They implicitly recognized that the amount of liquidity required to finance a certain volume of trade depended critically on the prices of the goods concerned. The lower these prices, the less liquidity needed. Hence, a search began for alternative sources of liquidity, i.e., currencies whose purchasing power over goods and services would not deteriorate as rapidly as the dollar's.

At first, the other members of the Bretton Woods system turned to gold, a monetary unit in relatively fixed supply. However, much of the world's supply of gold remained in the coffers of the United States, which had agreed to convert dollars into gold at $35 per ounce. In the late 1960s, as their confidence in the management of the dollar waned, other governments began to utilize the conversion privilege at a rapid rate; by 1971 the United States faced the unpleasant choice of losing its entire remaining gold stock or of initiating the classic gold-standard remedy of domestic deflation in order to restore confidence in the dollar. In fact, the United States chose to avoid both these alternatives; it simply suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold in August 1971. This left the Federal Reserve free to continue its highly stimulative monetary policies.

The drama's climax followed swiftly. Rapid U.S. monetary expansion in 1971–72 produced in 1972–73 a final surge in economic growth both at home and abroad. However, it also destroyed the last remnants of the Bretton Woods system which the Smithsonian Agreement (December 1971) on new exchange-rate parities had managed to preserve. After 1973, the search for alternative sources of international liquidity intensified; the other members of the Bretton Woods system, especially Germany, Japan and Switzerland, realized that their continued adherence to the fixed exchange rate regime would inevitably condemn them to the same high rate of inflation that the United States had chosen.

Gradually, these countries came to believe that their own currencies would serve their international liquidity needs perfectly well, if their supply were limited. Thus, the flexible exchange rate regime was born, full of the bright promise that countries would be able to utilize monetary policy against inflation or unemployment as they saw fit without having to encounter the severe balance-of-payments crises that had emerged during the latter stages of the Bretton Woods system.

At the very time the fixed exchange rate system was breathing its last, OPEC made its stunning decision in the winter of 1973–74 to quadruple the price of oil. This capped the climax, dealing

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a harsh blow to real incomes in all oil-importing countries. Along with a simultaneous tightening of money in major countries, it plunged the world economy into deep recession. The great postwar boom was at an end.

III

At first, no one saw it that way. The 1974–75 recession, it seemed, was just another business downturn, though an unusually severe one. Another round of demand stimulation, it was thought, would soon bring the industrial world back to full employment. In 1975 or 1976, the economic authorities in Britain, Canada, France and Italy followed this prescription. Each adopted a highly stimulative monetary policy in response to serious unemployment.

Then came a shocking discovery. The expansionary policies made hardly a dent on unemployment, but, instead, soon produced spiraling inflation and falling exchange rates. These countries were then forced to rein in money growth. Since then, all four have proceeded cautiously, daring neither to reexpand vigorously nor to tighten sharply. There has been some improvement in inflation but growth has been sluggish or halting.

The new reality is a mutation in economic psychology, caused not simply by the 1974–75 slump, but by the succession of monetary traumas of the early 1970s. As rapid inflation became a fact of economic life and fixed exchange rates broke down, participants in financial markets, in labor markets and in markets for commodities and for every kind of product in the industrial countries, began to form their economic expectations in new ways. Having lost faith in a stable or reasonably predictable price level, private decision-makers now try to anticipate the behavior of prices and exchange rates by paying close attention to what the monetary authorities are doing.

The markets have learned that when a country's monetary policy turns expansive, relative to that in other countries, its exchange rate will depreciate and domestic inflation will accelerate. These results are therefore anticipated; prices are put up and currencies down almost as soon as the new direction of policy becomes clear.

In consequence, governments have lost much of the ability they once had to bring about a rise in output and employment. For the impact of monetary expansion on real income and demand is soon absorbed by an accelerated rise in prices, and this, along with a depreciating currency, soon forces the authorities to tighten money again. Until the late 1960s, as we have seen, exchange rates

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were assumed to be fixed and the markets still expected prices to remain stable or the going rate of inflation to persist indefinitely. Thus, monetary expansion could successfully raise output and reduce unemployment before its inflationary consequences became apparent. Now, however, monetary expansion raises inflation before it can seriously affect employment.

Germany and Japan, along with Switzerland, demonstrate another variation on this stagflation theme. These countries, unlike those just mentioned, have consistently given a high priority to the fight against inflation. They have successfully kept domestic inflation down. By starting their fight against inflation early in 1972–73, these countries never allowed expectations of high inflation to become embedded in their economic thinking. More important, they resisted the general trend among the industrialized countries in 1975 and 1976 to utilize a stimulative monetary policy as a means of overcoming the recession of 1973–74. As a result, these countries have continued to enjoy relative price stability.

Of course, this victory over inflation has not been without cost. Unemployment did rise, especially among younger workers during 1974 and 1975. Some of this was due to the economic dislocations caused by the oil crisis, some was due to the recession in Germany's major trading partners, and some was due to the decline in the rate of growth of output destined for domestic consumption.

The German government did respond to the plight of its jobless citizens. Like the Swiss government, it slashed the number of foreign workers inside the country through tighter visa and work permit requirements. By the fourth quarter of 1975 the slide in the employment of German citizens had come to a halt. To aid those remaining unemployed the government liberalized unemployment benefits, intensified manpower training and relocation programs and stepped up government spending. Although the budget deficit ballooned, the German authorities resisted the temptation to finance a large portion of it through the additional creation of money. Instead, it reserved monetary policy for the fight against inflation. Now, it seems that these policies are bearing fruit. Inflation remains low and unemployment has dropped.

In summary, over the past five years the German public, and in particular the German trade unions, have been willing to accept this type and amount of unemployment as a cost of securing permanent price stability. They have consistently held wage demands to moderate rates, confident that the central bank will

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preserve price stability. No doubt this is due to their sophistication, born of historical experience about the connection between money, exchange rates and inflation.

Nevertheless, Germany has been caught in a policy dilemma similar to that encountered by the countries whose fight against inflation has failed. The dilemma arises because its low rate of inflation makes the mark attractive, relative to other currencies, as a store of value and as a speculative investment. Accordingly, the mark is chronically overvalued on the exchange markets; that is, at current exchange rates a mark will purchase a greater volume of goods and services in the United States than it will in Germany. Hence, its exchange rate is above the rate that would be consistent with the mark's domestic purchasing power. This overvaluation cuts into domestic profit margins and potential sales in German exporting- and import-competing industries. It therefore deters investment in those industries, impairing Germany's growth and causing unemployment.

Thus, when the dollar weakens, as it did in the summer and fall of 1978, the Bundesbank (the German central bank) comes under political pressure to intervene in the exchange market to prevent the mark from rising too rapidly against the dollar. As the Bank responds to this pressure, it buys dollars in exchange for marks. This speeds the growth of the German money supply and causes the German public to expect more inflation, and to act on that premise. This reaction alarms the Bundesbank and soon forces it to tighten money again. Thereupon the mark again rises on the exchanges, once again squeezing profits and discouraging investment.

Thus in industrial countries with low inflation as in the others, the public's increased sensitivity to monetary management has made it impossible for governments to conduct economic policy according to the rules of demand management developed in the 1960s.

The stagflation syndrome made its appearance later in the United States than in Europe. Beginning in 1976 and continuing on through 1977 and most of 1978, the Carter Administration and the Federal Reserve followed a classic 1960s prescription for dealing with recession and unemployment. At first, the policy seemed successful. Accelerating money growth beginning late in 1976 had a significant impact on U.S. output and employment and did not cause the dollar to fall and inflation to spurt until 1978. This difference from European experience is doubtless due

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to the U.S. economy's greater size, which limits or delays the impact of the dollar's fall on domestic prices.

Nevertheless, last November, after two years of swift monetary expansion, the Carter Administration and the Federal Reserve also acknowledged the sensitivity of inflation and the dollar's exchange rate to the acceleration in money growth. The United States now finds itself about where Britain, France and Italy were two or three years ago. Monetary policy has been tightened to cope with high inflation and a falling currency, and the U.S. economy is in recession.

Moreover, the Fed and the Administration are evidently uncertain whether the old demand-management magic can work again. For the exchange markets are now highly sensitive to the connection between U.S. monetary policy and the strength of the dollar. As soon as market participants judge that U.S. policy has become more expansive relative to that of Germany or Japan, they begin to sell dollars against marks or yen, producing a downward spiral of the dollar on the exchange markets. Such was the case in October 1978 and again, to a much lesser extent, in June and July of this year. Thus, the strength of the dollar against the mark and the yen has become a symbol of the competence of U.S. economic management.

IV

This brief analysis of stagflation goes a long way to explain broad developments in the industrial countries during the last few years. It suggests that the key to the problem of inflation is the public's loss of confidence in the ability of the authorities to come to grips with its root cause: too much money. Unfortunately, until very recently governments in much of Western Europe and the United States persisted in seeing inflation as the result of increases in the prices of strategic commodities or of wages, reasoning that inflation could therefore be checked by direct controls.

In the United States, this line of reasoning has been used to justify continuing control of domestic energy prices. But the issue posed by the high world price of oil is a problem which affects the patterns of production and consumption, not the overall price level or the rate of inflation. Confusing the high price of energy with inflation obscures the real issue of the energy crisis: how and how rapidly should the economy be allowed or forced to adjust to a radical increase in the relative price of its most important material input?

Social and economic goals that were accepted in the expansive

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atmosphere of the 1960s—goals for living standards, income redistribution and environmental quality, for example—assumed implicitly that the price of energy relative to other goods and services would remain stable or continue to fall, as it had for much of the postwar period. Now the need is to divert real resources in a massive way to pay for current energy consumption and for investment in domestic energy production and conservation. The talk about oil and inflation, or about oil and the dollar, only serves to conceal the need for these difficult economic and political adjustments. Moreover, if price and exchange-rate stability were restored by the only effective means—improved monetary management—these fundamental economic and political problems would come to the fore for appropriate discussion and treatment.

Of course, this would be only one of many benefits to the economy of overcoming inflation. The price system would once again be able to fulfill its natural function of providing an efficient guide to investment and employment opportunities. Periodic bouts of tight money would become less necessary; deep and prolonged recessions could be avoided; exchange rates could be stabilized; growth could be stronger and steadier because profit expectations would improve; and the rate of investment would rise. In short, a victory over inflation would bring with it a solution to the tangle of economic problems called stagflation.

For years now, governments of the industrial countries have railed against inflation. Until now, however, most have recoiled against the side effect of the antidote, a lower rate of money supply growth. Initially, such a policy leads to a reduction in the rate of growth of expenditures by consumers and investors on goods and services. Unless firms and workers react to the change in monetary policy by lowering the rate of increase in prices and wages, reduced spending will necessarily be spread over a somewhat smaller volume of production. Inventories accumulate beyond desired levels, output is cut back, unemployment rises.

However, these side effects are temporary. To move unsold goods, firms mark up prices at a slower rate, or actually reduce them. Gradually, inflationary expectations are weakened, new wage bargains reflect a lower inflation premium. It once again becomes profitable to expand output and employment.

But "temporary" has often proved too long a time frame for policymakers conscious of the electorate's displeasure. When unemployment rises, most countries have reversed the monetary restraint in an effort to check the rise in unemployment. Inflation, of course, has revived as a result.

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In most countries people have come to anticipate this policy cycle and its effects. Now, stabilization policies lack credibility. The public expects prices and costs to go on rising, and inflation holds up stubbornly in the face of monetary restraint. Investment in new plants and equipment lags, and, as a result, the growth in labor productivity and real wages slows. In countries with restrictions on labor mobility or stringent minimum wage laws, unemployment remains high, often concentrated among youth and disadvantaged groups least able to forego the on-the-job training which a more robust economy would provide. And this joblessness is well-nigh permanent, embedded in the structure of the economy and impervious in the short run to stimulative monetary and fiscal policies. To deal effectively with stagflation, thereby reducing unemployment in the long run, governments first have to win back the confidence of the public in their capacity as economic managers.

V

Under the pre-1914 gold standard, governments sought and won confidence in their currencies by keeping them convertible into gold at a fixed parity. Money creation was linked to, and disciplined by, the supply of monetary gold, which in those days was not subject to political manipulation. Under the Bretton Woods system, as we have seen, the dollar took the place of gold as the regulator of the supply of other currencies, while the Federal Reserve's control of the supply of dollars was qualified by the dollar's convertibility into gold.

Today, however, for the first time in modern history, there is no objective regulator to discipline money creation. Yet money retains its value—that is, its expected purchasing power—only when people have confidence that its supply will remain scarce relative to the supply of goods and services. Finding a new source of monetary discipline is, therefore, the key to the problem of stagflation.

Ideally, the regulator of money should be beyond national control, as gold was under the gold standard. It could be, for example, a supranational International Monetary Fund that would issue an international currency. But that solution is obviously beyond reach. A return to Bretton Woods is most likely out of the question also. Under Bretton Woods, the Federal Reserve played the role of a supranational monetary agency. It was top dog, controlling the international money supply. But the economic growth of Europe and Japan has long since reduced the

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economic preponderance of the U.S. market that underlay that monetary structure. Even if the purchasing power of the dollar were now to be stabilized, only a politically more balanced international monetary arrangement would prove acceptable today.

Between an ideal but impossible supranational monetary order and the anarchy of the present system, a new path to monetary stability can perhaps be found. An arrangement of this kind may grow out of the present effort of European countries to stabilize their currencies against each other, and to harmonize their monetary policies, under the new European Monetary System or EMS.

Basically, the EMS represents a commitment by each of its members to preserve fixed exchange rates between its own currency and those of the other members. The system started operation in March 1979 with West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, France and Italy as charter members. A central exchange rate for each country's currency in terms of each of the other currencies was established. Actual exchange rates are permitted to fluctuate up to 2.25 percent above or below the central rate, with the exception of the Italian lira, which is permitted a wider six-percent band on either side of the central rate. To enable countries to overcome any balance of payments problem that may arise, the EMS also contains provisions for short- and long-term credit facilities among member central banks and governments. Thus, in many ways the EMS resembles a Bretton Woods in miniature.[1]

As was the Bretton Woods system, the EMS will only be as strong as the acceptance by each of its members of the common inflation rate that any well-functioning fixed exchange rate regime implies. And it is for this reason that the EMS holds more promise than earlier European arrangements of the same kind. Those attempts failed because Britain, France and Italy were unable to find a common denominator with Germany for monetary policy. Now, however, the increased sensitivity of markets to monetary policy may also make it possible to bridge that policy gap, because it forces all EMS members, not Germany alone, to give a high priority to fighting inflation. Thus, the improved prospects for the EMS arise not because European governments are less jealous of their independence than they used to be or more willing to sacrifice monetary sovereignty on the altar of the European idea, but for practical reasons. The sensitivity of the exchange markets

[1] A detailed description of the EMS is contained in the *IMF Survey* March 19, 1979, "Supplement: The European Monetary System," pp. 97–100.

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has exposed the fallacy of attempting to reduce unemployment by fiscal and monetary expansion. Accordingly, policymakers in France and Italy seem to have lost faith in old-style demand management. In this chastened mood, they are ready for a new attempt to stabilize prices and exchanges.

In France, this process is already far advanced. The two-and-one-half-year-old "Barre program" (named for the Prime Minister) has slashed the rate of money growth in France and enabled the country to restore equilibrium in its balance of payments. So far, the French franc has experienced little difficulty in adhering to the EMS. Domestically, however, the program has not yet produced a major improvement in the French rate of inflation, although it has induced a significant rise in unemployment to nearly six percent of the labor force.

In part, French inflation remains high because the economy is adjusting to the last phase of the price decontrol program. However, it is anticipated that these effects will soon wear off, and that the monetary restraint of the past few years will produce a substantial fall in the inflation rate over the latter half of 1979. Thus, France has to a degree already copied much of the German recipe for success against inflation: a lower rate of money growth coupled with liberalized unemployment benefits and heavier use of the bond markets to finance a greater government budget deficit. France has probably already incurred the major cost of price stabilization; to abandon the struggle at this juncture would be to sacrifice whatever gains are to be made on the inflation front and to generate a substantial depreciation of the franc on the exchange markets without boosting employment significantly before the 1981 presidential elections.

In this stabilization effort, membership in the EMS has played a central role. Linking the franc to the mark in the EMS has conveyed to market participants the strength of the government's commitment to restoring price stability in France. The ability to maintain a fixed rate with a currency whose purchasing power is known to be stable disseminates important information: it indicates that French monetary policy is following a course which will bring the French inflation rate into line with the low German rate.

This external discipline has also attracted the Italian authorities. As one of its last decisions, the Andreotti cabinet entered the EMS. Although it took advantage of the wider six-percent band of fluctuation for the lira within the EMS, it is already clear that the Bank of Italy has used the EMS to guide its efforts toward

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internal price stabilization. Here, too, the strength of the lira within the EMS is conveying the information that Italy has started on the path to stabilization.

Of course, its commitment to this policy cannot be considered firm as yet. The new government has barely begun to formulate an economic program. However, looking to the long term, one may retain a certain degree of optimism about the ability of the Italian government to stabilize the domestic purchasing power of the lira. Any return to monetary stimulation would augur only a balance of payments crisis and a collapse of the lira such as occurred in 1976.

In this stabilizing process, Germany's low rate of inflation stands out as a beacon. Ultimately, it will tend to set the European norm, either because firms and individuals will have abandoned their own national currencies for marks, or because governments in other countries will have elected to follow Germany's policy lead. Accordingly, in recent years, many non-German residents have been holding an increasing portion of their wealth in assets denominated in marks. If Italy were to maintain a rate of money growth far above Germany, then firms and individuals in Italy would most likely continue to shift from lire into marks; this, in turn, promotes a depreciation of the exchange rate of the lira vis-à-vis the mark and an acceleration of inflation in Italy. Unless the Italian monetary authorities react to this, they will be increasingly unable to use money creation as a means of financing government expenditure on goods and services. In other words, their money sovereignty will ebb.

In fact, this is just what has been happening over the past few years not only in Italy but also in France. The governments of these countries have now reacted to this process by joining the EMS. Through it they can preserve some portion of their monetary sovereignty. In a world in which capital is relatively free to flow among currencies, monetary sovereignty is indeed dependent on the willingness of the people to hold the government's issues of currency. And that depends on the currency's prospective purchasing power, ultimately on its supply. To prevent people from abandoning their currency entirely and from simply holding German marks in lieu of francs and lire, the French and Italian monetary authorities have started to follow the German policy lead. By accepting membership in the EMS, monetary authorities in Italy and France have acquired the right to participate in decisions concerning the common rate of inflation toward which the fixed exchange rate provisions of the EMS will ultimately

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push its members. Without their acquiescence, it is likely that firms and individuals would have attempted to create a zone of price stability by shifting their currency holdings to marks.

If France and Italy are counting on the external discipline of the EMS to guide them back to price stability, Great Britain, for the moment, seems to be relying on its own internal discipline to do so. Britain, of course, represents the clearest case of the trials a country faces when it attempts to eradicate the philosophy of fine-tuning the economy through extensive stop-go economic policies. Although former Prime Minister James Callaghan had clearly stated that such stop-go measures only stalled the economy, the electorate has now entrusted Margaret Thatcher with the mandate to reduce inflation and eliminate barriers to production and investment. Largely on the strength of the Conservative Party's dedication to these aims, the exchange markets have bet heavily that the pound sterling will lose its purchasing power at a much less rapid rate in the future. With a hefty majority and a five-year tenure in office and some probability that Britain, too, will join the EMS, the Conservatives seem to have a fair chance to restore price stability in Britain. Their long-run success will depend, of course, on their maintaining a firm monetary stance in the face of the coming rise in unemployment.

Whether from external discipline or internal conviction, the European countries seem, therefore, to have embarked on the path to exchange-rate stabilization and price stability. Policymakers in France, Britain and perhaps Italy have probably seen the dash for growth transform itself once too often into the rush toward inflation and exchange-rate depreciation. In fact, the lack of a viable policy alternative may be the most powerful reason keeping the European economies on the stabilization path.

VI

If the preceding analysis is correct, a zone of European monetary stability seems a distinct possibility in the mid-1980s. The accompanying implicit or explicit coordination of monetary policies among European countries would add an important element of cohesion to the Common Market. This economic union would not only control the largest share of the world's industrial output but it would also be able to offer wealth-holders several currencies that would be attractive alternatives to dollars in their portfolios.

Under such circumstances a more balanced international economic system would necessarily result. However, the shape of the system and the role of the United States in it remain open.

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Although the inflation of the past decade has destroyed much of the dollar's central function in the international economy, the size of the U.S. economy and the depth of its capital markets ensure that the decisions of the Federal Reserve concerning monetary policy still have a major influence on economic conditions throughout the world.

However, this remnant of monetary hegemony from the Bretton Woods era is fast evaporating. Even now, important nonresident holders of dollars—OPEC countries, foreign central banks, large international firms—customarily shift a part of their dollar holdings into marks whenever U.S. monetary policy diverges in an expansive direction from German monetary policy. With the addition of sterling and other European currencies to the list of stable currencies, such shifts would swell in volume, shrinking the dollar's sphere of influence at a rapid rate.

Unless the United States reacts to these votes of no confidence in its currency, the dollar seems fated to replicate the long drawn-out demise of sterling as an international currency following World War II, and for much the same reason: a failure by the monetary authorities to preserve the currency's purchasing power. As Britain did in 1976, it is likely that the United States would ultimately confront a situation in which demand-management policies would reveal themselves to be utterly bankrupt.

Expansionary monetary policies would immediately lead to exchange-rate depreciation and an acceleration in inflation without raising output or lowering unemployment. In other words, the United States would find itself in the situation confronted by Britain, France and Italy, countries pointing toward stabilization because they have no other choice. Until then, however, stagflation would continue to rule in the United States and in much of Europe as well. The dollar would continue to slide on the exchange markets and the OPEC countries might view keeping oil in the ground as a better way to preserve the real value of their wealth than investing in financial assets, such as U.S. government securities.

Of course, it is in the power of the United States to short circuit this entire process. It can check the ebb in confidence in the dollar by starting now to stabilize its purchasing power. In so doing it can still aspire to the leadership of a new international monetary system, although never to the hegemony it enjoyed under Bretton Woods. Leadership responsive to European and Japanese interests would be welcomed and serve to strengthen the Western alliance. It would improve domestic economic conditions as well.

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However, the United States does not seem ready to embrace a stabilization program out of internal conviction. Perhaps the advantages of price stability for investment and growth are too obscure; the dangers that inflation and a progressive tax structure will erode the wealth of American families, too remote; and the consequences of such a stabilization program for unemployment, believed too abhorrent for the voters or the politicians to enshrine price stability as the primary target of economic policy.

Nonetheless, the problem of inflation and the erosion of the U.S. position in the world economy continues to demand attention from policymakers. If not internal conviction, perhaps external pressure will induce the United States to take action. To some extent, of course, it already has. Last November the rapid fall of the dollar against the mark and the yen persuaded the Carter Administration that some measures were necessary to protect the dollar. The dramatic increase in the discount rate and the subsequent drop in the rate of money growth in the United States did halt the dollar's slide.

Now, however, the first signs of the recessionary side effects of that policy are becoming apparent. Already, some official circles are talking of the need for stimulative measures, such as a tax cut, to spur the economy. Perhaps, therefore, external discipline is the only way policymakers can keep themselves lashed to the mast, so that the U.S. economy may traverse the narrow course toward price stability and more robust economic growth.

Is it not time for the United States to join Europe, and probably Japan and Britain as well, in a broader, looser version of the EMS, in which Washington would agree, first to stabilize its exchange rate against the mark and the yen, and then, after a period of six to 12 months, to generate an appreciation of the dollar sufficient to eliminate the current discrepancies in domestic purchasing power between the dollar and the other major currencies? If rigidly adhered to and implemented by appropriate monetary policies, this commitment could transmit the information needed to convince economic decision-makers both inside and outside the United States that the United States intended to preserve and strengthen its monetary sovereignty by attracting followers to its leadership. This would be a far wiser course than for the United States to attempt to force its hegemony on residents and non-residents alike by means of controls. And it would certainly be a more far-sighted policy than standing by passively as the dollar is abandoned for other currencies.

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Admiral John M. Lee

AN OPENING "WINDOW" FOR ARMS CONTROL

American and Soviet space planners are both familiar with the concept of "windows"—transient time periods when the positions and relative movements of the earth and the target planet or planets are such that a probe vehicle launched during the window can reach the target. In effect, the window exists when a number of variable factors, some independent, some interacting, are in phase at the same time.

A similar concept applies to arms control negotiations. Great strides are possible only under "window" conditions, when the negotiating parties are simultaneously driven to seek agreement by their interacting positions. The variables that determine those positions are many: strategic concepts, the state of technological development, weapons inventories and ongoing programs, control and verification capacities, and, most fundamentally, budgetary and political forces. All of these must be at least in a neutral position, and some must be pressing, if the resistance of inertia, hostility, suspicion, special interests and the momentum of weapons programs is to be overcome.

The classic case of an open window perceived and acted upon was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that was the centerpiece and major accomplishment of the SALT I agreements of 1972. That treaty essentially eliminated ABMs as an element in the strategic balance. It ended, for practical purposes, both the U.S. Safeguard and Soviet Galosh programs then in progress, programs which, in the judgment of all but a handful of strategic thinkers, could only have been destabilizing. And it saved both countries from very large expenditures.

On the other hand, the SALT II negotiations that ran from 1972 to the final set of agreements reached in 1979 suffered for lack of the window conditions, chiefly the obstacle of ongoing

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weapons programs of great momentum. Given a ratified SALT II treaty, however, a spectrum of factors will come together in the next negotiating period to open a window for arms control on a major scale, especially with respect to reducing or eliminating the deployment, on land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). A similar window may be opening with respect to theater nuclear weapons in the NATO area, although it will be more difficult to deal with. But if the problem of MIRVed ICBMs can be tackled successfully, the way may be open for a truly productive SALT III.

II

To understand how the SALT III window may work, it is worth noting briefly the conditions that made the ABM agreement possible:

1. *Strategic concept.* On the U.S. side in particular, there was grave concern that ABMs were inherently destabilizing. To the extent that they even appeared to offer protection to strategic targets, they made the requirements for attacking forces volatile and unpredictable, a clear field for worst-case planners. They were bound to stimulate increases in offensive weapons on both sides, and in programs for evading or overcoming defenses.

2. *Technological status.* The U.S. ABM system was under severe attack; experts contended that it was of fundamentally defective design for its stated objective, the defense of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fields. The U.S.S.R. program was proceeding very slowly if at all, suggesting that it, too, was being basically reexamined. Both sides had gone far enough to realize that while ABM systems could be created, they would be of doubtful effectiveness.

3. *Weapons balance.* The Galosh system was ahead of Safeguard, with some ABMs actually deployed. Safeguard, however, was technically more advanced and proceeding more rapidly. Neither side had a successful program clearly in prospect. On the contrary, emphasis on ABM, by either side, could only stimulate the other's programs both in ABM and offensive weapons.

4. *Expense.* The costs of the ABM development itself would be substantial for both sides, and the additional expense of the programs stimulated by the ABM could be foreseen.

5. *Control and verification.* Finally, there was available a realistic set of arms control proposals, including adequate verification.

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Just how these factors translated into political pressures on each side must be a matter of judgment. In hindsight, the Soviet leaders may have been less influenced by the strategic argument (which had been pressed on them as far back as the Glassboro summit of 1967) than by their limited technological possibilities, the relatively higher momentum of the U.S. program, and the expense. On the U.S. side, regional domestic opposition to any widespread U.S. deployment, and a powerful opposing campaign by technical and academic experts combined with public supporters of arms control were special added factors. What is clear is that both sides came into focus at roughly the same time, with similar basic calculations.

As a contrary example, in the same SALT I negotiations of 1969–72, no agreement or even serious negotiation was possible concerning MIRVs. Highly successful U.S. MIRV programs were in full swing, starting their deployment to operational forces, while the U.S.S.R. was in an early development phase. With such an imbalance, the United States could not generate a control proposal, carrying anything approaching an Administration consensus, which did not maintain a U.S. advantage. The Soviets, whose ability to catch up in a few years was easily predictable, and freely predicted, were disinclined to limit MIRVs until they had caught up, and in any case were completely and understandably unwilling to agree to a permanent MIRV inferiority. In brief: no window—no agreement.

Similarly, the development of these weapons systems and extensions thereof have obstructed breakthroughs in the SALT II negotiations. The Soviet programs, leading to their fourth-generation systems (SS-17, -18, and -19), are not only catching up in qualitative terms—MIRVs and improved accuracy—but are continuing to expand the U.S.S.R.'s ICBM force. In effect, they have been adding improved quality to increased quantity in a way which the United States was bound in the end to respond to with a new missile program of its own. At the same time, the United States has been completing its initial MIRVing program, improving accuracies and yields, starting new submarine and submarine missile programs, and—to a degree perhaps more disturbing to Soviet leaders than we had thought—moving well ahead in the development of high-accuracy cruise missiles of long and intermediate range. In these circumstances, it is understandable that SALT II accomplished less substantive arms control than was hoped, and the very real accomplishments of SALT II are all the more remarkable.

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For SALT III, however, both technological and cost advantages in far-reaching arms control measures should exert essentially equal magnetism for both sides. New technology, especially high-accuracy, mobile ICBMs and IR/MRBMs (intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles), as well as cruise missiles, confronts the two superpowers and their allies with new or intensified threats. Turning these potential threats into actual hardware, and developing and producing the weapons to counter them, will call for large new or expanded weapons programs on both sides. These programs will be destabilizing. They will be immensely expensive. They will, in some cases, be technically very difficult and uncertain, as, for example, the method of basing the proposed U.S. mobile ICBM designated MX. They will in some cases be politically very complex and divisive, e.g., the establishment, control and location of a cruise missile force, or an IR/MRBM force, in Europe. And, as always, the counter-programs will themselves be subject to countering in due course.

At the very best, all these programs can promise is a renewed temporary standoff, at an even higher level of weaponry, after a dangerous, unstable and very expensive buildup.

On the other hand, there is, in the same time frame, a basis for arms control agreements which could control the new threats without tilting the U.S.-Soviet (or NATO-Warsaw Pact) strategic balance. This is the window.

At present, and for a substantial period ahead, only ICBMs with MIRVs pose a preemptive counterforce threat to land-based ICBMs that could destabilize the nuclear balance. ICBMs with single warheads, however powerful, can destroy on the average only some fraction less than one silo each; the attacker in a silo-to-silo duel expends more weapons than he destroys and gains no advantage; the value of striking first evaporates. Submarine weapons lack the combination of yield and accuracy to threaten a major ICBM system in hardened silos, and the problem of controlling the immensely complex and time-sensitive counterforce attack would be formidable from submarines. Bombers, with or without cruise missiles, lack the necessary speed; warning time would be measured in hours, much too slow for preemption. It is only MIRVed ICBMs, and, indeed, only advanced MIRVed ICBMs such as fourth-generation Soviet weapons and U.S. MX and Minuteman III with Mark 12A warheads, that have the requisite combination of warhead numbers, yield, accuracy, speed, reliability, and tight controllability to attack entire ICBM systems. In brief, were the MIRVs on ICBMs eliminated, fixed ICBM

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vulnerability would go with them. Thus we should work in SALT III to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs.

Granted, this would not be a permanent fix. But it should last for a substantial weapons generation or more, until, say, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) accuracy, yield and control were markedly enhanced. And that problem could be handled by qualitative controls in future SALTs before it became acute.

III

Ratified SALT II agreements will make an important, probably essential, contribution. The accompanying "Statement of Principles" prescribes early resumption of SALT negotiations aimed specifically at reducing numbers, controlling weapon developments, and ensuring verification; the stage will be set for progress.[1] SALT II's provisions for equal numbers of strategic launchers provide the necessary common base for reductions and establish the principle of equality. SALT II's verification provisions are of central importance: MIRV counting rules, prescribed data exchanges, advance notification of certain tests, as well as the provisions, carried over from SALT I and further clarified in SALT II negotiations, against interference with or concealment from national technical means of verification (i.e., technical intelligence-gathering systems), are not only necessary in themselves, but are essential precedents for the intrusive, probably cooperative, verification measures that will be needed in later agreements. The limits set in SALT II on the number of warheads per missile reduce the worst-case projection of the total numbers of warheads the Soviets could load on their ICBMs, which are larger and of greater carrying capacity ("throw-weight") than ours; these limits are also a precedent for further warhead controls and reductions. The program restraints contained in the SALT II Protocol, especially those on deployment of ground- and sea-based cruise missiles and mobile ICBMs, while they do not restrain development and thus do not interfere with the negotiating leverage of these systems, emphasize their importance and focus ongoing negotiation on them.

[1] The "Statement of Principles," essentially the initial agenda for SALT III, agrees on continuing negotiations to: (1) limit and reduce numbers and qualitative characteristics of strategic weapons; (2) strengthen strategic stability by limitations of the most destabilizing arms; (3) ensure adequate verification by national means plus, where needed, cooperative measures. The agreed objectives are substantial reductions in numbers, limitations on new development and modernization, and agreement on cruise missiles, air-to-surface ballistic missiles, and mobile ICBMs.

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SALT II has another major value, perhaps inadequately appreciated. It cleans out a mass of underbrush that stood in the way of progress, laying down precise agreements, understandings and treaty terms on a long list of disputable points (the distinction between a modernized and a new missile, the counting of aircraft with cruise missiles, the definition of throw-weight, the dates when weapons pass into and out of the countable inventory, and dozens of other specifics). Given a ratified SALT II, none of this laborious effort need be repeated; much of the future work, indeed, could be accomplished merely by additions to, or revisions of, articles of SALT II. Also, the long negotiations have improved communication and understanding on both sides, at many levels of government and throughout growing arms control communities; there is a much clearer and readier perception of what the situation is and what the problems are. This will expedite and focus future negotiations.

Rejection of SALT II by the Senate, whether outright or by "killer amendments," would abruptly stop the SALT process, and surely have a negative impact on other arms control negotiations. How long it would take to regain momentum, if it could be done at all, and how much damage would have been done to the terms already agreed to and to the authority any Administration would bring to further negotiations, can perhaps be debated. Clearly, however, there would at best be much to do again, by negotiators commanding less confidence, in an atmosphere exacerbated by rejection of a hard-fought compromise.

By about the terminal date of the SALT II treaty, in 1985, if negotiations have not been successful, the new weapons, even those not yet deployed, will be accepted elements of the new strategic balance. Great investments will have been made; the programs will have widespread support and immense momentum. Defense planners will be concentrating on the next weapons generation—on the counters to the counters. Somewhere in that time frame, the current opportunity will slip away; this particular window will close. But with SALT II, there is an opportunity of unprecedented scope.

IV

As we have noted, the United States faces a situation in which its Minuteman system will, in the mid-1980s, be theoretically vulnerable to a preemptive strike by a fraction of the Soviet fourth-generation ICBMs (SS-17, -18, and -19), assuming the accuracies, yields and reliabilities now estimated for these weapons

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and the SALT II constraints on their missile and warhead numbers.

Such an attack would leave untouched the ample retaliatory capabilities of our at-sea submarines and alert aircraft. Further, the outcome of the attack is highly questionable, considering the great uncertainties confronting the attacker. The attacker's forces would be entirely inexperienced in large-scale launchings, and this would be an attack of great complexity in targeting and timing. The chances of serious mistakes would be substantial, and he would have no valid estimate of his "operational degradation," i.e., the reduction in accuracy, reliability and timing between single test firings on target ranges and mass firings from regular silos with ordinary crews under extreme tension. He cannot know with precision the resistance of our silos, nor, given the limits of geodetic precision, their exact position in relation to his launch points. In a mass attack, he, like us, has no experience of the effects of the detonations of leading weapons on following ones (fratricide), nor of the dust the leading weapons throw up, and if he designs his attack to separate the detonations in time and space to avoid fratricide and dust, the attack will take considerable time—hours—to complete, during which many yet unhit Minutemen could be fired in retaliation. He cannot be sure of the weather in the widespread target areas, which can have measurable effects on the arriving weapons.

Finally, the U.S. response to such a counterforce attack would be unpredictable, even by ourselves. The attacker could not be sure that the United States would not "launch on warning," that is, fire its ICBMs when the incoming strike was detected, before it hit, leaving only empty silos to receive the attack. And he surely could not count, with any confidence, on our government making a cool, analytical weighing of forces in such a situation, under appalling pressures, with the immediate dead—even in an anti-silo attack—counted in the millions. He would have to reckon with the substantial probability that the response would be a general strike by our immense remaining forces against his cities and population, essentially destroying the fabric of his country, even in the face of his capacity to do the same to us.

The expected vulnerability of Minuteman, when and if the Soviets achieve their anticipated accuracies in the next few years, is therefore of limited significance in a direct operational sense. Nevertheless that vulnerability, however theoretical, can be felt by us and seen by others as a U.S. weakness; in times of tension it could expose us or our allies to political pressure from nuclear

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threat. Perhaps more important, vulnerable Minutemen could be a destabilizing factor in a time of high crisis. The Soviet ability to destroy a high percentage of our ICBMs would put a premium on our striking first; in a situation where a strategic exchange seemed more and more probable, to the point of inevitability, some relative advantage from the first strike could be the final persuading factor. Finally, strikes against vulnerable ICBMs are at the heart of strategic concepts aimed at "limited" nuclear warfare at the strategic level. The ICBMs provide a "legitimate" (i.e., not urban-industrial or population) target system of significant value. Such concepts, giving apparent rationality and purpose to the actual use of nuclear weapons, erode the barrier between nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. They reduce nuclear deterrence.

Such considerations have brought the Administration to the decision to proceed with the development of a new mobile missile, the MX, and to pursue as a priority the question of its mobile basing. Senate SALT II hearings likewise leave no doubt that the Congress, too, is determined to proceed with necessary equalizing programs.

As in the ABM treaty case, it is not possible to be sure that these concerns, in the areas of strategic concept, deterrence, instability, and computer-calculated outcomes of nuclear exchanges, are felt as strongly on the Soviet side as they are in the United States. One simply cannot know whether the Soviet civilian leadership believes what some Soviet military theoreticians write about being prepared to fight nuclear war at all levels. But the Soviets are clearly capable of understanding and absorbing the U.S. determination to equalize, and the capacities of our proposed programs. They will feel that weight increasingly as the programs progress. It cannot fail to be clear to them, as to us, that the prospect is for an extremely expensive and, in the end, fruitless further competition unless an arms control avenue is found.

The MX is designed to be larger than Minuteman, to carry ten warheads (in place of the three in Minuteman III) of substantially higher yield and remarkable accuracy. It is to be carried in a mobile launcher and based in some sort of protective concealment system (trenches, multiple silos, "race tracks," conceivably in alert aircraft or waterborne in vehicles other than ocean-going submarines or bottom crawlers). It is expected to have limited vulnerability to attack—the land systems would be unprofitable counterforce targets because they would require greater expenditures of attacking forces than would be offset by losses of MX; the air and sea basings would themselves be protected by their mobility while

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in the air or at sea. The ten-year costs of a 200-missile system are currently estimated at $30 billion; experience suggests that estimates of weapons system costs made at this early stage are almost invariably markedly low. The present schedule calls for the system becoming operational commencing in 1986 and being completed in 1989; production delays, like cost overruns, are not unheard of in weapons procurement.

The MX system, then, when and if it meets its design goals, will overcome the present threat to Minuteman. In addition, the system will have sufficient capability to threaten the U.S.S.R.'s ICBMs as they now threaten ours. Subject to the same reservations that were outlined above about the significance, in operations, of Minuteman vulnerability, the MX system, once operational, would be theoretically able to destroy a very high percentage of Soviet ICBMs in their silos. Indeed, the threat to the Soviets would be greater than theirs to us, in that a higher proportion of their strategic power is concentrated in ICBMs—some 70 percent of their strategic warheads and over 80 percent of their strategic megatonnage, whereas for the United States the figures are about a quarter of the warheads and 40 percent of the yield.

Even the Soviet residual force, after discounting its ICBMs, would be a formidable, probably ample, deterrent. Still, the perceived threat would exist, as the threat to Minuteman does for us. Almost certainly the Russians would have to follow us into some form of mobility or concealment. At a minimum, this would require a major, entirely new, mobile weapons system. If their decision were to replace the capabilities of their entire fourth-generation fixed ICBM system, the new system would have to carry some three times the warheads of the proposed MX system—a massive program.

The product of this cycle, after a decade or more of dynamic instability as one and then another program reached operational status—and as possible weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the new systems were exposed and exploited or corrected—and after vast expenditures on both sides, would be at best two new opposed ICBM systems, neither vulnerable, for a time, to the other's preemption.

But this would be by no means the end of the matter. The Soviet fourth generation will threaten the Minuteman; the MX will threaten the fourth generation; new developments, in turn, will threaten MX. Nuclear arms expert Richard Garwin has already suggested to the House Armed Services Committee (February 7, 1979) that quite feasible "pin-down" tactics—detonating

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a series of weapons in the airspace above the MX deployment areas—could deny the use of land-based MX, for periods of hours, at times of the Soviet's choosing. (The same possibility exists for U.S. and Soviet ICBM fields, and for any future Soviet land-based mobile ICBM deployment area.) Speaking of the multiple aim point (MAP) basing system, a kind of massive "shell game" then apparently the leading candidate for MX basing, Garwin also pointed out that if adopted by the U.S.S.R., it would raise the specter of a Soviet "break-out" from SALT.

The thought here is that (1) SALT permits building and storing, but not deploying, additional missiles, and (2) allows for denunciation of the treaty by either party on six months' notice under the supreme national interest clause, while (3) MAP would require building a large number of protective silos. If either country built the weapons and silos—a thousand or more—and then denounced the treaty, a substantial ICBM reinforcement would require only the building of the launchers to hold the missiles in the silos, and the six-month denunciation notice—a relatively brief period. (A similar possibility exists in other land-based systems where a large number of protected launch points is built for a small number of ICBMs.) Garwin thinks that five years after this country went ahead with MX in MAP, there would be "as much concern and search for an alternative to MAP, in view of its potential vulnerability, as there is now a sense of urgency to do something about Minuteman." Problems of this nature apply to all the so-far suggested basing systems, for the United States and U.S.S.R. alike.

In short, the weapons-building route, the arms race, is inescapably unstable and unreliable. Clearly, if the end can be met by an arms control agreement, that would be the less dangerous, the less expensive, and the less hostile path.

V

Eliminating MIRVed ICBMs should not be beyond the limits of negotiability. It could be adequately verified by national technical means, supplemented by a ban on any further testing of ICBMs with MIRVs. It would require the United States to convert its 550 Minuteman III missiles to single warheads. The U.S.S.R. now has something over 600 MIRVed ICBMs, presumably building toward the SALT II limit of 820, that would have to be converted. Both sides possess tested single warheads for the ICBMs involved.

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The U.S.S.R. would reduce its warheads by a greater number—on the order of 5,000 (assuming the full 820 Soviet MIRVed ICBMs) to the U.S. 1,100. Numerically, then, the Soviet reductions would be the greater.

Timing (the period of the open window) is, as always, an essential consideration. There is a range of key dates. The SALT II Protocol will expire at the end of 1981, ending the ban on deploying mobile ICBMs (including the U.S. MX). Soviet fourth-generation ICBMs, with high kill probabilities against Minuteman silos, are expected to be essentially deployed in the early 1980s, as are U.S. aircraft armed with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). SALT II expires at the end of 1985. The MX missile is scheduled for deployment during the late 1980s.

What these dates indicate is that the Soviet weapons which bring ICBM vulnerability to a head will be in place a few years ahead of the proposed U.S. counters. Further, the U.S.S.R. may share our view that multiple warheads are the major benefit of their larger ICBM throw-weight, and feel that a MIRV ban would surrender a significant Soviet advantage. They may value the transient superiority in ICBM counterforce capability that will exist from completion of the fourth-generation deployments in the early 1980s until MX is operational. They may be—probably will be—disinclined to trade hardware going into deployment, the fourth generation, against weapons under development, the MX. It is a truism that neither nation is normally willing to bargain an actual against a hypothetical system.

However, there are countervailing considerations. The countering weapons are clearly within our capacity to develop and produce; the recent presidential decision on MX and the Senate SALT II debates have made clear that we are determined to produce them. Congressional action on the defense budget will drive the point home. Thereafter, MX forward movement will be clearly evident, month by month. The technology of the missile is in hand; the basing is complex theoretically but its construction is straightforward. The Soviets will be able to observe its momentum, and they are aware that weapons programs tend to become irreversible. In brief, MX probably has some leverage with the U.S.S.R. now, and it will steadily gather leverage during the SALT III negotiating period. This process will be stimulated by the quicker and more precise dialogue on strategic nuclear matters, between the superpowers, that the past ten years of the SALT process have created.

Further, the Minuteman III, when upgraded with the Mark

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12A warhead and the NS-20 guidance system, will itself have substantial hard-target kill potential. Were the United States to upgrade all 550 Minuteman IIIs (1,650 warheads), they could fire two warheads at each of the 820 Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and theoretically destroy some 75 percent of them (more with the introduction of marginal improvements expected in the next two or three years). It would clearly be worthwhile from the Soviet standpoint to eliminate this U.S. capability.

The Soviets have seen, in the case of MIRV—as we have—that advantages are temporary. We can hope they will be more ready to look ahead. And the possible agreements are of great value to both sides. In brief, the window is already cracked, and will open progressively wider through, say, the first half of the 1980s.

Against the point that greater Soviet ICBM throw-weight may make ICBM MIRVs more valuable to them, one can balance the facts that, first, they have already accepted, in SALT II, restrictions on numbers of warheads per missile—they are not, apparently, concerned to get maximum fractionalization. Second, since single warheads have greater yield than the aggregate of MIRVs on the same missile, the Soviets would gain in megatonnage; in the past, they have developed and tested very high-yield warheads—they may well find value in the megatonnage gain.

As far as the Soviet mid-1980s ICBM counterforce superiority is concerned, the rebuttal is self-evident. First, it is operationally unusable. Second, it is destabilizing and dangerous. Third, it could not be decisive; our retaliatory capacity is ample, redundant, and (with air-launched cruise missiles) growing, even assuming an unrealistically successful Soviet preemptive strike. Fourth, it is transient. MX, once deployed, will not merely cancel the advantage, but reverse it.

Those are, so to speak, the mechanics. More fundamentally, both sides would benefit from the agreement. From the U.S. standpoint, we would regain confidence in our Minuteman system. There would no longer be great concern about preemptive counterforce attacks against them, nor about the destabilizing effects of their theoretical vulnerability; "limited" silo-to-silo exchanges would lose such rationale as they now have. This country would sense improved deterrence, improved stability, and strengthened validity of our basic "assured second strike" strategic concept.

On the Soviet side, similar advantages accrue. They may not evaluate them as we do, of course, but even if they do not share our strategic concepts, the practical situation they confront will

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be quite clear, and they are at their best in evaluating the "objective factors." Their mid-1980s advantage is limited, not decisive. The oncoming MX program will reverse the advantage, put at risk their entire ICBM system, and require an equivalent system of their own. In a sense, therefore, rather than trading hardware against concepts, the Soviets could view the ICBM MIRV ban as trading away a moving MX program against the hypothetical Russian system MX would almost certainly require them to build. It is a good deal for the Soviets too.

Both parties would waste enormous amounts of money and resources on a mobile ICBM race. The Soviet cost would depend on the scale of their program, but it is unlikely to be less than the low estimate of $30 billion cited for the United States. If they made a complete changeover to mobile systems at their current force levels, it could be two or more times greater. Both would be faced with technical and strategic uncertainties; the mobile-basing problem is not solved, and mobility will at once raise the question of counters, and counters to the counters. Both would lose in intelligence confidence and SALT verification; verification of mobile systems is intrinsically less certain. And both parties—and their allies—would confront a decade or more of increased hostility and lessened stability from an intensified and dynamic arms competition.

The agreement, overall, would be balanced and equitable, causing no long-term tilt in the strategic relationship. Both sides would retain ample, indeed excessive, deterrent and retaliatory capacity. The Soviets would retain their lead in total yield and in missile throw-weight, but the significance of throw-weight would be markedly lessened when it could no longer be converted into a multiplicity of warheads. The Soviet advantages would be balanced by the U.S. lead in numbers of SLBM warheads and in bomber capabilities.

The elimination of MIRVs on ICBMs is not the only arms control route to reducing ICBM vulnerability. President Carter's "comprehensive proposal," at the start of his term, sought the objective largely through reductions in Soviet throw-weight, combined with control of increasing accuracy by limitations on missile testing. As formulated, the proposal was arguably inequitable, but, more important, the SALT II foundation had not been laid and the MX counterthreat was unborn; the window was not yet open. Others have proposed moving to, or at least toward, a dyad; eliminating the vulnerable ICBM system, or reducing it to minor proportions, and relying on air- and submarine-carried weapons

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for strategic deterrence. This would make our ICBM force into a bargaining chip in pressing for deep Soviet reductions in forthcoming negotiations.

McGeorge Bundy, in a thoughtful article in *International Security*, proposes that the triad be maintained, but not with MX. He would replace the Minuteman with a new system to serve as the triad's third leg: a mobile system embodying MX's reduced vulnerability,[2] but deliberately designed *not* to have the accuracy/yield/numbers characteristics which would threaten the Soviet ICBM system. It would thus cure the problem of Minuteman vulnerability, without driving the U.S.S.R. to a massive changeover to a mobile system. Verifying its limitations might be tricky. Even so, willingness to shift from MX to a Bundy-type system would be a powerful bargaining chip in arms control negotiation.

No such ideas should be dismissed. They should be explored in depth in preparing for SALT III negotiations. In the absence of new insights, however, eliminating ICBM MIRVs appears to be the most direct and effective cure for the problem of Minuteman vulnerability.

VI

In addition, an ICBM MIRV ban would be notably fruitful in opening up other aspects of SALT III. It should make both sides willing to agree to a complete ban on mobile ICBMs, since the key motivation for such systems would be removed. This would not only halt a major step-up in the arms race, but would make a valuable contribution to verification. As we have noted, verification of mobile weapons is intrinsically more difficult, and it will be hard indeed to make MX reliably verifiable without reducing the invulnerability of the system. The solution chosen may be subject to Soviet challenge as a violation of SALT's verification provisions. Further, we might—and probably would—be dissatisfied with the Soviet solution to the same problem in their answering system. The result could be a serious setback to verification generally and to strategic weapons control.

Also, an ICBM MIRV ban should lead to an agreement to flight test or deploy *no* new types of ICBMs, rather than the one new type apiece allowed in SALT II. Our SALT II motivation for

[2] Mr. Bundy leans toward waterborne, submersible basing, in mobile but not ocean-going or (to avoid treaty restrictions) bottom-crawling vehicles, rather than multiple aim points, trenches, etc. To meet the terms of SALT II, the vehicle would have to be, by definition, a submarine, but could be extremely simple. See "Maintaining Stable Deterrents," *International Security*, Winter 1978/1979, pp. 5–16.

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insisting on one new type was to permit MX, or its equivalent; the Soviet purpose is not surely known—perhaps they felt a need for a single warhead replacement for the SS-11. In any case, the ICBM MIRV ban should remove the requirement for both parties. This would still permit both sides to "modernize" their systems within the SALT II rules (perhaps refined in SALT III). Such modernization permits considerable development, but the agreed limits would prevent sharp, destabilizing changes.

Once the Minuteman vulnerability problem is in hand, SALT III should be capable of truly substantive strides. For openers, both sides could presumably agree on banning air-to-surface missiles. More broadly, both sides have agreed on "significant and substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms" as a SALT III objective. The basic SALT II aggregate number (2,250 ICBM and SLBM launchers, plus strategic bombers) could be cut by a flat amount—1,800 has been suggested for the initial step, with further steps to be negotiated later—or the parties could adopt the proposal advocated by a number of experts: cutting the total by a fixed annual percentage, say five percent, either for a stated term of years or indefinitely, until one or the other party calls for renegotiation. In either case the reductions would be meaningful.

The internal sublimits would come down sharply. The 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs would of course go to zero, and consequently open the 1,200 limit (ICBM plus SLBM) and 1,320 limit (ICBM plus SLBM plus bombers with ALCM) to steep reductions. The end figure will require hard negotiation. The United States relies on these relatively stabilizing air- and submarine-launched weapons for two legs of its deterrent triad, and on their large numbers of warheads to balance the Soviet margin in ICBM throw-weight and megatonnage. The Soviets might argue for smaller figures than we can agree on, though they, too, have a large investment in submarines. In any case, both sides should be ready for tightening of limits in the ALCM/SLBM areas.

The cruise missile question will be ticklish. The United States has settled on ALCMs, in preference to the B-1 penetrating bomber, as its chief aircraft-carried retaliatory weapon, and ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles are under consideration for NATO support (as is discussed more fully in the next section). The U.S.S.R. is understandably concerned about both. The United States will be unwilling to accept deep numerical cuts or seriously constraining qualitative limits on air-launched cruise missiles, and will be unable to discuss ground-launched or ship-launched cruise missiles substantively until the European theater

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question has been considerably discussed, and then only in concert with its allies.

So there will be hard bargaining on several issues. But the result should be a SALT III that would be truly stabilizing.

VII

One other destabilizing situation today is the increasingly perceived nuclear threat to NATO Europe. Soviet development of the SS-20 mobile IRBM, the Backfire bomber, and the SS-21 tactical missile appears to be creating the possibility of a counterforce type of attack that would make NATO's own nuclear capabilities highly vulnerable. A NATO response to these concerns is almost inevitable and perhaps approaching decision. Do we, then, have a parallel to the problem of ICBM vulnerability, with the elements of concern, threat, and potential counter-threat all present? I believe we do, and that the result could be another important window for arms control.

Europe has been vulnerable to nuclear destruction for nearly 20 years. It is not now possible to eliminate that threat to NATO Europe or to the Warsaw Pact countries, any more than to the United States or the U.S.S.R. Were there nothing else, were there no tactical or theater nuclear forces, each alliance is targetable by the opposing superpower's strategic forces, each armed with ample excess destructive capacity.

The significance of the new theater weapons is not that they alter that overall vulnerability, but that they can be perceived as reducing an element of theater-level deterrence by increasing the Soviet capacity for counterforce attacks. NATO Europe has relied for nuclear deterrence, and, if necessary, nuclear support, primarily on U.S. strategic forces, supplemented by U.S. nuclear elements based in Europe, allied "two-key" forces, and French and British national forces. These forces have not been invulnerable to attack—by aircraft, by overrunning, by strategic or other weapons—but the new Soviet weapons, especially the mobile SS-20 with its multiple warheads and high accuracy, have greatly increased ability to attack NATO nuclear elements, and other military targets, with high kill probabilities and little warning.

The increased threat to theater forces combines with European concerns about the certainty of the "coupling" of external U.S. strategic forces, the primary deterrent. Europeans, that is, cannot be absolutely sure that our strategic forces would if needed be committed to hostilities confined to the European theater—NATO treaty or no NATO treaty—now that such commitment

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would most probably result in the destruction of the United States. Europeans therefore understandably give some attention to the contingency of a theater nuclear war confined to Europe; in this scenario, increased Soviet counterforce capacity is significant.

Accordingly, several allied programs have been conceived to counter these Soviet developments. They include deploying extended-range Pershing missiles and additional modern nuclear-capable tactical aircraft to Europe. But the most significant possibility is a mobile intermediate-range missile system—cruise, ballistic, or a combination of both—designed for greatly reduced vulnerability and able to match the Soviet SS-20 by threatening the Western U.S.S.R., as well as the Warsaw Pact countries, with a reliable theater-based attack accurate enough for counterforce purposes. This would restore the theater deterrent, and while it could be perceived as increasing any tendency to decoupling, would sufficiently enhance the theater's self-contained capabilities to outweigh that consideration.

This European situation is quite comparable to the problem of Minuteman vulnerability. That is, an element of the overall NATO nuclear force can be seen as threatened by Soviet developments even though, as in the case of Minuteman, the operational feasibility and rationality of an attack is highly questionable. And the response, taking the weapons-building route, would be to create a new NATO-European system, analogous to MX, as a counter.

It must be noted that establishing a NATO IRBM or IRCM force in Europe would create major problems. The force would be an answering threat to the Warsaw Pact, granted. But on the NATO side, it would generate very difficult and divisive problems of control, deployment, coordination, security, financing, modernization, and support, like those that became evident in the early 1960s during consideration of NATO MR/IRBM and the NATO Multilateral Force. It would also be very expensive, diverting resources from more productive ends, military or civil. It would probably exacerbate European concerns about decoupling U.S. strategic forces from European defense. On the Soviet side, it would clearly be a project to oppose strongly, surely a source of enhanced NATO-Warsaw Pact tensions and hostility, and in due course a stimulus to a further countering system.

Agreements that would prevent a new theater nuclear weapon cycle or, better, commence the reduction of the opposing systems, would clearly be the better road.

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Negotiating such agreements would be a matter of great complexity. In the first place, they could not be negotiated directly between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The interests of our NATO allies are profoundly and directly involved; they would have to participate fully. Warsaw Pact nations would also have to join in, even if their participation were more cosmetic. SALT could not be the appropriate forum for a multilateral operation, even though its concerns would overlap at the boundaries (cruise missiles, Backfire bombers). Neither would the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction discussions in Vienna be a satisfactory locale; MBFR would likewise overlap the new negotiations (tactical nuclear weapons), but its basic thrust is quite different. It would not be rational to load the MBFR forum with a separate and important new task, requiring a different kind of expertise, just as its work, long comatose, is showing signs of progress. In sum, an entirely new multilateral negotiating forum would be needed, coordinating with both SALT and MBFR. There would be an exponential increase in negotiating difficulties.

Further, the elements of the agreements would be very difficult to fix in an evenhanded way. Theater nuclear forces in Europe form a continuum from deep-strike elements to battlefield weapons, from forces supporting strategic strike plans to those integrated into conventional forces. It would be visionary to try to attack the whole problem at once, yet, on the other hand, it would be hard to control one element without tilting others. The problem, and it would be complex and time consuming, would be to narrow down to specific issues where substantive, balanced agreements were possible and which made strides toward stability and toward mutual reductions in theater forces. Clearly, the theater negotiations, like SALT, would have to be a continuing process—agreement after agreement over time.

It is evident that much study and discussion, both national and international, will be needed to find a consensus on both the negotiating mechanism and the elements to be negotiated. Some outlines of the problems of substance can, however, be laid out. The objective, to repeat, should be to stabilize the theater nuclear relationship, to prevent deployment of major new systems or major modernizations or reinforcements on either side, and to undertake balanced reductions. The factors that would create the possibility for agreements now and in the next few years—the factors that open the window—are, in the first place, the heightened concern in NATO over increasing Soviet theater capabilities at a time of U.S.-Soviet strategic equivalence, bal-

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anced by predictable Soviet concern over prospective NATO programs produced in response; and, in the second place, the new and prospective weapons systems themselves, coming in the same weapon cycle: the SS-20, the SS-21 tactical missile, theater cruise missiles, enhanced radiation warheads, the extended-range Pershing, the general program to modernize NATO tactical nuclear elements. A related program, so far pushed aside in SALT but ultimately inescapable, is the question of U.S. forward-based systems, balanced by that of the Backfire bomber and other Warsaw Pact theater systems.

A special group has recently been established under the NATO Council, in Brussels, to explore theater nuclear arms control possibilities. It was set up, characteristically enough, some two years after a similar group started work on the arms-building route. As yet, the various national views have not coalesced, much less those of the Alliance, and the issue is not being given much priority. Obviously, there is as yet no contact with the other side on the matter, and the hard and time-consuming business of establishing working negotiations—getting mutual understanding and broad agreement on the general substance of matters to be negotiated, specifying the outlines of the problem, the order of priorities, and getting some feel for the nature of each side's preliminary views and proposals—remains to be planned, much less carried out. These matters took years in SALT and in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks.

The last ten years of intensive work in those negotiations have greatly extended the communications, the common vocabulary, and the informed work force in East-West arms control matters; theater nuclear negotiations will profit from what has gone before. Still, quick results in the European theater are not to be thought of. On the other hand, the deepening concerns, the threats, the counterthreats and the expensive hardware programs, all leading to a major, unstable climb to at best an equally unstable plateau, are clearly in sight. It is time for a substantial effort toward the arms control alternative. The factors are favorable if the negotiators can catch up with them.

VIII

Three other arms control agreements which bear on the strategic relationship and the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance are currently under negotiation: a comprehensive test ban, a ban on antisatellite weapons, and mutual and balanced force reductions. All

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would be killed, or at least indefinitely delayed, by failure to ratify SALT II. Given SALT II, however, all three are generally promising. Each would be a valuable step. Other possibilities can be suggested, or will emerge.

The projects discussed in the earlier sections, plus these, could together form the basis for a broad U.S. campaign of nuclear and East-West arms control. The key triggering item is solution of the problem of ICBM vulnerability. It is the one for which the various influencing factors—the window conditions—are most immediate and unmistakable. Success with it would ripple out, surely to a valuable SALT III, and also to positive momentum for the others.

No one can guarantee success, in whole or even in part, for such a major program of arms control efforts. Still, many factors justify the attempt. If it fails, the arms-building route, however unpalatable, remains. Success would make our security, our allies' security, and that of the whole world measurably greater and more stable. Hostility and fear would be reduced and large resources saved.

Last but not least, whether such a program were to fail or succeed, it would be good for this country that we had made the effort. It would be good for our view of ourselves and our confidence, now in disarray, that we still follow our best national impulses; it would be good for the world's view of us if we publicly dedicated ourselves to a large-scale effort to stem the momentum of the arms race.

There is, however, no reason to expect failure. The time is ripe; the international and military factors are favorable. A window is opening.

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David Kahn

CRYPTOLOGY GOES PUBLIC

In November of 1978 a remarkable conference took place in Germany. It brought together for the first time the Allies' backroom boys of World War II and those whom they had outwitted for nearly six years—the cryptographers of the Third Reich. Together with historians, they discussed what had been the most secret part of the intelligence war. This was the Allied solution of the principal German ciphers and consequent ability to read large segments of high-level military traffic, including the very messages of Adolf Hitler to his generals.

An admiral of the Royal Navy described how his knowledge of U-boat orders enabled him to steer convoys around the wolf packs to help win the Battle of the Atlantic. An American intelligence officer told how foreknowledge of a German attack enabled the Seventh Army to repel it with minimal losses. The Royal Air Force's former scientific intelligence chief recounted how Ultra—as the Allied solutions of German messages were called—gave him the first clues to German V-weapons and enabled the Allies to bomb the research center at Peenemünde and later the launching sites in France. A historian discussed how the American solution of the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine revealed what the Japanese ambassador in Berlin was reporting to Tokyo about his conversations with Hitler—intercepts that became, Chief of Staff George C. Marshall said, "our chief basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe."

All of this proved too much for one of the Germans. During the war he had repeatedly assured the head of the Kriegsmarine, Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, that the naval Enigma cipher machine was not being solved by the Allies—when, in fact, they were doing so almost solidly and often instantaneously. "If the Allies could read it all," he asked with some asperity, "why didn't they win the war sooner?" An American historian answered, "They did." And no one in the high-ceilinged university senate room dissented. All agreed that Ultra had shortened the war and saved thousands of lives. Ultra was, one of its veterans has rightly said, "the most important sustained intelligence success in the history of human conflict."

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It was typical of the traditions of cryptology that the Ultra secret was withheld, from the Germans as well as from the public, for nearly 30 years after World War II ended. Governments maintain this sort of discretion for a number of practical reasons. To reveal how a cryptogram was solved would enable other countries to strengthen their cryptosystems to prevent such solutions. Even to reveal *that* a cryptogram had been solved might awaken other nations' cryptographers to the possibility that their ciphers, too, might be broken and so might impel them to change them. Disclosing the details of one's own cipher systems would obviously nullify their ability to keep communications confidential.

Finally, to admit prying into other nations' messages would embarrass a country and so burden its international relations. In only one case, apparently, did a statesman refuse to read other countries' messages not out of fear of bad publicity if caught but because he felt it was wrong. In 1929, when Henry L. Stimson became Secretary of State, he ordered the closing of the combined State Department-War Department Cipher Bureau on the ground that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail" and in the belief that mutual trust was the best road to world comity.[1] It was an act of the highest international morality. But the times made it impossible. When he became Secretary of War in World War II, he was one of the grateful readers of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages—provided by the War and Navy Departments, which had kept their code-breaking groups alive in 1929.

Thus, secrecy about cryptology has been the rule at least since the science became a permanent function of state through the establishment of letter-opening black chambers in the Renaissance, as a concomitant of the rise of modern diplomacy. The Venetian Republic's Council of Ten ordained that any cryptologist who betrayed secrets could be put to death. In 1723, Britain's House of Lords asserted in a trial for treason that "it is not consistent with the public Safety, to ask the Decypherers any Questions, which may tend to discover the Art or Mystery of Decyphering." Governments still adhere to this principle as much as they can. In 1933 and again in 1950, the United States enacted

[1] The nations of the world have paid lip service to Stimson's principle by incorporating in Article 27, Section 2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations the rule that "The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable." *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 500, New York: United Nations, 1965, p. 110. Probably only the nations that cannot violate other countries' correspondence accede to the provision. The United States has in effect nullified its adherence by including in a 1978 law setting up procedures for electronic surveillance within the United States (including messages of foreign powers) the phrase "Notwithstanding any other law," which, under the Constitution, includes treaties. 92 *U.S. Statutes* 1786.

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laws that impose fines and jail terms for anyone revealing official cryptologic secrets. The National Security Agency (NSA), responsible for U.S. cryptology, operates under the tightest possible security. The same is true of its foreign counterparts.

And secrecy has been relatively easy to maintain because cryptology has been largely a monopoly of governments. Though businessmen have sometimes used codes or ciphers to conceal their messages, they seem almost never to have intercepted and solved competitors' cryptograms.

But it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep the official lid on. With the expansion of radio communications and advances in intercept technology, cryptology has become so extensive an activity of intelligence and security that political and military events will from time to time impinge upon it and expose portions of it. The 1964 clash of the U.S.S. *Maddox* with North Vietnamese patrol boats in the Gulf of Tonkin, the attack upon the U.S.S. *Liberty* during the Six-Day War in 1967, and the capture of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* by North Korea in 1968 revealed some details about American intercept operations. Previously, in 1960, two NSA employees, William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell, defected to the Soviet Union and gave a press conference in Moscow about American code-breaking activities. And the 1974–75 congressional investigations into the American intelligence community revealed a good deal about the vast scope of NSA's intercept operations.

More recently, cryptology has, perhaps for the first time, become the subject of formal intergovernmental agreement. In the final stages of the negotiations of the SALT II agreements now before the Senate, the American side insisted that the treaty bar "the encryption or encoding of crucial missile test information," as President Carter said in his June 1979 televised address to the Congress on the treaty. Concealing information on missile tests by encryption would make it harder for the United States to ascertain Soviet missile capabilities—and for the Russians to ascertain American.

To prevent this, the treaty provides that "neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty." But since the treaty does allow encryption when it does not interfere with verification, the question of when encryption interferes and when it does not is being looked at hard in the Senate's deliberations.

But the SALT case is relatively limited and still mainly a

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government problem. What is today far more interesting and significant is the degree to which new factors are causing cryptology to spill over from the governmental domain into public awareness. Major governments today are not limiting their intercept activities to official communications; they seek to draw intelligence from the communications of tens of thousands of private firms and citizens of all nationalities. The protective countermeasures of target nations necessarily include the private sector. At the same time, concerns about foreign and domestic invasions of privacy have led private firms and individuals to demand security for their stored computerized files and their electronically transmitted messages. To meet this demand, private researchers have invaded the highly technical realms of cryptology that have long been a government monopoly.

In short, what has happened to other technologies, such as atomic energy, is happening to cryptology. It is becoming a public matter, and raising a whole new set of public issues.

If one nation is intercepting communications on the territory of another, what is the proper diplomatic response to this? Should a government advise its nationals on protecting their communications from foreign exploitation when such advice might enable other nations to better protect their own communications and so deny the parent government valuable communications intelligence? May private individuals develop and publish cryptographic techniques that, because of their advanced nature, could also deprive a parent government of communications intelligence? Do First Amendment rights take precedence over the needs of national security?

We are only beginning to see the shape and scope of these and other issues raised by cryptology as it goes public. This article seeks to explore some of them.

II

A few words about terminology may help. "Cryptology" encompasses signal security and signal intelligence. The former includes all ways of keeping secret both human messages, such as telegrams and telephone conversations, and electronic messages, such as computer-to-computer data exchanges. These ways include cryptography—varied techniques for putting the messages into secret form by code or cipher. The elements of the message—letters, electronic pulses, voice sounds—can be scrambled or replaced by other elements. The receiver, who must know the key or secret

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procedure used in encryption, then reverses the process to read the original message.

Signal intelligence comprises all methods of extracting information from transmissions. These methods can include identifying radars or translating telemetered data of intercontinental ballistic missiles in flight. Other methods deal largely with human communications. Among these are interception of messages in plain language; traffic analysis, which matches radio call signs to particular military or other headquarters and draws inferences from the volume of traffic on various radio circuits; and cryptanalysis, which breaks the codes or ciphers that armor messages. These three are generally grouped together as communications intelligence, or COMINT.

Nonspecialists frequently ask two questions about cryptology. Is there an unbreakable cipher? There is indeed one that is absolutely unbreakable. This is the one-time pad. It cannot be used in every situation because it requires as many random letters for its key as in all messages that will ever be sent, and this presents an insuperable distribution problem. It can serve in restricted situations, however, as in spy messages and on the Moscow-Washington hot line. There are also many ciphers that, properly used, are unbreakable in practice, since the cryptanalyst cannot assemble enough text to analyze their complexities. Because they do not have the disadvantage of the one-time pad, such systems serve in most military and diplomatic networks today.

The other question is: Have computers not made it possible to solve all ciphers? They have not. Modern cipher machines are in effect special-purpose computers themselves. Since doubling the encryption capacity appears to square the number of trials the cryptanalyst has to make, the codemaker can always stay ahead of the codebreakers.

III

In 1975, the Rockefeller Commission on Central Intelligence Agency activities revealed that the communist countries "can monitor and record thousands of private telephone conversations." News stories later said that the Russians not only could but did monitor "millions" of domestic American telephone calls—100,000 a year in the Washington area alone. Then President Carter, at a news conference, acknowledged that "Within the last number of years, because of the radio transmission of telephone conversations, the intercept on a passive basis of these kinds of

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transmissions has become a common ability for nations to pursue."[2]

How did this happen? How do they do this?

Since 1950, telephone companies have increasingly sent conversations—both between people and between computers—from city to city by microwaves. These are radio waves beamed on a line of sight from a transmitter through several relay towers, usually perched atop hills about 25 miles apart, to the receiver. Communication companies like microwaves because building and maintaining towers costs less than buying land for right of way, digging a trench, and laying cable. Today about 70 percent of the toll call mileage within the United States is microwave.

But radio is easy to intercept. The intruder does not even have to reach into the microwave beam. Each relay radiates enough energy for an eavesdropper to pick up the microwave signal five to ten miles away. The antenna for this would have to be a ten-foot dish, but "The interceptor can make use of a number of innocent-appearing structures such as apartments, houses, sheds, barns or a specially outfitted van," says a recent study made for the White House.[3] If the interceptor can get closer to the beam, he can use smaller and less obtrusive equipment. None of this is either very difficult or very costly—around $60,000 according to the study. The real problem arises in trying to pluck a particular person's conversations out of the incredible welter of calls. And for a long time this final step seemed insuperable. There were simply too many telephone calls to check.

But the evolution of computers made individual targeting feasible. A computer can count the clicks of a telephone dial or the beedledybeeps of multifrequency pushbutton calling as they pour in torrents over the microwaves. It compares that number with a list stored in its memory. If it finds no match, it discards the call and passes to the next. But if a match exists, the system "drops" the intercept onto a tape recorder for human analysis.

The Soviet Union, acting through disguised intermediaries, has almost certainly rented houses near important microwave routes and filled them with the sophisticated electronic gear needed for interception. Senator Daniel Moynihan has said that the Russians are listening in their consulate in San Francisco, their mission to

[2] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977,* Vol. II, Washington: GPO, 1978, p. 1234.

[3] Mitre Corporation, McLean, Virginia, *Study of Vulnerability of Electronic Communication Systems to Electronic Interception,* prepared for the Office of Telecommunications Policy, January 1977, Department of Commerce: National Technical Information Service, PB 264447 and PB 264448, Vol. I, p. 17.

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the United Nations in New York, and their apartment house in the Riverdale section of the Bronx. The two locations in New York, he states, provide "extraordinary access to telephone traffic in the whole of the New York metropolitan area, and in particular to that of the financial, commercial, and legal communities of Manhattan."

Though the aerials on the present Soviet embassy on 16th Street in Washington a few blocks north of the White House are designed for legitimate shortwave transmissions and not for interceptions, the Russians got lucky with their new embassy on Tunlaw Road, on one of the highest hills in Washington. When they were assigned the land, private telephone monitoring was unknown, and no one took into account that the site bestrides some important microwave beams. A primary telephone trunk group for the eastern seaboard runs close by on the relay between microwave towers in Arlington, Virginia and Gambrills, Maryland. A Defense Department digitized voice circuit from the Pentagon to Western Union's Tenley Tower on Wisconsin Avenue passes almost directly over the site.

Late in 1977, the Soviet Union added another new and important mode of interception when it installed big antennas in Cuba to monitor communications sent by satellite. These comprise telephone calls, telegrams and computer data moving between the United States and 55 other nations. The messages are directed upward to one of seven satellites hovering 22,300 miles above the Atlantic; the satellite then retransmits them back down toward a receiving station on the ground, usually on the other side of the ocean. But the downward beam spreads widely, and even from outside its fairly large "footprint" on the surface of the earth it is easy to pick up its signals, though the cost of a steerable 30-meter dish for such interception has been estimated at $1.5 million.[4]

All this seems an extraordinary effort to gain information that on its face does not seem very important. Why does the Soviet Union do it?

One reason is that codebreaking no longer yields the quantities of central information it once did. The transistor and large-scale integration of electronic circuits, which made pocket calculators

[4] There have never been any reports of Soviet or other attempts to "tap" the transatlantic telephone cables. A submarine could lay a length of wire alongside a cable and pick up the signals by induction. But demultiplexing the numerous interleaved conversations would require considerable complicated equipment, probably too bulky for a submarine to carry. The Roosevelt-Churchill conversations that the Germans intercepted during World War II were sent by radiotelephone, since no telephone cables then existed. The Germans never attempted to tap the transatlantic telegraph cables.

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so cheap, have placed excellent cipher machines within the price range of more countries than ever before. This means fewer code-breaking results, and this reduction has driven the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, to gather information from the unencrypted, plain language messages—both human and computer—that pass over telephone circuits.[5] Though plain language intercepts seldom provide the insight that cryptanalyzed ones do, they have their strengths. "Anyone listening in to a senator's telephone conversations for two weeks would own him," says one senatorial aide with tongue only halfway in cheek.

Another reason for the shift to telephone eavesdropping is that it can provide quantities of a kind of information that is becoming more and more important: economic intelligence. Information that might warn of dollar or energy crises is becoming as critical as military and diplomatic information. The Soviet Union, for example, is reported to have used its intercepts of American grain dealers' telephone conversations to advantage in its big grain purchase. Monitoring the data flowing by microwave and satellite in domestic and international time-sharing computer networks could reveal financial transactions of giant multinationals, once the trivia of airline, hotel and rental-car reservations are screened out.

The United States, too, is seeking economic intelligence through interception. In its leaked 1976 report, the House intelligence committee said that American signals intelligence "in this area has rapidly developed since 1972, particularly in reaction to the Arab oil embargo" and the Soviet grain deal success. Recently it was reported that intercepts of oil-producing nations' messages warned the U.S. government of their intention to raise oil prices.

Almost certainly, too, the United States eavesdrops extensively on communications within the Soviet Union. Monitors at the embassy on Tchaikovsky Street in Moscow are known to have listened in on the limousine radio-telephones of Soviet leaders, even though they apparently got only scraps of intelligence (including, according to a columnist, views on the ability of a favorite masseuse). It seems likely that such activities are targeted as extensively as possible on other Soviet internal communications, particularly those of a sort that would be between private citizens

[5] It might seem that this decline would reduce the scale or status of the code-breaking agencies. But the need to process much more traffic to approach the quality of cryptanalyzed intelligence means having to add more men and/or machines. Thus the cryptanalytic loss, far from being an organizational disaster, may be a bureaucratic godsend. Though the present NSA Director says that this analysis does not fit the facts, several non-NSA intelligence specialists say it is true.

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in America. (In the 1950s the CIA did manage to tap the military telephone lines used by Soviet forces in East Germany, through a tunnel under the East Berlin boundary, but this was probably a one-time success after its discovery by the Russians.) No doubt the Western powers get fewer intercepts from East European countries and the Soviet Union than those powers obtain in the West, but because information is harder to come by in the communist closed societies, the West's intercepts are more valuable.

IV

As these new techniques become known, the two superpowers are taking steps to close them off. And these steps have generated some of the new controversy and discussion. What are they?

The Soviet Union has flooded the American embassy with non-signal-carrying microwaves, apparently to jam the American eavesdropping devices. But microwaves pose a health hazard, for this is the same radiation that at higher intensities cooks food in microwave ovens. Although there was a brief scare, American officials have since emphasized that they have no evidence that the radiation has yet been responsible for any illnesses.

But that is not a solution in the United States, as much for environmental as for technical reasons. Nor is a proposal by Senator Moynihan, who grew incensed about the apparent double standard applied against interceptions. "We are standing around in the Rose Garden pinning medals on one another for having discovered that the FBI is tapping somebody's telephone," he said, but nobody is doing anything about the Soviet intrusions. He introduced a bill that calls upon the President to declare persona non grata any individual with diplomatic immunity who is "willfully engaging in electronic surveillance on behalf of a foreign power."

One problem with this idea is that the Russians might retaliate in the same way against American eavesdropping, which would probably hurt the United States more than the Soviet loss of intelligence would hurt them. Another is that expelling a foreign eavesdropper might cause more loss than gain. For the United States has apparently learned about Soviet eavesdropping mainly by "piggybacking," or intercepting Soviet transmissions of their urgent American intercepts back to Russia for analysis. To reveal details officially might compromise the source.

Probably for these reasons, the executive branch has rejected the Moynihan proposal. Carter has said that "I would not inter-

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pret this use by the Soviet Union or by other embassies to be an act of aggression." What then is the United States doing to deprive the Soviet Union of this intelligence?

It is undertaking a multi-million-dollar program to protect American domestic communications. On February 15, 1979, the White House issued a three-page, single-spaced National Telecommunications Protection Policy directive. It divides messages into three categories and specifies different safeguards for each.

"Government classified information relating to national defense and foreign relations"—military and diplomatic messages—will come, as before, under the control of the National Security Agency, the government's cryptologic body. It has already transferred many sensitive telephone circuits from microwaves to buried cable, and is expanding the Electronic Secure Voice Network. This uses telephone scramblers—each about the size of two file drawers—to render conversations unintelligible to eavesdroppers.

The other two categories will be handled by a new Special Project office in the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Associate Administrator Donald Jansky has an annual budget of $2 million and 20 experts for the job, the main part of which he expects will last 5 years. His teams have already spoken to almost a dozen telecommunication common carriers on how to protect messages in the second category: "unclassified information transmitted by and between government agencies and contractors that would be useful to an adversary." Some companies are looking into such matters as the practicability of bulk encryption to scramble all messages transmitted over a particular microwave link. The teams will also survey the needs of government agencies and will recommend particular cipher systems to them.

The third category consists of "nongovernmental information that would be useful to an adversary." Examples that Jansky gives include the strategy to be used by American firms in negotiations against foreign competitors, changes in the prime interest rate, crop forecasts, the availability of critical materials, and developments in advanced technologies. The White House directive requires that such information "be identified and the private sector informed of the problem and encouraged to take appropriate measures." Jansky's office is not chartered either to analyze the problems of particular firms or to recommend specific ciphers. But it will draw up guidelines for evaluating types of protection systems that the firms will probably buy.

The entire program comes under a National Security Council

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subcommittee that will settle jurisdictional disputes between Commerce and NSA. It marks the first time that any government has ever dispensed advice on codes and ciphers to the public. This has helped bring cryptology out of the closet. So has the question of cost. Jansky predicts that for the carriers and private firms this will reach "probably in the billions."

V

The new program is linked to the rising debate on cryptology in another way as well. One of the cipher systems that it will recommend to some government bodies and contractors lies right in the crossfire of the argument over whether foreign code-cracking intelligence is more important than protecting citizens' privacy by giving them good ciphers. The cipher is known as the DES, or Data Encryption Standard. As bank cash-dispensing machines grew in number, bank officers became concerned that the wires between these machines and the central office computer could be tapped to gain information and then used to "tickle" a money machine to make it disgorge its average cash holdings of $20,000. So the International Business Machines Corporation devised a cipher to encrypt the identifications, amounts and account numbers passing over these wires. Modern semiconductor techniques enabled it to be extremely complex and yet embodied on an integrated-circuit ceramic "chip" the size of a thumbnail: it is the tiniest known "cipher machine" ever produced.

In 1973, the National Bureau of Standards, responding to the increasing public concern about data privacy—such as the confidentiality of individuals' Internal Revenue Service files—solicited for a standard cipher. Government agencies would have to use it when encrypting personal files, and private firms would have to use it when communicating with these agencies in secret mode. By far the best system submitted was IBM's.

It was, in fact, so good that a miniature debate seems to have broken out in secret between the two halves of the National Security Agency, which was advising the Bureau of Standards. The code-breaking side wanted to make sure that the cipher was weak enough for NSA to solve it when used by foreign nations and companies. The code-making side wanted any cipher it was certifying for use by Americans to be truly good. The upshot was a bureaucratic compromise. Part of the cipher—the "S-boxes" that performed a substitution—was strengthened. Another part—the key that varied from one pair of users to another—was weakened. In this form the government proposed its adoption as

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the Data Encryption Standard for non-national security messages and files and for interfacing with the private sector.

At once a storm of controversy broke.[b] Computer scientists and mathematicians clamored that the DES was still too weak. They charged at technical conferences and in the press that NSA had secretly pressured the standards bureau to weaken the cipher so it could solve it more easily. NSA, they contended, had no right unilaterally to decide a question of such importance to so many people. They also said it was possible that IBM and the code agency had built a "trap door" into the cipher that it alone could spring to reach a solution, and argued that lengthening the key was necessary to afford proper protection to personal records. The Bureau replied that the cipher was strong enough and that lengthening the key would increase the cost of encipherment unacceptably. So vociferous did this first national debate on cryptology become that the standards bureau set up two workshops on the DES. These vented some of the criticism but otherwise nothing changed. As of July 15, 1977, the DES became the official government civilian cipher.[7]

Later the Senate intelligence committee staff investigated the matter. It issued a report saying that no one had exercised any improper influence on anyone else and noting that the NSA had recommended the cipher for use by the Federal Reserve Board. For the present, the furor has abated. DES chips are now being manufactured by half a dozen firms, and it is a sign of the new interest in secret communications that the DES bids fair to become what no other cipher ever has been: profitable in sales to business. The American Banking Association has endorsed it, and it will therefore protect many financial messages in the coming era of electronic funds transfers. (The protection of the security of such transfers is, of course, a matter of grave private concern. But there is also the possibility that hostile elements or terrorists, if they could break into the system, might introduce spurious messages designed to throw the whole financial system into chaos.)

But in five or ten years advances in computer technology will so greatly reduce the time needed to crack the DES—a time now measured in years, even with the fastest computers—that the cipher will have to be strengthened. The debate will resume. It will again bring into confrontation the needs of national security

[6] See David Kahn, "Tapping Computers," *The New York Times*, April 3, 1976, p. 27.

[7] Department of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards, *Data Encryption Standard*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46, Department of Commerce: National Technical Information Service, January 15, 1977.

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through codebreaking and those of individual liberties through codemaking.

VI

Another great debate in cryptology continues to simmer. Should free inquiry be allowed in the field, or are its implications for national security so great and so sensitive that research should be controlled by the government?

For a long time this issue did not really exist. The only cryptologists outside NSA, with its squadrons of brilliant dedicated mathematicians and engineers backed by banks of the biggest and fastest computers, were a few hundred hobbyists who solved pencil-and-paper cryptogram puzzles. The spread of computers and of data communications began changing that. Whereas stealing a paper file required physical access to it, stealing data that was stored and transmitted electronically could be done by copying it at a remote terminal. Computer crime, wiretapping and terrorism made this threat real. One defense was encryption, and computer scientists in many firms and universities began studying it; the DES is a product of this interest. Very rapidly the quantity and quality of information on cryptology being circulated outside of government channels exceeded by far what it had ever been before.

The expansion was accelerated by Stanford University scientists' development of public key cryptography, the most revolutionary new concept in the field since polyalphabetic substitution emerged in the Renaissance.[8] Unlike standard cryptosystems, such as the DES, in which the same key serves both to encrypt a message and to decrypt it, public key cryptography employs one key to encrypt and another to decrypt. The two keys are mathematically related to one another, and each user possesses a pair. He makes one key public. The other he keeps secret. Suppose user A wants to communicate secretly with user B. He looks up B's public key and encrypts his message to B in it. B applies his private key to decrypt the message. Thus anyone can send B a secret message, but only he can read it. This asymmetry can eliminate one of the most

[8] For an excellent discussion of the idea by its inventors, in the context of the best current survey of modern cryptography, with extensive bibliography, see the study by the Stanford scientists, Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman, "Privacy and Authentication: An Introduction to Cryptography," *Proceedings of the IEEE* (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers), March 1979, pp. 397–427. The most workable realization of public key cryptography is by Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman, "On Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems," *Communications of the ACM* (Association for Computing Machinery), February 1978, pp. 120–26.

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vexatious problems in practical cryptography: distributing keys to a correspondent before secret communication can be started with him. And a twist makes possible what has never been possible before with electronic messages: unforgeable signatures.

The seeming impossibility of these schemes, their boldness, and their elegance have attracted numbers of first-rate mathematicians to cryptology. There is now, for the first time, an informal network of scientists who can do sophisticated mathematical cryptology and who bounce ideas off one another in the way that advances a study rapidly and rationally.

Suddenly the nation is faced with a problem it has never had before—an information explosion in cryptology. NSA worries that any mention of codebreaking might make other nations change their codes, losing intelligence and forcing the agency to redo much of its work. This happens far less often than the agency likes to think. In 1941, for example, Japan did not change its principal diplomatic cipher despite an unequivocal report that the United States had broken it. Nor did the German navy alter its systems in World War II, despite much suspicion. Several of the countries named by the defectors Martin and Mitchell in 1960 as having had their codes broken by NSA did not change them thereafter. But more cautious nations do replace their cryptosystems upon suspicion of solution, and NSA fears that all the new activity in cryptology may not only dry up the flow of foreign intelligence but also inadvertently expose principles used in American ciphers. All of this has caused it to ask whether the right of unrestricted inquiry is worth the national security losses. The issue has surfaced in three recent episodes.

One dealt with inventors of cryptographic systems. Dr. George I. Davida, a bright and articulate professor of electrical engineering and computer science at the University of Wisconsin, had applied for a patent for a cipher device using advanced mathematical techniques. The law requires that, if competent government authority deems that disclosure of an invention "would be detrimental to the national security," the Commissioner of Patents "shall withhold the grant of a patent." On the advice of NSA, the commissioner ordered that Davida's invention be kept secret. The university's Milwaukee chancellor protested that the secrecy order had "a chilling effect on academic freedom." The NSA Director argued, on the other hand, that the decision to seek a patent implied a profit motive, not academic freedom. "If the individual had elected to publish in academic journals there would have been no question of a secrecy order," he said. But this dodged the

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fundamental issue of whether publication of Davida's work would have impaired the government's cryptologic operations.

While this matter was working its way through the government and university bureaucracies, the Commissioner of Patents imposed another secrecy order. This was against a "phaserphone" voice scrambler invented by four West Coast men originally for use with citizen's band radios; it would let CB and telephone users who had it chat without being overheard by others. The four estimated that the device could sell for $100 and could have a large commercial market. The leader, Carl R. Nicolai of Seattle, angrily charged that the secrecy order "appears part of a general plan by the NSA to limit the privacy of the American people. They've been bugging people's telephones for years and now someone comes along with a device that makes this a little harder to do and they oppose this under the guise of national security." (The 1974–75 investigations revealed that NSA had in fact listened to the conversations of 1,650 Americans and had intercepted millions of private telegrams up to the mid-1970s.)

The storm of publicity led to a quick about-face by NSA. It lifted the secrecy orders on both applications. But the agency's vacillation suggested that it had not resolved within itself the issue of freedom versus security that the incidents had raised.

The third episode began when an eccentric NSA employee, J. A. Meyer, wrote on his own a letter to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, one of the largest professional societies in the world, which was holding a session on cryptology as part of a symposium in Ithaca, New York. Meyer warned the IEEE that the session and articles on cryptology that it had published might violate the government's International Traffic in Arms Regulations.[9] These implement the law authorizing the President "to control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services." On the U.S. Munitions List that enumerates these articles, which include guns, ammunition, and warships, are, in Category XIII(b), "speech scramblers, privacy devices, cryptographic devices," and ancillary equipment.

To export a warplane or a cipher machine, the exporter must apply for a license, which the State Department grants or denies after consultation with the Defense Department. (It is easy to evade these controls for cipher devices, some manufacturers note. They ship the mechanisms to the foreign country's Washington embassy, which then sends them home by diplomatic pouch.) But

[9] *Code of Federal Regulations,* Title 22, Chapter I, Subchapter M.

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the regulations also require a license to export "technical data" touching these "implements of war." "Technical data" is defined very broadly. It covers "any unclassified information that can be used . . . in the design, production . . . [or] operation" of any Munitions List items as well as "any technology which advances the state of the art or establishes a new art in an area of significant military applicability." At the same time, the regulations in effect define "export" very broadly. Before publishing something in a periodical with subscribers outside of the country, the writer must seek government approval, the regulations say. They declare that "an export occurs whenever technical data . . . is disclosed to foreign nationals in the United States (including plant visits and participation in briefing and symposia)." This seems to mean that every time someone publishes a paper or gives a talk at a conference on cryptology or on any of the other items on the Munitions List without government approval, he is breaking the law. These regulations seem never to have been tested in court.

When Meyer's letter reached the IEEE, officials cravenly urged authors of papers on cryptology to clear them with the government. As a consequence, some of the speakers conferred with their universities' lawyers, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology suspended distribution of a monograph on public key cryptography. There was a flurry of news stories. But in the end, all the papers were read—though one tenured professor read papers by two of his graduate students to protect them—and the mailings resumed.

For a while, many people thought that NSA was behind the Meyer move. But the Senate intelligence committee cleared the agency of this charge. What has not been clarified is the threat of government crippling of research posed by the arms regulations. The present Director of the NSA, Admiral Bobby Inman, a tall, boyish, brown-eyed intelligence specialist, is seeking first to calm the waters. "I am striving," he said, "to open up a dialogue" between the agency and industry and academia. He is doing so by talking to private researchers, giving interviews to the press, making a speech in public.[10] No other Director has ever thus come out officially from behind NSA's triple barbed-wire electrified fence at its Fort Meade, Maryland, headquarters; Admiral Inman says he is doing so out of concern that a bad press might harm recruitment.

[10] Before the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, January 11, 1979. Reprinted in *Cryptologia*, July 1979, pp. 129–35.

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Inman's substantive proposals on cryptologic research flow from his "deep convictions that the national security missions entrusted to the agency are in peril." He is considering imposing restrictions "on domestic dissemination of nongovernmental technical information relating to cryptology," though he would limit this to "a central core of critical cryptologic information that is likely to have a discernible adverse impact on the national security." It is rumored that he is seeking a law for cryptology analogous to the Atomic Energy Act, which places under government control not just government-generated secrets but "all data" concerning atomic weapons and "special nuclear material." Present laws on cryptology deal only with government secrets.

On the export problem, such a law would presumably provide a stronger basis for action than the purely administrative International Traffic in Arms Regulations. And, as a possible step in this direction, NSA is already seeking to have cryptology included among the "critical technologies" whose export would be controlled under a pending House bill introduced by the Administration (H.R. 4034).

But George Davida, his erstwhile opponent in the patent secrecy dispute, sees many problems in this approach. Who can foresee where the critical areas are? Microprocessors—which put practically an entire computer on a single chip—may confer greater cryptologic ability on a country than all the seminar papers ever given. Yet they are not cryptologic in themselves. Mathematicians working with no thought of cryptology may find that their work touches upon it directly. Complexity theory, which deals with how hard some problems are to solve, is a current example. "How are you going to clamp down on complexity theory?" Davida asks. "And to turn a complexity theorem into encryption is trivial. If Inman is trying to monitor everything, he'll find it very hard. In universities, where we have to keep up with new developments in computing science for our livelihoods, we find it hard."

Nor are the problems confined to the United States. They are as universal as science. Several nations, among them France and West Germany, have passed laws requiring that stored or transmitted personal data be encrypted where necessary.[11] Work is under way to create effective protocols. Though cryptologic activity seems not as great among mathematicians and computer scientists abroad as in the United States, interest is growing.

[11] See Department of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications (now the National Telecommunications and Information Administration), *Selected Foreign Data Protection Laws and Bills*, Special Publication 78-19, Washington: GPO, 1978.

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Individuals and firms who ten years ago would not have given a passing thought to cryptology are now devoting substantial portions of their time to it. The problems of transborder data flows, which some governments are trying to restrict for fear that too much of their national "information capital" may fly to nations powerful in data processing, include encryption; the study committees of industry and government have not yet grappled with them.

Among these questions is the variability of practice among governments in dealing with encrypted information coming into their territories by cable or radio. Some countries impose no restrictions; others require knowing the cryptosystem used.[12] Some countries insist upon this for domestic communications as well. For most nations, the new public awareness of cryptology has not yet become a major concern of their governments. Even in Britain, where the most public work is being done, persons studying cryptology have not gotten the feeling that the government cryptologic agency is trying to discourage the activity. But there seems little doubt that such concerns will eventually emerge.

VII

Davida and Inman, at odds on a number of points, agree on others: cryptology is no longer a government monopoly; the debate is just beginning; it will be political; it will attract many participants. Davida thinks that the question of government regulation in the field is a matter that "each person must decide for himself." Inman says that the question has to be "fully examined by the executive branch, the Congress, and the interested segments of the public."

But the examination itself may raise more difficulties than it settles. Is it paradoxical to seek public resolution of a matter that deals in secrets? Will it be done by legislation or executive order—or not at all? How can one balance the conflicting demands of national security and individual freedom?

And the problems are almost impossible to predict. Will the experts in the National Security Agency (who are reported to have invented their own type of public key cryptography some years ago), be able to stay a step ahead of the inventors, or will their closed work system eventually be matched (as it may have been in that case) and even surpassed by the open interactive

[12] This is permitted by Articles 35 and 41 of the International Telecommunications Convention of November 12, 1965. *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Vol. 18, part I, Washington: GPO, 1968, pp. 620, 622.

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community of bright scientists who refuse the restrictions and nonrecognitions of work in a clandestine agency? Will the study of cryptology become an epidemic that even all the government's resources will be unable to stem?

So cryptology, in 1945 a nation's most closely held secret, has gone public. But not even the procedures or forums for coming to grips with the new problems have been settled on. Their evolving substance will be harder still to resolve.

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Barry Wain

THE INDOCHINA REFUGEE CRISIS

Indochina is bleeding. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea discharge a massive flow of apparently permanent refugees, on a scale the world has not experienced since World War II. No end is in sight to the flow nor is any political solution visible.

There is more to the outflow than the aftermath of war—prolonged, bitter and bloody as the 1960–75 conflict was. Of the more than one million persons who have fled or been forced out of Indochina since communist governments took over in 1975, by far the greatest number have left in the last 18 months. Behind the upheaval is Hanoi's determination not only to bring Kampuchea into line and free Laos of dissidents, but to rid its own territory of unwanted elements and carry out the socialist transformation of unified Vietnam without delay. Anti-Chinese feeling is a major factor; Hanoi's approach includes forcing out of Vietnam hundreds of thousands of people considered undesirable in the new society, many of them ethnic Chinese, and in the process exploiting their financial resources to its own benefit. If the policies behind this exodus should be resumed—after the short breathing space apparently gained by the July 1979 Geneva conference—another million or more inhabitants of Vietnam might seek refuge abroad.

Already the refugees have saddled neighboring non-communist nations with serious political, economic, social and security problems. Their presence is potentially explosive in several countries, notably Malaysia and Indonesia, which have Chinese minorities and delicate racial balances. Altogether, the stability of Southeast Asia is threatened. But the implications go much further: for the Soviet Union, Vietnam's main supporter, which shows no inclination to curb Hanoi's present course; for China, whose hostility to Vietnam may have helped swell the refugee tide it now piously condemns; and for the United States, the only country capable of

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taking the lead in fashioning a solution and whose handling of the situation will determine its standing in the region in the immediate future.

Slow to recognize the human tragedy unfolding in Indochina, the West has yet to formulate an adequate response to it. After an unseemly display of indifference and buck-passing, the international community is at last starting to treat the symptoms: saving refugee lives and finding permanent homes for them. But it has yet to find a lasting cure for the disease. The fact is that Vietnam has discovered a powerful political weapon in the refugees and is unlikely to stop employing it until Hanoi sees some worthwhile diplomatic gains.

A number of nations have reacted to Hanoi's refugee policies and military action against Kampuchea by suspending aid and otherwise ostracizing the Vietnamese. The United States, consistent with this approach, has frozen moves to normalize relations with its former battlefield adversary. But Hanoi is proving almost as impervious to diplomatic pressure as it once was to carpet bombing. At the same time, such pressures could prove counterproductive, particularly for the refugees. Ultimately, the answer to the growing refugee crisis in Southeast Asia may lie in the opposite direction—bringing Vietnam in from the cold while trying to moderate its more extremist tendencies.

II

Before South Vietnam fell to the communist onslaught on April 30, 1975, President Gerald Ford and many others had predicted an immediate bloodbath in that event. By most accounts those directly associated with the old regime have indeed been treated fairly harshly by Western standards. But there was in the first postwar years nothing resembling the wholesale massacres and reprisals originally predicted, encouraging the belief that there was room for just about everyone in the new order, provided they accepted its ways.

Thus, the first flow of "boat people" from Vietnam was only a trickle. In Malaysia, from a handful of 77 in 1975, the total mounted to 1,080 in 1976 and 5,817 in 1977. Small numbers turned up in southern Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong and even distant Japan and Australia.

These first boat people generally gave a similar explanation for leaving: deteriorating conditions at home. Food was scarce and rationed, the shortage aggravated by severe drought in 1977 that was followed by damaging floods and typhoons in 1978. Life in

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New Economic Zones, rural areas opened by the government to encourage productive employment in the countryside and help resettle bloated city populations, was becoming less and less tolerable, especially to former urban dwellers. In addition, a widening draft was snaring men for border clashes that were rapidly turning into outright war with Pol Pot's Kampuchea.

In Laos and Kampuchea, the story was different from the beginning. Thousands of refugees started to pour across the Mekong River into Thailand as soon as the Pathet Lao took charge in Vientiane in May 1975. They were mostly hill-tribe groups, predominantly Hmong, also known as Meo, who had fought the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao for more than a decade in close cooperation with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. But the tribal minorities were soon joined by sizable numbers of lowland Lao, the largest single group in the country, often with urban backgrounds. The movement did not abate—rather, it picked up. In the first two years of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, proclaimed in December 1975, an estimated 150,000 Laotians crossed into Thailand.

The dislodgment from Democratic Kampuchea, as the country was renamed in 1975, also began immediately after Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge guerrillas set up government and started forcibly emptying Phnom Penh and other cities. Tens of thousands, mainly ethnic Vietnamese and Chinese but including some Khmer, fled—most to Vietnam, a few to Thailand. A larger group, predominantly Khmer, followed in late 1977 and early 1978, coinciding with purges in the Kampuchean armed forces and administration and with border clashes between Vietnamese and Kampuchean forces (supported by Chinese arms). In all, about 330,000 arrived in Vietnam by late 1978, those of Vietnamese extraction—just over half the total—being treated by Hanoi as returning countrymen rather than refugees.

Then, in late 1978, Vietnamese military forces moved into Kampuchea in earnest and ousted the Pol Pot government. Hanoi's invasion, and its determination to eliminate the last pockets of Khmer Rouge resistance to its puppet Heng Samrin administration in Phnom Penh, have had dire consequences for village life. Already stunned by three and a half years of barbaric Marxist reforms instituted by Pol Pot, Kampuchean peasants have not been able to avoid the fighting that has swept across the entire country.

At the same time, Hanoi intensified its support for the Pathet Lao in operations against the hill tribes of northern and central

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Laos, with the apparent aim (judging from the state of refugees reaching Thailand and those dying in the attempt) of annihilating the Meo in particular.

The resulting 1978–79 wave of refugees from Laos and Kampuchea overtaxed the patience and resources of the Thai government, already burdened with caring for 150,000 refugees. It decided to repatriate forcibly half of the more than 80,000 new Kampuchean arrivals, all of whom it termed "illegal immigrants." They were herded back across the border, many to certain death. All told, the post-1975 total of refugees from Laos and Kampuchea (excluding the movement to Vietnam) is now on the order of 300,000, of whom roughly two-thirds remain in Thailand, with a few in camps in other Southeast Asian countries. About 75,000 have been permanently resettled, in the United States and France for the most part.

But ghastly as the plight of these refugees remains, it is the second wave of "boat people" from Vietnam itself that now claims by far the greatest share of attention and effort. (Indeed, for reasons of focus and also to avoid political controversy over which is the legitimate government of Kampuchea, Laos and Kampuchea were not even invited to the July conference in Geneva.)

The first signs of a new and different refugee flow from Vietnam emerged around mid-1978. In July of that year, 6,232 Vietnamese landed in neighboring countries, more than had made the perilous voyage during the entire previous year. No longer were most of the refugees ethnic Vietnamese from coastal fishing villages. Before long, ethnic Chinese, called Hoa by the Vietnamese government, became a majority, despite the fact that they constituted only about three percent of the total population of roughly 50 million. And they ventured in larger boats, each carrying between 150 and 600 passengers crammed into slots little bigger than their bodies. Concurrently, in the summer of 1978, some 160,000 Hoa, many of them from the northern border areas, streamed into China overland.

What lay behind both these movements is a matter of acute controversy, especially between China and Vietnam. Unquestionably, a major factor was Hanoi's decision in March 1978 to abolish "all trade and business operations of bourgeois tradesmen"—in effect, to do away with the private trading and commercial activities that had for generations been the principal occupations of the 80 percent of the Hoa clustered in the cities of the south, especially in the old Cholon area of Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). Abruptly, more than 30,000 of the larger private busi-

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nesses, a big proportion run by Sino-Vietnamese, were closed; their stocks were purchased by the state. The owners and their families were asked to return to their native villages or transfer to New Economic Zones. Some traders had to switch their capital to "productive activities": handicrafts, or agricultural ventures. In a follow-up to the clampdown in May, a new currency was introduced—the second such reform since 1975—in a move against the hoarding of cash.

Whether or not the decision was actually taken from basic ideological rather than anti-Chinese reasons—one observer called it at the time the end of Hanoi's "soft-pedal approach to Socialist transformation"—Peking took up the cause of the Hoa and protested their treatment vigorously through the spring and summer of 1978, setting off a vitriolic verbal duel. At the same time, tensions between the two countries over Kampuchea were rising, as a result of stepped-up border incidents which ended with Vietnamese forces controlling the old Parrot's Beak area.[1]

By summer, Hanoi was definitely starting to tilt toward the Soviet Union, instead of keeping its relations with the two communist giants in careful balance as it had done for years. In late June Vietnam joined the Soviet-centered COMECON group, and shortly thereafter China stopped all foreign aid to Vietnam, suspended work on all its technical assistance projects in the country, withdrew its specialists, and closed three Vietnamese consulates in southern China.

In such an atmosphere, many Hoa must have felt that however they might behave, their future in Vietnam was uncertain. And to the outside world the overland crossings into China appeared voluntary. Indeed their warm welcome by the Chinese rang alarm bells in other Southeast Asian countries containing large Chinese communities, and lent color to Hanoi's claim that Peking agents were stirring up the flow.[2]

[1] During the war years, the two governments had boasted of being "as close as lips and teeth." But, of course, the historic antagonism runs deep, and after 1975 there had been occasional spats. Nonetheless, the relationship as of late 1977 appeared to be on a fairly even keel.

[2] Hanoi claims—and many independent analysts support it—that Peking agents under the direct control of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi started spreading rumors in the Hoa community in late 1977. The message: China would soon go to war with Vietnam; the Vietnamese would start massacring the Chinese; and the Hoa would be well advised to return to China. Hanoi's 40-page pamphlet, *Those Who Leave*, circulated at the recent Geneva conference, comments: "For the Hoa living in the provinces along the border between the two countries, the situation was a tragic one. To leave Vietnam would mean abandoning their houses, gardens and occupations in order to go and live in China, which most of them hardly knew at all. But to stay would mean running the risk of finding themselves caught in the cross fire in case of armed conflict and facing the necessity of taking up arms one day for one side or the other."

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But there were disturbing signs that more was involved in the boat traffic. Refugees told of bribing government officials to leave, booking passages in advance, having land transport provided, being assigned to vessels, and meeting no opposition from security patrols on departure. In addition to the rural ethnic Vietnamese traveling in groups of 30–40, the larger boat loads of Hoa now contained some urban ethnic Vietnamese, mostly officials of the former government or those associated with U.S. and other foreign companies, with a sprinkling of intellectuals and the formerly wealthy.

The voyage of the *Hai Hong* confirmed the worst fears of Southeast Asian governments, Western refugee officials and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. An aging 1,580-ton coastal freighter, sailing under temporary Panamanian registration, the *Hai Hong* turned up in Indonesian waters late last October packed with more than 2,500 Vietnamese, three-quarters of them ethnic Chinese. The captain claimed they had swarmed aboard from smaller boats while his ship was disabled at sea. The story put together by investigators was quite different. The vessel had been acquired by a Hong Kong syndicate specifically to collect the refugees from the southern Vietnamese port of Vung Tau. The passengers had paid a total of around five million dollars in gold and U.S. dollars for their one-way tickets, or roughly $2,500 per head.

The *Hai Hong* opened a new chapter in the Indochina refugee story. Inquiries revealed it was not the first large foreign vessel explicitly chartered to go to Vietnam and pick up refugees. That doubtful honor went to the *Southern Cross*, a 900-ton Honduras-registered, uninsured rust bucket that had beached itself in Indonesia the previous month. The 1,252 Vietnamese on board were accepted as normal refugees by unsuspecting Indonesian authorities, who believed the captain's innocent explanation of their rescue at sea. But it was the *Hai Hong* which established that departures from Vietnam were being organized. It also indicated that the outflow could reach massive proportions.

It has. According to U.N. figures, October recorded 12,266, November 22,202, December 13,730. The new exodus has since passed through various phases, influenced by different events, including political developments at home and abroad and the weather in the South China Sea. For instance, large freighters were abandoned when three more of them after the *Hai Hong*, transporting over 8,100 refugees from Vietnam like cattle, encountered resistance at established refugee receiving points in the

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region. But, with fluctuations, the numbers leaving Vietnam have continued to escalate sharply. This year, after a two-month lull and in the wake of the Chinese "punitive expedition" into Vietnam, arrivals of boat people soared from 13,423 in March to 26,602 in April, 51,139 in May, and 56,941 in June. A large majority of these were Hoa.

Most recently, in the summer of 1979, indications have been reported that, while the total dropped sharply in July (after the Geneva conference was set), the proportion of ethnic Vietnamese has been rising. The racial composition has fluctuated periodically, but the overall proportion of ethnic Chinese, or Hoa, in the grand total of 600,000 now estimated to have left Vietnam since 1975, is still reckoned at 60–70 percent.

The overall result is what Poul Hartling, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, calls "an appalling human tragedy." Refugees starve to death on the banks of the Mekong in Laos, are cut down in cross fire in Kampuchea, perish of thirst in Vietnamese waters, are raped, plundered and murdered by Thai pirates, and drown by the hundreds farther out to sea. Casualties are particularly high among the boat people. No accurate figures exist, but the most informed estimates (by those who deal constantly with arriving refugees and get their stories of lives lost or other groups departing) put the loss at up to 10 percent of all departures, or as many as 30,000 deaths of boat people in the past four years. With resettlement efforts overwhelmed by arrivals, swelling refugee camps blight the landscape in East Asia. They have been described accurately as "hotels of humiliation, degradation and despair."

This was the Indochina refugee picture at mid-1979, principally from U.N. sources:

—Malaysia was host to 74,408 boat people, Hong Kong 66,065, Indonesia 44,247, the Philippines 4,938, Macao 3,211, Singapore 821, Japan 557, and South Korea 42.

—Thailand was providing camp shelter for 169,167 land refugees from all three Indochina states as well as 7,000 Vietnamese and Kampuchean boat people. In addition, more than 40,000 Kampucheans who arrived this year remained on Thai territory, their fate uncertain.

—China had received around 250,000 persons from Vietnam, most across its land frontier, and they were still arriving at the rate of 10,000 a month. The government had resettled, mainly on farms, about 200,000, though 30,000 were without shelter, more than 10,000 of them at border posts. Peking said 30,000 ethnic Vietnamese among the refugees wanted to settle in third countries.

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—Vietnam had taken advantage of Pol Pot's overthrow to repatriate most of the 150,000 non-Vietnamese refugees who had arrived from Kampuchea by mid-1978. About 30,000 refugees remained in Vietnam; most were being encouraged to integrate into the local community, though a limited number continued to emigrate.

III

Although the root of the Indochina refugee crisis is in Hanoi, the immediate impact is thus being felt throughout Southeast Asia—and much farther afield. Member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—which had been patiently trying to build bridges to Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War, initially were reluctant to criticize the Vietnamese. In September and October 1978, Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong made a goodwill trip that included all five ASEAN capitals. Not only did Vietnam respect territorial integrity, he told them, but it wanted to contribute to regional peace and stability. Further, Vietnam appreciated the strains imposed on its neighbors by the Indochina refugees and it would do its best to alleviate them. So anxious were Malaysians, at that time, not to offend Dong that they requested journalists not to question him about refugees at a news conference.

But within three months of delivering these reassurances Vietnam had signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union, and sent more than 100,000 troops into Kampuchea to crush Pol Pot, and since then its policies have unleashed much vaster refugee flows than before. The resulting sense of betrayal among the ASEAN states blends with acute and specific security concerns.

These are felt most immediately in Thailand. Along the Thai-Kampuchean border, fighting continues, with large concentrations of Vietnamese troops trying to wipe out hard-pressed Khmer Rouge units that have reverted to their former guerrilla tactics. Numbers of these Khmer Rouge were undoubtedly among the more than 80,000 refugees who fled into Thailand; it was their presence, and the resulting fear of a Vietnamese incursion into Thai territory, that led the Thai to push 42,000 of them back across the border (even though some of these had actually been accepted for resettlement in other countries).

The Thai, too, are peculiarly sensitive to the possibility that the new waves may have been "seeded" with subversive agents by Hanoi. While the claim of one Thai official that ten percent of all

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refugees are such agents is not taken seriously even in Bangkok ruling circles, the lack of information on the background of the refugees is a source of wide concern. It seems far-fetched to suppose that many of the refugees would try to link up with any of the outlawed communist parties in Southeast Asia, which are all pro-Peking, but the squalor, misery and hopelessness inevitable in the present camps—which in Thailand have existed for years—can only make them breeding grounds for trouble.

In addition, of course, the refugees impose a financial and administrative load on the Thai and Malaysian governments that is only partly lightened by international assistance. Social and other strains are showing, in the form of corruption, black marketeering, food shortages, rising prices, and the like. These can be expected to become more visible and acute. For example, more than 33,000 Vietnamese have taken refuge in the remote Anambas Islands northeast of Singapore, outnumbering the Indonesian population three to one and having a calamitous impact on the local community. Only a vast evacuation exercise could reduce the pressures and tensions in that isolated area.

Above all, the arrival of tens and hundreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese has already started to aggravate racial tensions in the area. The situation is potentially sensitive in Indonesia, and acutely so in Malaysia with its delicate ethnic balance (47 percent Malay, 34 percent Chinese, the rest of varied origin) and with a long-term program to advance the Malay role in the mainstream of economic activity. Vietnamese of any sort, but especially ethnic Chinese, are simply not welcome in Malaysia, as the government has now made clear. And the heavy new burdens of caring for predominantly Chinese refugees, in all the ASEAN countries, are bound to arouse latent anti-Chinese sentiment. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (of Chinese descent himself) has said: "The more pressures are placed on these countries, the more the balance is upset and the more anti-Chinese and anti-China they become."

Many in ASEAN see the influx as nothing short of an invasion. They feel vulnerable and exposed, even if the reaction is exaggerated at times for domestic political reasons. Reflecting this anxiety, the *New Straits Times*, a Malaysian daily newspaper, commented in June: "The crux of the issue is that the flow from Vietnam is no longer just a humanitarian problem. It has become as much a weapon of war as a softening-up raid by waves of bombers."

The ASEAN countries have continued to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Hanoi. But by the end of June this year

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their foreign ministers, meeting in Bali, "agreed that Vietnam is responsible for the unending exodus" of refugees and "has a decisive role to play in resolving the problem at source." They "strongly deplored the fact that Vietnam had not taken any effective measures" to stem the tide. They reiterated that in principle their countries would no longer accept refugees on a "first asylum" basis. And they declared that they would expel refugees already in camps unless these were fairly promptly accepted by resettlement countries or their countries of origin.

IV

If developing Southeast Asia feels uneasy at playing temporary host to hundreds of thousands of unwanted Indochinese, the developed world seemed determined from the start not to get stuck with them permanently. Former Senator Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, noted in May that not enough had been done to ease the burden carried by first-asylum countries placed by geography in the refugees' flight path. The inadequacy of resettlement programs constituted a "human crisis" that went far beyond what the international community anticipated, he said. While it is true that the dimensions of the problem were not foreseen, the response of affluent nations for the most part remained selfish, mean and grudging when the tidal wave of human misery broke across the beaches of the region.

The United States, with a special responsibility toward Indochina, took the lead but did not want to get too far ahead of the pack. Japan, the richest nation in Asia and one that profited from the Vietnam War, found permanent homes for a mere handful of refugees. Other countries played a numbers game, imposing small refugee quotas and hiding behind a flurry of dismal statistics on employment, growth and balance of payments. Between January 1 and June 30, 209,000 refugees were admitted to camps while only 54,000 were moved out to permanent homes.

At the Tokyo summit of industrial nations in late June, the United States initiated a major effort to cope with the humanitarian aspects of the refugee crisis. President Jimmy Carter announced that Washington was doubling its monthly intake of displaced Indochinese to 14,000. Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda, meeting his ASEAN counterparts in Bali a few days later, followed up by pledging to foot half the 1979 Indochina budget for the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. That will amount to at least $50 million, perhaps as much as $100 million.

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Undoubtedly the pressures manifest in Tokyo and Bali played a large part in the convening of a 62-nation Geneva conference on July 20–21 under the chairmanship of U.N. Secretary General Waldheim. Ostensibly, the conference was billed as being concerned solely with common efforts to deal with the humanitarian aspects of the problem. Vietnam (as we shall see) continued to deny responsibility for the outflow, but attended in part as a country of first asylum for refugees from Kampuchea. The upshot, in practice, was that Western countries came up with increased pledges for resettlement, while Vietnam undertook (to Waldheim personally) that "for a reasonable period of time it will make every effort to stop illegal departures."

As the conference closed, Mr. Hartling of the U.N. refugee office was able to announce that the number of resettlement places now offered had been increased to 260,000 (as against 125,000 as of May 31). The bulk of the new places came from the increased U.S. monthly quota of 14,000. All told, the increase would, if effectively fulfilled, just about serve to handle the existing refugee population in the transit camps within a couple of years. U.S.-backed efforts to organize reprocessing centers—regular transit camps to hold refugees for home resettlement, guarantees for which are given in advance—in remote or island areas of Southeast Asia are starting to bear fruit. And, after earlier opposition, Hanoi agreed to hold "concrete discussions" with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for the establishment of a transit camp within Vietnam itself, a proposal strongly advocated by the ASEAN countries.

It was a better result than had seemed conceivable earlier in the summer. But it is obvious to all that it provides only a temporary solution for the humanitarian needs of the refugees, and no long-term assurance whatever that the flow will not be renewed at a high rate.

V

In what way can the Western nations and the nations of Southeast Asia best cooperate to deal with the present and prospective flow of refugees from Indochina? How can Hanoi be persuaded to eliminate that flow or at least to reduce it to modest proportions over the long term? And can a lasting reduction be accomplished without condemning minorities (particularly the Hoa) and dissidents in Vietnam to some form of internal "solution" that would be even more brutal than the recent treatment of the overland refugees and boat people from that country and

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also from Laos and Kampuchea? The three issues involve interlocking questions of humanitarianism and human rights (including the right of free emigration proclaimed in the U.N. Convention on Human Rights) on the one hand, and of practical policy toward Vietnam on the other.

Let us start by reexamining the reasons for the various refugee flows, which as we have noted differ sharply from one wave to another. The ongoing flow of tribal refugees and lowlanders from Laos is, of course, directly related to the Indochina War of 1960–75; these, and the Meo in particular, have a particularly strong claim on the attention of the United States, which backed them during the war and put them in a position where any victorious side emerging from the war might have tried to eliminate them as obvious sources of continued resistance.

The case of the 1975–77 wave from Kampuchea is only slightly different. While chargeable in the direct sense to the genocidal policies of the Pol Pot regime, the fact that extremism in Kampuchea could reach this pitch is surely due in substantial measure to the American invasion of what was then Cambodia in 1970 and subsequent American military actions in Cambodia that made the essentially civil war in that country so bloody and divisive.

The refugees who have sought to flee Kampuchea in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of late 1978 are a different case. Their plight is due to Hanoi's postwar policy of taking over Kampuchea (and thus the whole of Indochina), a policy which—whatever the horrors of the Pol Pot regime—has been widely condemned by the ASEAN countries and by world opinion generally as a case of clear-cut aggression against a regime which, while provocative, was not a real threat to Vietnam.

The fourth category are the political refugees from Vietnam. In this group the ethnic Vietnamese who have found their own way out despite Hanoi's tight controls deserve the same kind of sympathy as the refugees of 1975 whom the United States accepted in large numbers. And while Hanoi may be condemned for its New Economic Zone policies and the brutality involved in moving potential dissidents and urban dwellers to harsh rural lives (sometimes to their deaths), a degree of painful adjustment was inevitable as Hanoi sought to bring into line with the austere north what had become, in the years of American occupation of the south, a corrupted consumer society. There is a strong measure of self-justification and exaggeration in Hanoi's repeated claim that it inherited, in what had been South Vietnam, three million

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unemployed, several hundred thousand prostitutes and drug addicts, thousands of gangsters and criminals, one million people with tuberculosis, several hundred thousand with venereal disease and four million illiterates. But there is a measure of truth in the overall claim made by one Vietnamese publication: "One had to rebuild not only a country that had been ruined materially, but also a society that had been completely perverted and turned upside down."

But the vast majority leaving recently have a different motivation. With a few exceptions, Sino-Vietnamese and other minorities and dissidents tell of hardship and deprivation, of being advised to leave, of being forced out when they hesitate, or having their property confiscated and their possessions sold. The practice varies from time to time and in different parts of the country. Ethnic Vietnamese often risk severe punishment if caught trying to escape. But so open and approved is the departure of Hoa that ethnic Vietnamese planning to leave often acquire false documents bearing fictitious Chinese names and learn to count in Cantonese.

Only the well-off can afford to go. A passage usually costs the gold equivalent of between $2,000 and $3,000, half price for children. The refugees hand over the gold pieces directly to Public Security Bureau officials, or to authorized collecting agents. A large slice of each fare, amounting to a departure tax, goes to the government. Middlemen and boat owners also get a share.

Refugees, of course, are not always the most reliable witnesses, though there is a compelling consistency with which they relate their experiences—be it after being rescued at sea, in a processing center, or safely resettled in the United States. Other evidence exists to support their accounts. The *Hai Hong*, for a start, established the Vietnamese government connection; the ship's officers and crew dealt with officials of several Vietnamese agencies while anchored off Vung Tau. Later investigations by the Singapore government also yielded a statement by Allan Ross, a 36-year-old Singapore businessman, who had been aboard the *Southern Cross* when it made its run in August last year. He disclosed that the *Southern Cross* was guided to a wharf in Ho Chi Minh City by a Vietnamese pilot who boarded from a launch. The ship was guarded by troops at the berth, loaded with refugees being escorted by soldiers and guided by the pilot back out to sea while it flew the Vietnamese flag. It encountered no Vietnamese patrol boats, he said. Charles Freeman, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, has testified before a congressional subcommittee that Vietnam set up a boat-building industry specifically to help

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refugees leave the country. Hanoi's takings from the refugee traffic are unofficially estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars.

All this has been enough for major Western nations, including the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, and many others to condemn Vietnam for persecuting its minorities and artificially inducing a refugee crisis. Two Southeast Asian foreign ministers, Carlos Romulo of the Philippines and Singapore's Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, have compared Hanoi's answer to its internal troubles with Hitler's final solution for European Jews. "A poor man's alternative to the gas chambers is the open sea," said Mr. Rajaratnam. For his part, Mr. Romulo referred to "another form of inhumanity, equal in scope and similarly heinous"—the holocaust at Auschwitz and Buchenwald.

Against such charges, Hanoi's attempt to blame the United States and especially China, as well as the colonial past, for the exodus is, to put it mildly, unconvincing. China's protests about the March 1978 decree against commercial middlemen may have been accompanied by a degree of encouragement to the Hoa to leave that played some part in the overland refugee flow to China. But the latest Hanoi position, contained in its *Those Who Leave* pamphlet, that in the case of the boat people there is indeed an organized departure service from the country but that it is the work of "counter-revolutionary" elements established in Vietnam by the Americans, is absurd and self-convicting. Does anyone seriously believe that in a totalitarian state 50,000 people a month can be organized, ticketed, transported to departure points and allocated boats—a major logistical exercise—without the government's knowledge? Does anyone seriously accept that people, given a reasonable choice, opt at the rate of 600,000 a year to risk their lives in vessels that have been described as "floating coffins"?

Nor is Hanoi convincing when it argues that the Hoa in Vietnam were at any time a potential fifth column serving China.[3] Whatever isolated acts there may have been, the great bulk of the Hoa have lived in Vietnam for generations; they remain a separate and distinct group, but they have always protected themselves by remaining apolitical and not identifying themselves, for example, with the South Vietnamese government—which never drafted Hoa in significant numbers or made any military use of them even at the high points of mobilization during the war. In this respect, as in others, they have behaved much as other ethnic

[3] See, for example, the article by Hanoi's best known apologist in the West, Wilfred Burchett, "Between Devil and Deep Blue Sea," *The Guardian*, July 22, 1979.

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Chinese minorities have come to do in the other countries of Southeast Asia. A number of these countries have indeed regarded their ethnic Chinese as a potential subversive element—in the Malayan insurrection of 1948–60 the guerrillas were almost all ethnic Chinese and there was a very strong element of ethnic division—but the problems have always been met even in such cases on the spot, and never by wholesale eviction.

No, the root of Hanoi's present actions lies in internal policies instigated by Hanoi that are both rigidly totalitarian and deeply infected with anti-Chinese feeling. The fact that the 1.5 million Hoa in Vietnam—four-fifths of them in the south—played disproportionate roles in the economic life of the country (as elsewhere in Southeast Asia) hardly meant that they were in fact a serious obstacle to Hanoi's socialist plans; in the north, Hoa had for years occupied substantial managerial and technical positions in Hanoi's major industrial and mining enterprises as well as in the government bureaucracy. Rather, as an embattled Hanoi tightened the screws internally in the face of economic difficulties and the burdens of its own expansionary policies in the rest of Indochina, the Hoa became in 1978 a scapegoat. The elimination of their commercial role became in practice a program of deliberate persecution and eviction, capped by the extraction from the Hoa of economic assets amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars in badly needed hard currencies and gold. The parallel to "normal" political refugees from a totalitarian regime breaks down; the Hoa now being evicted from Vietnam are not simply like the middle class that Castro threw out of Cuba, but rather—as Mr. Rajaratnam, Mr. Romulo and now Vice President Mondale have said—on all fours with the Jews evicted by the Nazi government of Germany.

And, in the process of eviction, Hanoi's leaders either had from the beginning, or have now developed, a bonus foreign policy objective that is all too well understood in the rest of Southeast Asia. They see value in disrupting the internal situations of countries with ethnic Chinese minorities and thus sowing division among these countries and between them and the Western countries being asked to provide permanent resettlement of the refugees.

In sum, the policy of evicting the Hoa is serving Hanoi well. Not only is it dispensing with elements judged difficult to assimilate and of doubtful loyalty, but it generates income for a government with extremely meager resources and soaks up considerable quantities of gold that have been buried in backyards since the

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communist takeover. And, on the political side, the stream of refugees keeps the ASEAN countries off balance, defensive and inclined to bicker among themselves and with their natural allies, the resettlement nations, over who is shouldering a fair share of the burden. Hanoi has shown in the past its capacity to play on the humanitarian concerns of the United States in particular—witness only the bargaining use made of U.S. prisoners in the prolonged peace negotiations of 1968–73. It is well aware of the agonizing dilemmas of principle and practical behavior the refugee flow presents to the West and above all to the United States.

VI

That dilemma is compounded—again as Hanoi well knows—by concern for the alternatives to accepting whatever refugee flow Hanoi chooses to stimulate or allow. Most nations would like to see Hanoi end the deliberate and wholesale export of its people that consigns many of them to a watery grave. But at the same time they fear a reversal of that abhorrent policy might result in widespread repression and other equally repugnant measures against Vietnamese minorities and dissidents. So, for the most part, they settle for a restrained public protest while trying to rescue and rehabilitate the endless flow.

For the time being there is surely no alternative to continuing the rescue effort that has been made ever since 1975. Measures undertaken during the period have been on a limited and inadequate scale, but they were substantially increased at the Geneva conference in July. It will be difficult for the governments which made pledges at Geneva of resettlement spaces to fulfill those commitments; already, in the United States, the Congress is starting to balk at the expense and other burdens involved, while polls suggest that 60 percent of Americans, as of now, oppose a further influx of Southeast Asian refugees.

Moreover, nothing Vietnam has said or done indicates it intends to discontinue its callous policy toward the refugees, once the temporary moratorium has been observed. Vague Vietnamese promises to channel departures through orderly, safe and legal channels rest entirely on a seven-point memorandum of understanding signed on May 30 this year between Hanoi and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. It is an extremely narrow and restrictive agreement, limited to "family reunion and other humanitarian cases."

How many more potential boat people are left in Vietnam is

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anyone's guess. Vietnamese officials in May estimated that up to 600,000 more Chinese wanted to leave. There are also considerable numbers of ethnic Vietnamese, especially those associated with the former regime, who will leave if given the opportunity.

Some observers believe the flow must inevitably decline before long, if only because of the large numbers who have already fled. But it would be a mistake to make this assumption and become complacent. *Those Who Leave*, a publication produced by the Vietnamese government, says the "bellicose declarations" of Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping about teaching Vietnam another lesson have caused great anguish within the Vietnamese Hoa community. "So long as Peking's warlike policy continues, it is to be expected that the exodus will go on," the booklet warns.

Another consideration is that Hanoi can simply turn up the heat, or lower the fares, and force more people out whenever it likes. In any event, it would be almost impossible now to stem the flow of ethnic Chinese because they are convinced the government is committed to persecuting and expelling them, not only in Vietnam but in Kampuchea. In these circumstances, informed estimates put the likely number of departures, if unchecked, at around one million over the next year or two. And the immediate problem of widespread famine in Kampuchea could drive "still more hundreds of thousands" across the border into Thailand, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke testified to a congressional committee in mid-July.

VII

Humanitarian measures, then, must be taken by the Western countries and the other nations of Southeast Asia, in cooperation. Not to deal with the flow, whatever its size, would be not only inconsistent with the basic principles for which all these nations stand, but might put them in the position that Britain, the United States and others were in when the Jews were being evicted from Nazi Germany—of an obduracy that appears to condone Hanoi's very reasons for the evictions.

But this still leaves the practical problem of persuading Hanoi to change the policies that lie behind the refugee flow. Unless one assumes that Hanoi can be pressured by the mass disapproval of "world opinion"—an assumption with little warrant in recent history—only the Soviet Union could possibly dissuade Vietnam from its present course. But Moscow is too busy chalking up points in Hanoi and keeping an ally on China's southern flank to contemplate such a role. When President Carter appealed to

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Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev to help solve the problem at the Vienna summit in June, he got nowhere. A Soviet official cynically remarked, "The people who are fleeing are Chinese, and we do not consider them refugees."

A number of countries have reacted to the invasion of Kampuchea and the refugee crisis by cutting aid and further isolating the Vietnamese. Some, including a few that were among the first to offer economic assistance to Hanoi in 1975, diverted funds intended for reconstruction to the resettlement of boat people. The United States suspended formal negotiations toward normalization of relations.

These reactions are wholly understandable. To take any other course would, on its face, amount to accepting the Vietnamese takeover of Kampuchea as a fait accompli—a point particularly galling to the ASEAN countries—and also to accepting Hanoi's internal policies whatever their nature and consequences. These are bitter pills to swallow, regardless of one's views on the Indochina War and the extent of U.S. responsibility, in particular, for what has followed in its aftermath.

But the plain fact is that policies of pressuring and ostracizing Vietnam are most unlikely to work. They patently have not worked to bring Vietnam to heel in the past and it is doubtful if they will have any more success in the future. And Hanoi cannot be pressured easily in any case because its links with the non-communist world are limited. Postwar Vietnam has never been fully accepted by the West into the community of nations.

Faced with a hostile China and an uncooperative United States, Hanoi has joined COMECON and moved snugly into Moscow's orbit. Some critics of U.S. foreign policy argue that the Vietnamese were left with little option but to turn to the Soviets because of Washington's refusal to recognize Vietnam within three years of the communist conquest. It follows, they contend, that the present refugee nightmare would not have occurred. The case can be debated endlessly. It serves little point. More important is the need to reexamine current options in Indochina in an effort to work toward a resolution of the refugee crisis and ensure that similar ugly developments do not occur in future.

With its determination to keep "dumping rubbish over the fence," as Malaysian Home Affairs Minister Ghazali Shafie puts it, Vietnam seems to be sending signals both to its non-communist neighbors, who initially receive the refugees, and the Western world, particularly the United States, which resettles them. Its message has yet to be deciphered. But it is no secret that Hanoi

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wants Western aid for the rehabilitation of its country, ravaged by 30 years of war and recent natural disasters. It also was disappointed not to have obtained nonaggression pacts and other treaties with ASEAN members when Pham Van Dong toured the region last year.

As matters stand, the United States has let its emphasis on normalizing relations with Peking override its earlier intention to recognize Hanoi. It conducts a policy of equidistance from the Soviet Union and China. Equidistance from Vietnam, the world's third largest communist nation with a population of more than 50 million, also would seem desirable.

This is not to suggest that Washington submit to political blackmail and rush into diplomatic ties with Hanoi. But a policy of actively working toward a position of influence would seem to carry possible rewards. As it is, at a time when Washington needs leverage in Vietnam almost desperately, it has none.

There is something disturbingly negative and illogical about existing U.S. attitudes toward Vietnam. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke articulated one glaring contradiction when he testified to a House subcommittee on June 13. He said: "The major reason we had sought to normalize relations [with the Vietnamese] was to enhance regional peace and stability. Since recent events had the opposite effect and endangered regional peace and stability, our caution in not moving further last fall was justified."[4]

His line of reasoning seems to discount—in retrospect—any possible display of leadership or positive influence by Washington in the events he criticizes. He does not face up to the possibility that if the normalization process had gone forward, Washington might have succeeded in its goal of enhancing regional peace and stability. Given what happened, it is strange to claim vindication of a policy that failed so conspicuously to meet the declared objective.

[4] As this article was in press, North Vietnam's Acting Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, in an interview with Seymour Hersh, stated that a clear-cut breakthrough in the U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations toward normalization occurred in late September 1978, when Vietnam dropped its demand that the United States agree to a major aid commitment before normalization. Mr. Thach specifically charges that the United States decided at that time that normalization with China "prevailed" over normalization with Vietnam. Commenting on the interview, Mr. Holbrooke confirmed that the aid issue had been settled at that time, but added that the U.S. decision to slow normalization was solely in response to questions involving Kampuchea, the refugee exodus and the Soviet-Vietnamese agreement announced in early November, and had nothing to do with Washington's decision to recognize Peking. (*The New York Times*, August 7, 1979, pp. 1, 6.) Subsequently, Vietnam in early August received two delegations from the U.S. House of Representatives for discussions of the refugee problem. In these talks the question of normalization was repeatedly raised by the Vietnamese. (*The Washington Post*, August 13, 1979, pp. A1, A7.)

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As of mid-August, it was reported from Washington that, in U.S.-Vietnamese contacts in June and July, the U.S. side had reiterated that normalization was currently impossible. But Mr. Holbrooke did add: "We also said that future movement is not impossible, that this remains the U.S. objective, and that Vietnam's actions will affect it." The issue of evacuating Kampuchea, according to these reports, is a major obstacle.[5]

VIII

To suggest that the United States and other Western nations adopt a policy of dealing with and assisting Vietnam may seem a tall order. In the existing circumstances it amounts to giving in to the crudest kind of blackmail. But on a longer historical perspective one may well ask whether it differs from the long-accepted policies of dealing with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as they are, and notwithstanding their continuing wholesale violations of the human rights standards of the West.

As the debate over the Indochina refugee dilemma has intensified over the past year, it has been characterized, understandably, by much emotion and handwringing. It has also been marked by a paucity of diplomatic and other initiatives that might resolve the matter. Most nations have come to the conclusion that the problem must be dealt with "at the source," which they pinpoint as Hanoi. But how to go about tackling the matter leaves them floundering. There obviously is no easy solution. Some government leaders and officials believe there may not be any solution at all—until the refugee flows finally dry up of their own accord.

The United States seems satisfied by what its officials call the "growing international condemnation of Vietnamese policies and practices." But this is surely cold comfort: the diversion of funds previously earmarked for economic development in Vietnam affects the material well-being of the masses as much as the Hanoi leadership, and may contribute to the creation of more refugees in the long run. For its part, ASEAN has not advanced past the stage of asking Hanoi to stop the outflow and end other actions, such as the military occupation of Kampuchea, that are generating more refugees.

But with so much at stake, as we have seen, Hanoi is most unlikely to respond to mere appeals to be more neighborly. The

[5] *The Washington Post*, August 13, 1979, pp. A1, A8.

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threat by the ASEAN countries, enunciated by their foreign ministers at Bali, to return the refugees to Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea is positively alarming. Hanoi has demonstrated that it cares little whether they live or die. ASEAN's proposals that returnees be held in U.N.-administered "suitable transit centers" in Indochina thus raises the specter of concentration camps.

In the absence of possible solutions, then, and given Hanoi's adamant refusal to discuss anything but humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem at international conferences, the situation is nothing short of desperate. In these peculiar and complex circumstances, only the United States seems capable of exhibiting the leadership necessary to do what Vice President Mondale at Geneva called "something meaningful, something profound." Neither the American public nor the Congress appears in a mood to contemplate closer relations with Hanoi at present, but alternatives are nonexistent or barren.

The object of the exercise should be for Washington to negotiate a full diplomatic package that would take it step by step along the path to normal relations with Hanoi. Washington would have to take the lead and drop some of the current manifestations of its annoyance with Hanoi, such as its objections to World Bank funds for Vietnam. But the United States is not without bargaining chips. Hanoi's desire for normalization as well as economic assistance should be sufficient for Washington to ensure that the Vietnamese start to behave more responsibly.

The United States, ideally, would move forward gradually as Vietnam made concessions on such key issues as its occupation of Kampuchea, the refugee outflow and perhaps its other internal policies.

A Hanoi that has ties only with the Soviet Union is sure to go on behaving, as it is now doing, as the "rogue nation" of Southeast Asia. Unless the nations of Southeast Asia and the West have some alternative means of dealing with such a nation, they would be better advised to accept reality and make it worthwhile for Hanoi to close its back door. Only then is there a chance that conditions within Vietnam may over time become tolerable for its inhabitants, or that Hanoi will moderate its international behavior.

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

ROYAL FACTIONALISM AND SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY

To the Editor:

Mr. John K. Cooley's article, "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," in the Summer 1979 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, is, in my opinion, a carefully worded, balanced, and mostly accurate assessment of the Persian Gulf today, and particularly of the often complementary "two schools of thought" in Saudi Arabia: the "pro-American" and the "pro-Arab." The vivid description of the vulnerability of the Saudi oil fields and the Strait of Hormuz to even limited and unsophisticated acts of terrorism with immediate worldwide consequences is chilling, especially for the strategic vacuum created by the West's absence from the area. The article is extremely good at showing the Saud family's exquisite sense of compromise and consensus put to the full test by the nexus of "neighborly" realities: the renewed revolt in the Dhofar province; the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict in Iraq; the withdrawal of Iranian force from the Gulf; the church-militant alliance between Ayatollah Khomeini and Yassir Arafat; and the complex "isolation" of Egypt.

In view of the basic correctness of the article, I hope that I am not unnecessarily carping in my critical observations of its Part V, devoted to Saudi Arabia. However, I do think that certain inaccuracies could prove to be misleading, and therefore ought to be corrected. Prince Muhammad, who is described in the article as the elder brother of Prince Abdullah, Commander of the National Guard, is in fact the sole elder brother of King Khalid. Prince Muhammad is the third eldest son of the late King Abdul-Aziz, after his brothers, the late King Saud and King Faisal. By primogeniture, Muhammad was "next in line" for the crown, but renounced his claim in favor of his younger brother, Khalid. According to several observers, Khalid was arrived at as the desirable successor by prior agreement of his predecessor, King Faisal, and senior members of the family, which accounts for his swift ascension hours after the assassination of Faisal.

The methods of primogeniture are not inviolate, particularly if the al-Saud family finds it in the best interests of the kingdom and itself to do otherwise, as was the case in the family accord that artfully required King Saud to abdicate and renounce his birthright because he was not properly filling the role of king. In such cases, senior "uncles," and the several "brothers" in line for the crown, as well as venerable religious leaders with royal and noble bloodlines will reach a consensus on what is best, and hands will be laid on, or lifted from, selected candidates. In the instance of the succession after King Faisal, Prince Muhammad, although "next in line," was in ill-health and had shown little eagerness for the grueling demands of kingship in modern Saudi Arabia. In willingly renouncing his claim by birthright, Muhammad bowed to family wishes and fraternal unity, and the family again displayed the Nejd bedouin practicality and instinct for survival that has characterized it. I know of no evidence that, in stepping aside, Muhammad drove a bargain that Prince Abdullah would become the Crown Prince to succeed Fahd, when and

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if the latter becomes king. To be sure, Muhammad is a political and Islamic conservative, undoubtedly part of the "pro-Arab" school. However, it is to be noted that his younger brother, Khalid, is fully as conservative, and ascended the throne as his full brother and as next in line by seniority. Therefore, by family methods, this was all sufficient recompense for Muhammad's renouncing his claim. Most certainly, Prince Muhammad's thinking on the matter of the succession will be listened to most seriously, but I do not believe that the family arrives at its critical decisions through any unilateral "hard bargains" from its senior members.

This is not to say that tensions do not exist in the royal family, for they exist in any family or political organization. The balance between King Khalid, of the conservative Jaluwis, and Crown Prince Fahd, of the more progressive Sudairy branch, is a dynamic tension set up purposefully by the family to represent, and reconcile wherever possible, the quickly developing economy and society with a role of worldwide importance, and a kingdom which protects the Islamic holy places and derives from a tribal bedouin and pilgrim stock. The acknowledged presence of different approaches, and the attempts at reasonable compromise to achieve consistent policies, are a dynamic that bodes well for the future; as such, the ways of the true desert monarchy could not be more different from the imperial mannerisms and sole source commands that have distinguished such other rulers as the Shah of Iran.

Of the "two schools of thought" in Saudi Arabia today, I think that along with those members of the "pro-Arab" school mentioned in the article (Prince Abdullah, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, etc.) I would add Prince Majed, Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, and Prince Miteb, Minister of Public Works and Housing (both of these ministries formed since 1976). They appear as strong and consistent supporters of Prince Abdullah within the Council of Ministers. Likewise, the individuals who make up the important religious organizations under the Ministry of Justice or the Royal Court (the Committee on Public Morality, the Committee on Holy Mosques and Religious Supervision, the Sharia Courts, etc.) wield considerable, if unspecified, influence, particularly in light of the pervasiveness of fundamentalist Islam in Saudi Arabia. In regard to the happenings of so-called resurgent Islam, it is telling to note that the powerful Minister of Interior, Prince Naif, one of the full brothers of the "progressive" Sudairy branch of the family, which includes Crown Prince Fahd as elder brother, has just recently implemented a number of distinctly conservative policies—including a stricter dress code for women, a prohibition on office work and even public bathing for females in mixed company and a definite "frowning upon" Christian religious services if held indiscreetly. Simultaneously, Prince Naif has deported thousands of illegal aliens from Muslim Third World countries as an obvious security measure.

While adding members to the "pro-Arab" school, I would take away Minister of Planning Hisham Nazir and Finance Minister Muhammad Aba al-Khail. Both are non-royal "technocrats" who seem to me near-perfect examples of modern, enlightened nationalists. As such, they seem to argue national economic and industrial self-interest, taking sides with whoever or whatever enhances these interests. For example, with Saudi Arabia's cash reserves overwhelmingly held in dollar-denominated, short-term instruments of the U.S. government, and the kingdom as a major, dependent importer of

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goods and services, any abrupt or significant reduction in oil production or increase in oil prices would have serious effects on the economic well-being of the kingdom as well as the West. Whatever his personal feelings, I find it hard to imagine the Minister of Finance arguing therefore the "pro-Arab" line, which the article rightly contends seems to favor sharply reduced production and increased prices. A desire to see the kingdom preserve its chief but depleting asset, oil, and to divert more crude into higher profit petrochemicals is, no doubt, always in the mind of Mr. Aba al-Khail. Also observers stress that the Minister personally feels strongly that the United States has not done enough on its side in the "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia. However, he must look to the preservation of his country's cash assets as well. This is why I see him in a complex situation unsuited to classification into "schools of thought," which are primarily regional-political in nature.

More importantly, Crown Prince Fahd, I believe, has been a rather firm member of the "pro-American" school, and not, as the article states, "an arbiter" between the two factions. Before the Camp David Accords he worked in concert with the United States to provide the monies to Egypt, along with U.S. military aid, to permit the formal break with Moscow. According to observers, he was a major advocate of unpopular restraint within OPEC to hold down oil price levels and to produce more Saudi oil. He promoted the purchase of the F-15 jets, painfully aware of the publicity it would produce, and he sought active U.S. intervention in the troublesome Horn of Africa, the lack of which has reportedly distressed him considerably. He has reportedly even argued on a personal level with fellow Arab leaders that the United States, despite its support for Israel, is nevertheless the best hope for a "just and lasting peace" in the Middle East.

However, recent events, particularly the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel, and the fall of the Shah, have, also according to observers, caused the Crown Prince to call into question his own "pro-American" position, and to bring to the surface the long-standing objections of some family members and neighbors to this position. The prolonged absence of the Crown Prince in Spain recently, his longest "holiday" since being made Crown Prince, and particularly at the critical time of the Baghdad "rejectionist" conference, raises questions as to the future course of his own thinking and that of the kingdom.

In light of all this, as I see it, the "pro-Arab" school is really an enlarged concern for the protection of stable and reasonable governments in the Arab, Islamic and even non-Arab neighboring countries, and for a swift but genuine solution to the Palestinian problem. The "pro-American" school, on the other hand, is really a "pro-Western" school that encompasses economic and even military cooperation with friendly nations such as France—which seems willing to supply arms; to discuss some sort of intervention in the trouble spots of the region; to chastise the United States when necessary for such failings as a lack of a coherent energy policy; to articulate the Arab "rejectionist" position within the Western bloc; and to trade with Saudi Arabia unencumbered by legislative barriers and disincentives.

Within and between these "schools" is a school of pragmatic nationalists who regard the kingdom as, in a very basic way, standing alone to conduct its foreign policy without immediate or fully predictable protection or support from any major ally, including the United States. Thus we should expect to

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grow accustomed to the "rumors" of direct negotiations with Moscow on the Yemen problem, and even on renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries; inter-Arab defense agreements, even with Syria or Iraq; and, in short, any number of "uncharacteristic" acts for Saudi Arabia, which nevertheless reflect its current national self-interest in light of being outside the protective embrace of anyone but Allah.

DON N. DE MARINO
The Nicholson Group
New York, N.Y.

Mr. Cooley replies:

I am grateful to Mr. De Marino for pointing out my omission of Prince Muhammad's kinship with King Khalid and my erroneous reference to Prince Abdullah being a full brother of Prince Muhammed. He expertly describes the Saudi succession process, a description which a shortage of space in my article prevented including. I do feel that Crown Prince Fahd, despite his pro-Western leanings, has played and still does play an arbiter's role. Most Saudi observers believe there was at least a tacit family understanding, when Prince Muhammad stepped aside, that Prince Abdullah would stand in direct line to become Crown Prince once Prince Fahd becomes king. Events since my article was written certainly confirm Mr. De Marino's observation about the growing influence of the strict religious moralists on Saudi society.

BITING THE BULLET IN THE MIDDLE EAST

To the Editor:

We are indebted to Amos Perlmutter for his imaginative sketch of the likely course of the negotiations over Palestine pursuant to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ("A Race Against Time: The Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations Over the Future of Palestine," Summer 1979 issue). However, while the opening parts of his scenario seem plausible enough, I see little basis for even the qualified optimism with which he plays out the succeeding sections.

The fault, of course, lies not in Mr. Perlmutter's vision but in the incomplete script, which—as it stands—seems destined to end in a tragedy. Some of the dangerous possibilities of such a denouement are suggested in "Iran, the Palestinians and the Gulf," by John K. Cooley in the same issue.

The establishment of a Palestinian entity is now, finally, seen as the heart of the matter. But an independent Palestine is hardly conceivable outside the framework of a comprehensive settlement acceptable to Israel and its Arab adversaries. Suggested solutions falling short of that goal are highly unlikely to prove negotiable and would in any event only perpetuate the problem. No lasting solution can be expected from negotiations between an Israel determined to prevent an independent Palestine and an Egypt torn between self-interest and an Arab solidarity which has now been turned against it. As for the solution which, at times, appears to be favored by the United States—a Palestine entity somehow linked with Jordan—do we really want to create another Lebanon?

What is needed is agreement on the framework of a comprehensive settlement which, by accommodating the interests of all the parties concerned, could induce them to support (and later to enforce, if necessary) the conditions

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that would have to be fulfilled by a Palestinian state to make it acceptable to Israel (and, one suspects, to moderate Arabs as well).

An independent Palestine cannot be created in a vacuum, nor at the stroke of a pen. It presumes agreement, *inter alia*, on its actual boundaries, on the limited armaments it could acquire, on some special status for East Jerusalem and probably for such significant Israeli settlements as may remain in the West Bank, on a regime for sharing regional water resources, etc. Only the prospect of a comprehensive settlement and the peace it would bring could provide the impetus for agreement on such difficult issues and exorcise the specter seen by many Israelis of a hostile, PLO-dominated state thrusting into the heart of their land.

That is why I find Mr. Perlmutter's concluding paragraph disappointing. He cautions that "the United States must not follow an unworkable policy of trying to achieve grand multilateral and overall solutions." I suggest he is confusing negotiating procedure with strategy. His advice may have been sound before President Sadat's initiative opened up new perspectives while at the same time generating a massive backlash among both moderate and "rejectionist" Arabs. As it is, there is persuasive evidence that the other Arab states directly concerned are prepared to enter into a final settlement that would return occupied territories, provided that at least the minimal demands of the Palestinian people are also met. Yet there is no agreed framework for either bilateral or multilateral negotiations toward that end.

Mr. Perlmutter also properly stresses the need for "the exercise of [U.S.] presidential authority" and "dogged presidential determination." Unfortunately, the 1980 electoral campaign is already upon us and we all know what happens to U.S. policy on the Middle East during such campaigns. While President Carter deserves great credit for the persistence he has displayed to date, is it realistic to expect that, as a probable underdog, he can maintain that stance and still be reelected? If not, which of his possible successors is likely to emerge from the campaign with a policy of equal firmness?

I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Perlmutter's warning that we are in a race against time. I fear, however, that we are likely to lose it unless—while there is yet time—we make clear that *our* desired solution to the problem of Palestine is an independent state, provided its inhabitants demonstrate their willingness and capacity to fulfill the conditions of a comprehensive settlement acceptable to all the parties directly concerned.

In so doing, we would be in the happy position of acting justly toward the unfortunate Palestinians while maintaining our traditional support for the right to self-determination, of encouraging the cooperation of moderate Arabs (without which no lasting settlement is possible) and of serving our national interest. Can we afford to do less for the sake of a peace that will be of immense benefit to everyone?

SAMUEL DE PALMA
New York, N.Y.

Mr. De Palma was formerly Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

Mr. Perlmutter replies:

Recent events in the Middle East clearly demonstrate that the only workable American policy is one which operates state by state and stage by

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stage. The futility of the multilateral, overall solution was demonstrated at the American-inspired Geneva conference which Sadat's visit to Jerusalem bypassed. For peace in the Middle East to be achieved—and this is the heart of the matter—the Egyptian-Israeli model should be applied to solving the Israel-Syria conflict. As I argued, there is much that Syria can gain from such an approach. For the Palestinians, the autonomy plan is the equivalent of a Balfour Declaration. It is up to the Palestinian imagination to fulfill it. The fulfillment of the autonomy plan by phases and the entry of Syria into the negotiations (leading to an Egyptian-Syrian patronage of the Palestinian state) would be a more realistic solution than the one Mr. DePalma advocates.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

NATIONALISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By A.D. Smith. New York: New York University Press, 1979, 232 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $8.95).

There exists a vast literature on nationalism, to which A.D. Smith himself has made signal contributions, but still more can be said as new trends in human affairs test the old conclusions and suggest new ones. The main points of interest here have to do with the reinforcement of nationalism, even in the most advanced countries, at the very time that man was supposed to be outgrowing it. Smith's work has both historical sweep and keen analysis of the contemporary world.

STUDIES IN CRISIS BEHAVIOR. Edited by Michael Brecher. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction, 1979, 384 pp. $12.95.

Brecher and his colleagues are deep into the study of patterns of crisis. As they push out the frontiers of this branch of behavioral science, they are publishing some of the results of their case studies and their search for significant generalizations. The cases chronicled here range over 40 years and from Guatemala to India, with a fairly heavy stress on recent crises in the Middle East. In general they represent partial or preliminary findings and are not easy reading because of the framework of analysis required by the overall project, but there is sustenance here for the devotee of history as well as for the theorist.

TEN YEARS OF TERRORISM: COLLECTED VIEWS. Edited by Jennifer Shaw, E.F. Gueritz and A.E. Younger. London: Royal United Services Institute/ New York: Crane, Russak; 1979, 196 pp. $14.95.
TERRORISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE. Edited by Yonah Alexander, David Carlton and Paul Wilkinson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 280 pp. $20.00.
TERRORISM: THREAT, REALITY, RESPONSE. By Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 450 pp. $14.95.

Walter Laqueur says in the foreword to one of these books—he is also a contributor to another—that the serious study of terrorism is only beginning. It is certainly beginning with no lack of conferences, collective volumes and repetition. The Royal Services Institute publication has the bigger names, but the other two carry the subject a bit further. Yonah Alexander and his colleagues look at causes, motives, the character of terrorist movements, the

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relation of terrorism to broader social trends, and prospects for the future. The Hoover Institution volume goes more deeply into the role of advancing technology in what terrorists can do and what can be done to combat them.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THE CASES OF CUBA, ISRAEL, AND RHODESIA. By Donald L. Losman. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979, 156 pp. $12.95.

The author's purpose is to examine, in three prominent cases, what the actual results of the imposition of economic sanctions have been. His investigation is not as far-reaching as it might be—admittedly the problems are complex and some costs impossible to measure—but it is sufficient to support his main conclusions that, one, the economic damage to the target country has been considerable in each case, and, two, the intended political consequences are further away than ever.

SIX BILLION PEOPLE: DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMAS AND WORLD POLITICS. By Georges Tapinos and Phyllis T. Piotrow. New York: McGraw-Hill (for the Council on Foreign Relations/1980s Project), 1978, 218 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

Two demographers, one an economist and the other a political scientist, lay out the facts and the associated issues of policy that constitute what is inaccurately called "the population problem." Of particular concern for the 1980s and 1990s is how fragile Third World governments and weak international institutions might cope with the population bulge that is going to cause massive problems of unemployment, migration and social unrest.

William Fox

THE POLITICS OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES. By Richard Espy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 224 pp. $10.95.

Avery Brundage, President of the International Olympic Committee for 20 years, devoted his career to the Olympic ideal, the proposition that sports and politics do not mix. Espy's book is a chronicle of how they were mixed from the start, inevitably so in view of the facts of world affairs and the way in which the Games themselves were organized. The book is competently done but unfortunately does not have a modicum of the drama which the Games, and even some of the political issues, have provided.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS. Edited by Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1979, 310 pp. $16.95.
HUMAN RIGHTS & AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Donald P. Kommers and Gilburt D. Loescher. Notre Dame (Ind.): University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 345 pp. $14.95.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Barry M. Rubin and Elizabeth P. Spiro. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 283 pp. $20.00.

If President Carter wished to see more American interest in the question of human rights throughout the world, he is getting his wish, at least from the lawyers and professors—but someone should think up some new titles for the books. These three volumes, each with many authors, cover so many aspects that it is difficult to generalize except to say that they reflect all the dilemmas the government faces in trying to fit concern for human rights together with the other aims of foreign policy. All three are, for the most part, positive in

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the sense of wishing to see American support for human rights made more effective and offering concrete suggestions to that end. The Notre Dame symposium is a cut above the others in its organization and the weight of the contributions; it is the only one to say much about the U.S.S.R. The volume edited by Rubin and Spiro is made up almost entirely of pieces originally published elsewhere.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

RESTRAINTS ON WAR. Edited by Michael Howard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 173 pp. $16.95.

These elegant lectures delivered at Oxford discuss, through the experience of history, the attempt to control war to suit political aims. What comes through clearly is how much more difficult that task has been made by nuclear weapons and political concepts such as "wars of national liberation."

THE SALT EXPERIENCE. By Thomas W. Wolfe. Cambridge (Mass.): Ballinger, 1979, 405 pp. $18.50.

An unusually timely book. The author, a well-respected and close observer of the SALT negotiations of the past decade while he was with RAND, writes with clarity and evenhandedness. Especially useful is his discussion of the institutional setting of the negotiating process in Washington and Moscow, including the use of the "back channels." Wolfe's careful history makes clear how the SALT II agreement is the direct descendant of the Vladivostok accord of 1974. Although some of the chapters were previously published as RAND papers, there are significant new materials covering the Carter Administration. Unlike much of the current debate, this is a valuable treatise rather than a tract.

SHALL AMERICA BE DEFENDED? SALT II AND BEYOND. By Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.). New Rochelle (N.Y.): Arlington House, 1979, 267 pp. $10.95.

A former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency launches into a vigorous, though not always analytically rigorous, criticism of the strategic arms negotiations as conducted by both the Democratic and Republican Administrations. Graham's blast is directed against the whole concept of mutual assured destruction, as well as the SALT II accord.

ARMS CONTROL AND SALT II. By W.K.H. Panofsky. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979, 80 pp. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

Three lectures by a distinguished scientist which provide a synopsis of the argument for using arms control to restrain technology. Unfortunately, the lecture format is too brief for the subject and the discussion of the SALT II treaty, though timely, is oversimplified.

DEFENSE POLICY AND THE PRESIDENCY: CARTER'S FIRST YEARS. Edited by Sam S. Sarkesian. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 341 pp. $18.00.

An early cut, as far as scholarly literature goes, at President Carter's national security policies. The authors find much vacillation and a lack of clearly defined policy objectives. Insufficient distinction is made, however,

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between the question of the formulation and execution of policy and its actual substantive content.

THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES NAVAL POWER. By James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 248 pp. $15.00.

The strength of this book lies in its recognition of the many uncertainties and ambiguities in the use of naval power. For the United States, a rapidly changing international environment and the growth of domestic economic and political constraints make classical force planning extremely difficult.

SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND PERFORMANCE. Edited by John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger. Hamden (Conn.): Shoe String Press/Archon, 1979, 219 pp. $25.00

SOVIET STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR WAR. By Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 160 pp. $5.95 (Paper).

These two studies of Soviet military strategy start with a common perception of the grave danger presented by the growing military capabilities of the U.S.S.R. Erickson and Feuchtwanger provide fairly detailed information on the Soviet military machine: its weapons, personnel and strategy. Douglass and Hoeber focus on strategic nuclear doctrine and the Soviet concept of victory through a "war-winning" strategy.

STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR THE EARLY EIGHTIES: WHAT CAN BE DONE? Edited by William R. Van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979, 200 pp. $4.00 (Paper).

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE IN THE 1980s. By Roger D. Speed. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 174 pp. $7.95 (Paper).

These two contributions to the debate on strategy emphasize the growing vulnerability of U.S. land-based nuclear forces to a Soviet strike in the early to mid-1980s. The value of the Scott Thompson-Van Cleave book lies in its listing of specific steps that might be taken, ranging from "quick fixes" such as accelerating cruise missile development to ballistic missile defense and civil defense.

THE MY LAI INQUIRY. By Lt. Gen. W.R. Peers, USA (Ret.). New York: Norton, 1979, 306 pp. $12.95.

The author conducted the official investigation of the My Lai incident of 1968 and its subsequent coverup. Most of the book comes directly from the inquiry's records. One is impressed by Peers's sober and responsible weaving through contradictory testimony in search of what turns out to be the damning truth. Peers believes that those responsible were not properly punished, but he blames President Nixon's apparent sympathy for Lt. Calley and others as much as the system of military justice.

NEITHER ATHENS NOR SPARTA?: THE AMERICAN SERVICE ACADEMIES IN TRANSITION. By John P. Lovell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 362 pp. $17.50.

A detailed, thorough and imaginative study of the four service academies which looks at both their historical development and their current problems. The distinctiveness of each is emphasized, as is the importance of the leadership role of the Superintendents. The author, a West Point graduate who is

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now professor of political science at Indiana University, has full command of his subject and has written a definitive work.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980s. Edited by Derek Leebaert. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1979, 302 pp. $15.00.

The value of this collection lies not only in its comprehensiveness—dealing with important topics such as energy and Eurocommunism as well as the more directly defense-related aspects of European security—but in its up-to-date treatment of current issues. A sophisticated product of the Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN NATO. By Robert S. Jordan. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 316 pp. $20.00.

A rather straightforward account of the first four secretaries-general of NATO—Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker and Manlio Brosio—which can be read in conjunction with the author's earlier book on the NATO international secretariat. With détente, superpower arms control and the partial transfer of the East-West competition to the Third World, the role of NATO's secretary-general may be diminished.

PLUTONIUM, POWER, AND POLITICS: INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DISPOSITION OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL. By Gene I. Rochlin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 410 pp. $22.95.

PROLIFERATION, PLUTONIUM AND POLICY. By Alexander De Volpi. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 359 pp. $25.00.

Both books seek ways to retard nuclear proliferation by controlling or altering the nuclear fuel cycle. Rochlin's is the more politically sensitive. His proposal for an international regime for the management of spent fuel and the disposal of reprocessing wastes is no longer original, but it is presented in a comprehensive and knowledgeable manner.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

A LIFE FOR SOUND MONEY: PER JACOBSSON, HIS BIOGRAPHY. By Erin E. Jacobsson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 413 pp. $41.00.

The Swedish economist started work at the League of Nations in 1920; from 1931 to 1956 he was Economic Adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, and he spent the last seven years of his life as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. His economist daughter has chronicled this remarkable career with the help of his diaries and notes from other people. Perhaps space made it inevitable that events should be rather personalized and Jacobsson's thought sometimes oversimplified. A continental neo-liberal who fought the inflationary bias he found in much British and American thinking, he had a gift for the pragmatic and eclectic, and mixed the medicine to suit the case. The chapter summarizing his thought is particularly useful since this influential talker and doer wrote no books—except two detective stories. There are no extraordinary revelations, but the record is a valuable one that could have come from nowhere else.

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GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. By Robert L. Rothstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 280 pp. $18.50 (Paper, $4.95).

The failure, from 1974 to 1977, of the North-South negotiations on commodity agreements is explained here in terms that put a good deal of blame on both sides. The episode is seen in the larger setting of "a failed incremental system" that is no longer able to respond adequately to demands for change. Without too much optimism the author suggests major measures of reform of more than just UNCTAD and, more hopefully, some rules to make things work better in the existing framework. An intelligent, interesting book based on close contemporary observation.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE FOR MINERALS. By Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979, 353 pp. $18.95.

The title is more dramatic than the actual story, which covers the period from the end of World War I to the 1960s and skims the rest. The documents on which the Ohio State historian relies come largely from people who favor active American policies, and his analysis does not fully explain why there was so often no follow-through to the sounding of alarms. Though policy issues are not dealt with as deeply as would be desirable, the book is a valuable one to have at a time when people are again interested in the ancient subject of raw materials and international politics.

MERCHANTS OF GRAIN. By Dan Morgan. New York: Viking, 1979, 387 pp. $14.95.

The international grain merchants are a secretive lot and the frustrations suffered by Mr. Morgan of *The Washington Post* show in this book. Still, it tells us more than any other work about the past and present of the biggest (and mostly American) firms. In the realm of public affairs there are useful accounts of some familiar episodes (Soviet wheat, Korean rice) and revealing reports on less well known matters such as the activities of the Department of Agriculture in pushing grain sales abroad. All told, there is less than a reader could hope for but more than has been collected in one place before.

THE SHADOW OF KEYNES. By Elizabeth S. Johnson and Harry G. Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979, 253 pp. $15.00.

The late Professor Johnson as student, teacher and scholar, and his wife as editor of four volumes of Keynes's collected works, lived much in the shadow they delineate so sharply. The man, the milieu, the ideas and the followers are vividly and not always admiringly presented. A kind of Canadian populism informs the authors' judgments of what they see as largely the product of late-Victorian, aristocratic values. Though most of the papers have been published before, they gain from being put together in spite of some repetition. This is one of the most attractive books about economic thought in a long time.

IRRWEGE DER POLITISCHEN ÖKONOMIE. By Helmut Arndt. Munich: Beck, 1979, 263 pp. DM. 19.80.

It is hardly news when "the errors of political economy" are said to include models that do not match actual cases, dehumanizing the subject, and widening the gap between theory and reality. But it is rare to find these criticisms made so systematically and with such fine illustrations as in this pungent book by a Berlin professor. As the targets include Ricardo, Marx and

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Keynes as well as more recent savants, one is awed by the conclusion that "the economists have to rewrite their textbooks." Unfortunately, we are left to wonder how.

THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. Report by the Director-General of GATT. Geneva: GATT, 1979, 196 pp. $10.00 (Paper).

In an unusual step, the GATT secretariat has published a most useful history of the Tokyo Round when it is barely over. Issues are explained, approaches and the sequence of events recounted and positions described (though not always who took them). The results are given in some detail with statistics on some of the most important tariff reductions. Some of the data are incomplete and some preliminary, and others will, of course, add to the analysis later on. There is nothing indiscreet here but there is also no propaganda or obfuscation; a valuable product.

EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM. By M.M. Kostecki. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 157 pp. $25.00.

The emphasis is on the different arrangements Poland, Hungary and Romania have with GATT; but Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are briefly discussed and there is an interesting chapter on the Soviet approach. Writing in Geneva (he is now in Montreal), the Polish author clearly had good access to participants and has given us by far the fullest account of these matters in print. His proposals for improvement may be a bit weak.

THE ROLE OF TARIFF QUOTAS IN COMMERCIAL POLICY. By Michael Rom. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 258 pp. $30.00.

A tariff quota permits a certain quantity of imports at one rate of duty but applies a higher rate to anything over that fixed quantity. Whether the effect is to restrict or to liberalize trade depends on what was done before. The complexities of this hybrid device are thoroughly examined in this book by an Israeli scholar who draws especially on its use in the U.S., the European Community and the general system of preferences for developing countries. He suggests some new possibilities.

GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES: INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC AND POLICY DECISIONS. By Renato Mazzolini. New York: Wiley, 1979, 400 pp. $31.50.

Why do some government corporations engage in foreign activities and others not? Considering their variety—steel, coal, oil, automobiles, computers and many other things—one knows that the answer must be "it all depends." While a large number of relevant conditions are mentioned, they are not very rigorously examined in this rather wordy book by a professor at the Columbia School of Business. There is, however, original material in excerpts from interviews in Western Europe (the only area considered) which often raise interesting points.

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF POLITICAL RISK. By Dan Haendel. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 206 pp. $18.50.

The old art of political assessment by businessmen and bankers is having a post-Iranian renaissance in which it is sometimes mistaken for a science. This useful book—which predates the latest excitement—criticizes a number of

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different methods and approaches to the problem. It also summarizes the debate about the proper functions of OPIC (the Overseas Private Investment Corporation). There are lots of good questions and no very convincing answers.

MONEY IN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE: THE CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY SYSTEM. By Ronald I. McKinnon. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, 294 pp. $12.50 (Paper, $6.95).

Those who want to find out how money is used in international trade can learn much from this systematic, detailed analysis that describes public and private practices with only a limited use of mathematics. The author, a major authority, makes a number of novel points.

ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL ENERGY PROJECT. Edited by Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin. New York: Random House, 1979, 353 pp. $12.95.

The conclusions of this major study were set out in the Spring 1979 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The full report includes substantial chapters on all the major fuels and on conservation, "the key energy source."

GLOBAL CHALLENGES. By Harry Clay Blaney III. New York: New Viewpoints, 1979, 288 pp. $12.95 (Paper, $6.95).

They are all here: population, food, energy, health, pollution, climate, the oceans, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, ignorance, and technological change, its use and abuse. In a remarkably comprehensive book, a U.S. Foreign Service officer stresses the perils we face. He concludes with proposals for institutional reforms in which there is full participation, better communication, voting power that reflects the realities of numbers and influence, and especially more common analysis of problems to support cooperation in making decisions and to broaden the range of choices.

FOOD FOR THE FUTURE: HOW AGRICULTURE CAN MEET THE CHALLENGE. By Keith O. Campbell. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979, 188 pp. $12.50.

U.S. FOOD: MAKING THE MOST OF A GLOBAL RESOURCE. By David W. McClintock. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 122 pp. $15.00.

Campbell, an Australian economist, emphasizes scientific research and better application of known technology as the keys to providing enough food for the world. His analysis of the constraints—not least, governments—is systematic and interesting. McClintock, an American Foreign Service officer, also reviews constraints but his emphasis is on the factors standing in the way of shaping a sensible U.S. policy toward one of its greatest resources. As his judgment seems good, his hopes are restrained.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

A TIME TO HEAL. By Gerald R. Ford. New York: Harper/Reader's Digest, 1979, 454 pp. $12.95.

Serene, unruffled, unpretentious, like the author. This is the shortest and most honest of recent presidential memoirs, but there are no surprises, no deep probings of motives or events. No more here than meets the eye.

SIDESHOW: KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE DESTRUCTION OF

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CAMBODIA. By William Shawcross. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, 467 pp. $13.95.

This exposé of the murderous destruction of Cambodia, which was secretly begun and irrationally sustained by Kissinger and Nixon, deserves the high acclaim it has received. A brilliant, disturbing book.

BAY OF PIGS: THE UNTOLD STORY. By Peter Wyden. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, 352 pp. $12.95.

An interesting but flawed book—interesting for the presentation of material drawn from extensive interviews on the behavior and perceptions of the Cuban invaders and defenders, and for the portrait of Richard Bissell of the CIA; flawed because of the failure to describe confusion without being confusing.

WATER'S EDGE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Paula Stern. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1979, 265 pp. $19.95.

This is a major contribution to our understanding of the conception, negotiation and passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that led the U.S.S.R. in 1975 to denounce the trade agreement negotiated with the U.S. in 1972. The public record, interviews and inside information are combined to give a detailed and lively account of what went on; when data fail, *Rashomon* is invoked to provide alternative readings. Close analysis of the aims, methods and choices of Senator Jackson tells us much about his relation to Jewish groups, labor, other senators and the executive branch. The latter, usually personified in Henry Kissinger, does not cut a very impressive figure in this account. Rebuttals from protagonists are to be expected, but it is hard to see how they can detract much from this first-rate piece of work.

W.D.

EAGLE ENTANGLED: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN A COMPLEX WORLD. Edited by Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild and Robert J. Lieber. New York: Longman, 1979, 365 pp. $17.50.

Twelve essays, the first drafts of which were composed in June 1978, on topical and regional aspects of American foreign policy. This is a better than average symposium, but like all such efforts to capture the present moment it is already somewhat dated. The appraisals of Carter's achievements, although mixed, now (July 1979) seem too optimistic.

PAT: A BIOGRAPHY OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN. By Douglas Schoen. New York: Harper, 1979, 322 pp. $12.95.

A detailed, admiring biography of one of the most colorful and provocative figures in American public life. The section on differences between Moynihan and Kissinger is perceptive.

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1980 BUDGET. Edited by Joseph A. Pechman. Washington: Brookings, 1979, 229 pp. $11.95 (Paper, $4.95).

This year's analysis and critique of the President's budget by Brookings is just as clear as, but more concise than, its predecessors. The volume stresses the absence of theme in domestic cuts and confusion over purposes in the enlarged defense sector.

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DOMESTIC AFFAIRS. By James Duffy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979, 309 pp. $10.95.

A young New York lawyer begins with goals set by President Franklin D. Roosevelt for the domestic life of the nation in 1944 and then offers a nonpartisan report card on achievements since. The overall average is passing, the individual grades vary from B to D. He ends on an upbeat note.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

CANADA CHALLENGED: THE VIABILITY OF CONFEDERATION. Edited by R.B. Byers and Robert W. Reford. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1979, 355 pp. $8.50 (Paper).

Canadian academics are, quite understandably, devoting the lion's part of their energies to examining their country's future. These essays speculate on what Canada would be like with greater centralization and with less. Donald Story's discussion of federal and provincial jurisdictions in foreign affairs is particularly interesting for the American reader.

G.S.

QUEBEC AND THE CONSTITUTION 1960–1978. By Edward McWhinney. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, 170 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $5.95).

A constitutional lawyer reviews the development of thinking by Quebec political intellectuals and deplores the comparative absence of creative thought in other provinces. He says that a major cause of English-speaking Canada's unresponsiveness to Quebec was the dominance of Keynesian assumptions concerning centralized economic policy.

G.S.

THE ROOSEVELT FOREIGN-POLICY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE "GOOD NEIGHBOR": THE UNITED STATES AND ARGENTINA 1941–1945. By Randall Bennett Woods. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1979, 277 pp. $18.00.

A long, detailed and competent analysis of the rift between Argentina and the U.S. during World War II, concluding: " ... the Good Neighbor Policy was undermined by, first, Argentina's refusal to make an all-out commitment to the War against the Axis, and, second, bureaucratic proliferation and competition within the Roosevelt foreign policy establishment and their dramatic effect on the way Washington responded to Argentine neutrality." The bureaucratic disputes pitted the "Latin Americanists"—Welles, Duggan, Bonsal, Collado—against the "Internationalists"—Hull, Breckinridge Long, and others.

JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN: A HISTORY. By Robert J. Alexander. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 177 pp. $15.00.

A well-known Latin American expert provides workmanlike biographical analysis, in the format of topical headings, of a tragic rather than a great leader. Lacking a clear political philosophy, Perón was doomed to tactical maneuvering as a substitute for a strategic purpose, and to the squandering of splendid talents on destructive rather than constructive undertakings. An interesting observation: "No man who really cared for his wife would have

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used her cadaver for his own political benefit in the way that Juan Perón did."

REVOLUTIONARY CUBA IN THE WORLD ARENA. Edited by Martin Weinstein. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979, 166 pp. $13.50.

The international projection of Cuba's political and economic values and practices is described in seven essays covering such topics as ideology, military policy, COMECON, and foreign policy objectives. An introduction serves in lieu of an integrative or concluding chapter.

DICTATORS NEVER DIE: A PORTRAIT OF NICARAGUA AND THE SOMOZAS. By Eduardo Crawley. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 180 pp. $14.50.

A chronicle of struggle and unrest in Nicaragua, pre- and post-Sandino, by an Argentine writer who covers hemispheric topics. The approach is journalistic with an emphasis on color.

Western Europe

Christoph Kimmich

IN DEFENSE OF DECADENT EUROPE. By Raymond Aron. South Bend (Ind.): Regnery/Gateway, 1979, 297 pp. $14.95.

The title is ironic, for this is a defense not of decadent but of liberal Europe. Aron concedes Europe's problems and he analyzes their scope and effect acutely. He believes, however, that they are episodic, not symptoms of decline, and he challenges the West to face realities—to dismiss Marxist promises of salvation and acknowledge the superiority and strength of free societies. Originally a contribution to the political debate in France before the 1978 elections, this hard-headed polemic will have much to say to Americans as well.

THE EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVES: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. Edited by G. Ionescu. Alphen aan den Rijn (Neth.): Sijthoff, 1979, 538 pp. Dfl. 60.

The result of two years of research and discussion, this massive volume addresses two questions: Are the policies developed by the European Community valid alternatives to national policies? Are they realistic and effective, acceptable to European opinion at large? The answers, arrived at in a series of interesting policy studies by officials of the Community and academic consultants, are of course mixed. Some policies seem more distinctively European than others; a good many seem not to distinguish between exclusively European and more general Western interests. And it would seem that inadequacies occur most frequently in the preparation of policy. The book offers some very useful recommendations.

PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE. By David Marquand. London: Jonathan Cape, 1979, 147 pp. £ 4.95 (Paper, £ 2.95).

If Ionescu's volume deals with what is, Marquand's turns to what ought to be. Drawing on his own experience as a pro-Europe Labour MP and, until recently, a member of the European Commission at Brussels, he blames the Community's stagnation on its present institutional arrangements, in which power is vested not in an elected European parliament but in an appointed

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commission of member states. Technocratic Europe must be replaced by parliamentary Europe, he says, if the Community is to meet the challenges facing it and proceed to European union. A tightly argued, eloquent tract for the times.

COMMUNISM AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by David E. Albright. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 379 pp. $21.00.

Should we interpret Eurocommunism as an instrument of Moscow or as a cluster of independent Marxists evolving into left-wing social democrats? Neither, say the authors of this volume of essays, for study of the individual parties, each treated in the political context in which it operates, shows the situation to be far more complex than either interpretation would admit. Scholarly and judicious in approach, but, given the recent spate of books on the subject, no longer particularly novel.

ZAPADNAIA EVROPA V SISTEME MEZHDUNARODNYKH OTNOSHENII (VOL. II). Edited by E.S. Khesin, Yu. I. Iordanov and Yu. I. Rubinsky. Moscow: Mysl, 1979, 318 pp. Rubles 1.20.

Western Europe appears here both as an appendage of American imperialism and as the imperialist exploiter of developing countries. The book is useful for its fairly extensive presentation of Soviet views on the European Community and on "all-European" political and economic cooperation.

J.C.C.

GERMAN REARMAMENT AND THE WEST, 1932-1933. By Edward W. Bennett. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 569 pp. $35.00.

A history of Germany's military plans and preparations in the period just before and after Hitler assumed power, set against the background of the hapless disarmament conference of 1932-33. Hitler's policies, it turns out, were not nearly so radical as is often assumed, while those of the Western powers, who were more suspicious of one another than of Germany, foreshadowed the appeasement that was to come. A sophisticated study, based on much new material.

JEWISH RESPONSES TO NAZI PERSECUTION. By Isaiah Trunk. New York: Stein and Day, 1979, 371 pp. $15.95.

Some 60 eyewitness accounts by survivors of the ghettos and concentration camps in Eastern Europe. Dealing with the conditions of daily life, with atrocities and attempts to resist, they make for grim reading. The originals, recorded after the war, mostly in Yiddish, belong to the collection of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in New York, where Trunk is chief archivist.

IM URTEIL DES AUSLANDS: 30 JAHRE BUNDESREPUBLIK. Edited by Johannes Haas-Heye. Munich: Beck, 1979, 237 pp. DM. 18.80.

The German Federal Republic is 30 years old, and as part of a general assessment at this point, the editor of this volume asked a number of foreign observers (mainly academics and journalists) to comment on the country's development and prospects. Their responses, reflecting rather different interpretations of this task, are largely positive—and as interesting for what they say about the respondents' own countries as for what they say about Germany.

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TERROR OR LOVE? THE PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF A WEST GERMAN URBAN GUERRILLA. By Michael Baumann. New York: Grove Press, 1979, 127 pp. $6.95.

Rambling recollections of West Germany's terrorist scene, by a working-class youth who broke away from it and is now in hiding. Styled as an indictment of contemporary society, the book is largely an expression of unfocused anger—with a good measure of self-pity beneath the flip surface. The book acquired considerable notoriety when it appeared in Germany in 1975 and the police made an ill-conceived attempt to confiscate and suppress it.

BLOOD OF SPAIN. By Ronald Fraser. New York: Pantheon, 1979, 628 pp. $15.95.

Fraser interviewed some 300 surviving participants of the Spanish Civil War and has fashioned their testimony into a highly readable history of "how people lived that war." What emerges from the testimony—the passions and bitterness of war, revolution and counterrevolution—is a version at once different from and complementary to existing political and military histories.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

REVOLUTION AND SURVIVAL: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA, 1917–1918. By Richard K. Debo. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979, 462 pp. $25.00.

How the fledgling Bolshevik regime, with Lenin as its guide and Chicherin as the skillful executor of foreign policy, survived its infancy in a hostile world. While this history does not supersede the distinguished work of Carr, Kennan and others, it supplements and completes them by drawing on all the material old and new (except what remains hidden in the Soviet archives) in a full and well-written account of the realistic diplomacy that subordinated the cause of world revolution to the higher priority of the preservation of the Soviet state.

THE BOLSHEVIK PARTY IN REVOLUTION 1917–1923. By Robert Service. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979, 246 pp. $24.50.

The Bolsheviks were anything but a monolithic and disciplined party when they came to power, but in the ensuing years, under the pressure of huge problems and civil war, democratic centralism became what it has been since, all centralism. As Robert Service describes the transformation of the party, it is a question of inexorable process rather than personality or doctrine, but the roles played by Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin come through clearly enough. A reasoned and convincing book.

SOWJETISCHE AUSSENPOLITIK IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Andreas Hillgruber. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979, 154 pp. DM. 18.

Germany's leading historian of the diplomacy of World War II writes on Soviet policy in that conflict. The text is brief and general but it covers all the main decisions, and the notes provide a comprehensive bibliography. Reissue of a work first published in 1972 as part of the *Osteuropa-Handbuch* series.

THE SOVIET POLITICAL AGENDA: PROBLEMS AND PRIORITIES 1950–1970. By Daniel Tarschys. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1979, 217 pp. $20.00.

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The author takes three specific years—1950, 1960 and 1970—and compiles the "agenda" of each through a tabulation of the topics and content of the editorials in *Pravda*. The exercise tells something about how much conditions changed and how much remained the same from the Stalin to the Khrushchev and then the Brezhnev era; but, as the author recognizes in formulating his conclusions, it is no substitute for other forms of Sovietology in seeking to find out the who's and why's of decision-making.

ENTSPANNUNGSPOLITIK IN OST UND WEST. Edited by Hans-Peter Schwarz and Boris Meissner. Cologne: Heymanns, 1979, 303 pp.
DIE SOWJETISCHE KOEXISTENZPOLITITK GEGENÜBER WEST-EUROPA. By Christoph Royen. Baden-Baden: Nomos (for Stiftung Wissenschaft und Polititk), 1978, 174 pp. DM. 29.

Two excellent German studies of the détente policies of the 1970s. In the thorough background survey edited by Schwarz and Meissner, experts on international law and relations examine détente as expounded and practiced by the U.S.S.R. and its Warsaw Pact allies, by the dissident communists (Yugoslav, Romanian and Eurocommunist), and by the states of the West. Royen's book looks at the Soviet strategy of détente, the contradictory nature of its several aims, and the difficulties and dilemmas it poses for the Soviet leadership.

MEZHDUNARODNAIA RAZRIADKA I IDEOLOGICHESKAIA BOR'BA. By Yu. P. Davydov. Kiev: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury Ukrainy, 1978, 144 pp. Kop. 35.

Variations on a favorite Moscow theme: détente and continuance of the ideological struggle go hand in hand. This is one of the most extensive and best informed expositions of the argument, and a reminder, both to the enemies of détente and to its friends who ignore ideology, to take the argument seriously.

AKTUALNYE PROBLEMY RAZORUZHENIIA. Edited by O. N. Bykov, V. V. Zhurkin and I. G. Usachev. Moscow: Nauka, 1978, 174 pp. Kop. 60.

A group of well-known Soviet experts on relations with the West covers the whole field of arms negotiations: SALT, MBFR, test ban, and "general and complete disarmament." More than a mere recitation of official statements.

DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By Dina Rome Spechler. Washington: University Press of America, 1978, 95 pp. $6.50 (Paper).

This brief monograph, less ambitious than its title, compares how leading Soviet newspapers, and by inference the individuals and elites identified with those papers, dealt with Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in October 1973. The method is perhaps too simple and the analysis too speculative, but the results are not without interest.

HISTORY'S CARNIVAL: A DISSIDENT'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Leonid Plyushch. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979, 430 pp. $14.95.

Quite a number of Soviet dissidents with roughly similar experiences—of protest, arrest, incarceration and eventual release and exile—have published their stories in the West. That of Leonid Plyushch, a Ukrainian scientist, stands out for both its intellectual and its human qualities. His own story,

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well and simply told, is supplemented by his wife's account of her four-year struggle for his freedom.

THE COMMUNIST STATES IN THE ERA OF DÉTENTE. Edited by Adam Bromke and Derry Novak. Oakville (Ontario): Mosaic Press, 1979, 306 pp. $7.95 (Paper).

A country-by-country picture of internal and international developments in the communist world (including Asian communist states and Cuba) as of the mid-1970s, a successor (with some of the same authors) to Bromke's earlier volumes on the same subject published in 1965 and 1972. A good and useful survey, although the pieces are relatively brief and are now dated.

PERSPECTIVES FOR CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SOCIETIES. Edited by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 194 pp. $16.75.

Separate essays on a number of European communist countries, each with something to say but no common framework and few comparisons. The editor draws an interesting distinction between societies in which the national political culture is congruous with the communist system (U.S.S.R., G.D.R., Bulgaria) and those where there is a basic incongruity (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary).

BEAR AND FOXES: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES, 1965–1969. By Ronald H. Linden. Boulder (Colo.): East European Quarterly, 1979, 328 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $17.50.)

A comparative study of the foreign policies of the states of Eastern Europe which depends largely on tabulating "interactions" and "attitudes" and draws conclusions on the varying degrees and types of deviance on the part of the foxes from the lines established by the bear. How far the general attempt succeeds is debatable, but there is no question about the real value of the well-documented case study of Romanian policy.

DIE WARSCHAUER VERTRAGSORGANISATION. By Stephan Tiedtke. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1978, 195 pp. DM. 54.

A welcome addition to the scanty Western literature on the Warsaw Pact. Tiedtke looks not only at Soviet military and political strategy, which the organization is intended to serve, but also at the special interests of the smaller members (notably the GDR) and at such relatively unexplored areas as military doctrine and arms procurement.

MONEY, BANKING, AND CREDIT IN THE SOVIET UNION & EASTERN EUROPE. By Adam Zwass. White Plains (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1979, 233 pp. $18.50.

Although there have been many departures from the Soviet model in the East European countries and their economies differ a good bit from one another, in none do money and credit perform the same functions as in market systems, according to this analysis. Increased economic intercourse with the West cannot lead to real integration of the socialist countries into the world economy without drastic changes in price policy to make currencies convertible (or even truly transferable within the Eastern system). Dr. Zwass writes with the authority of a career in Polish banks, five years in the COMECON headquarters in Moscow, and a decade of observation from Vienna.

W.D.

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ON THE BORDER OF WAR AND PEACE: POLISH INTELLIGENCE AND DIPLOMACY IN 1937–1939 AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ULTRA SECRET. By Richard A. Woytak. Boulder (Colo.): East European Quarterly, 1979, 141 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $11.00).

This slim volume has little new to offer on the main story of the crises of the last years of peace, but it does present interesting new material on Polish activity in the field of intelligence.

DANS LES ARCHIVES DU COMITÉ CENTRAL: TRENTE ANS DE SECRETS DU BLOC SOVIÉTIQUE. By Karel Kaplan. Paris: Albin Michel, 1978, 365 pp. Fr. 55.

Revelations of a former functionary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia who, as a historical researcher, had access to the party archives. Twice imprisoned, he was eventually able to leave the country, taking with him his recollections of the secret files, though not the documents themselves. He uses this special knowledge to retell the history of the politics and international relations of the 1950s and 1960s, especially the spectacular political trials of that period.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF ISRAEL. By Jacques Derogy and Hesi Carmel. New York: Grove Press, 1979, 346 pp. $12.50.

Originally published in France in 1978, this "secret" history by two journalists well acquainted with Israel probes diplomacy, politics, and especially the field of intelligence and covert operations. Unreliable as history and hardly living up to its extravagant billing, it nevertheless does reveal some secrets and certainly makes enthralling reading.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT. By Karen Dawisha. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 271 pp. $25.00.

The first part of this book is a balanced but quite condensed narrative of the course of Soviet-Egyptian relations since 1955, adding little if anything to the previous studies by Laqueur, Smolansky, Carrère d'Encausse, Freedman, Rubinstein, and others. The second part, an exploration of Soviet policymaking for the Middle East, is a worthy effort, searching for good evidence, stating some of the possibilities regarding interest groups and "bureaucratic politics," but not taking off into the blue.

LEBANON IN CRISIS. Edited by P. Edward Haley and Lewis W. Snider. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1979, 323 pp. $18.00 (Paper, $7.95).

The events in Lebanon during the past few chaotic years are described from the respective standpoints of those involved, both neighbor states and distant powers and, of course, the PLO, but with relatively little on the Lebanese themselves. A disjointed book, it nevertheless comes close to fulfilling its purpose as a guide to those who wish to understand the conflict, for it has many expert contributors.

THE CLOUDED LENS: PERSIAN GULF SECURITY AND U.S. POLICY. By James H. Noyes. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 144 pp. $6.95 (Paper).

American policy in the Gulf region in the critical period following British

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withdrawal and the crisis of 1973–74, during which the author served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Much of the book is devoted to giving cogent answers to the critics of America's arms sales and its military presence in the region. The opacity of the lens, and also the author's conclusion that harder tests are still to come, have been confirmed by events in the area since his book went to press.

LE MOUVEMENT NATIONAL KURDE. By Chris Kutschera. Paris: Flammarion, 1979, 393 pp.

More than any other book written in a Western language, this work by Chris Kutschera, a French journalist, gives full and play-by-play coverage of the Kurdish national movement. It is excellent on the place of the Kurdish question in the politics of Iran, Iraq and Turkey, and in the relations of the outside powers contending against each other in the Middle East. Mullah Mustafa Barzani emerges larger than life.

THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TRUCIAL STATES. By Rosemarie Said Zahlan. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 278 pp. $22.95.

A solid work of scholarship on the seven Trucial States which became the UAE of today. It covers the period between the two world wars when effective power was in British hands. There is much detail, the result of thorough research in the British records.

ARAB DEVELOPMENT FUNDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Soliman Demir. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1979, 131 pp. $15.00.

Strictly a fact book, but a very useful one, on three principal Arab funds: two national (the Kuwait Fund and the Abu Dhabi Fund) and one established by the League of Arab States (the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development). The study was done under the auspices of UNITAR.

THE ARAB PRESS. By William A. Rugh. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1979, 205 pp. $18.00 (Paper, $6.95).

Written by a USIA officer who served in Riyadh and Cairo, this book does not attempt to assess press content country by country or year by year, except incidentally to the author's main purpose of describing the media as political and social institutions. But his industry and care in collecting data give the book, among its other merits, the character of a handbook for Western journalists and others making their way in the Middle East.

L'HUMANISME DE L'ISLAM. By Marcel A. Boisard. Paris: Albin Michel, 1979, 436 pp.

Knowledge, understanding, and a broad view mark this work, which is both an exposition of the history and values of Islam and a plea for the extension of current concepts of international law and relations to reflect the diversity of the world's cultures and religions. The author is a Swiss professor who has been a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross in a number of Islamic countries.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE. By Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper. New York: Crowell, 1979, 162 pp. $10.00.

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Although mainly concerned with the Japanese economy, this book also has some useful insights into Japan's relations with the world. Kahn, always provocative, has had some second thoughts about the probable future of Japan. In an earlier work, he made a number of comparisons between contemporary Japan and 19th-century Prussia. Now he sees reasons why Japan's low-posture policy may work more or less indefinitely, particularly if the U.S. is strong and reliable enough as a partner. He is especially convincing on the need to maintain U.S. force levels in the Pacific and on the many useful and admirable aspects of the so-called Japanese free ride.

THE SOVIET UNION AND POSTWAR JAPAN. By Rodger Swearingen. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1979, 340 pp. $14.95.

A very timely, broadly gauged analysis of the post-World War II relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan. There are informative sections on trade relations, the Sino-Soviet-Japanese triangle, fishing disputes, the northern territories issue, and Japanese public opinion on the Soviet Union.

A MATTER OF TWO CHINAS. By William R. Kintner and John F. Copper. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979, 127 pp. $6.00 (Paper).

An argument that the U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China was based on an exaggerated view of Chinese power and that "playing the China card" could be dangerous to U.S.-Soviet relations.

THE COMING DECLINE OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE. By Victor Louis. New York: Times Books, 1979, 198 pp. $12.50.

A Soviet journalist, long known for his KGB connections, paints a picture of a consistently expansionist, exploitive China sitting on the backs of its repressed minorities and itching to conquer the Soviet Far East, Siberia and Central Asia. As Harrison Salisbury points out in a useful introduction, the alarming point about this book is that Louis seems to be trying to lay a foundation for a Soviet preemptive strike against China. Although the book may be intended more as part of a war of nerves against China and the U.S., it can also be read as an extraordinary reflection of the depth of Russia's fears about China, fears that we would do well not to underestimate.

THE CHINA DIFFERENCE. Edited by Ross Terrill. New York: Harper, 1979, 335 pp. $12.95.

A group of our leading Chinese specialists address themselves to the interested general reader rather than to other specialists. The strength of the book lies in the impressive assembly of expertise; the weakness in its blandness and lack of synthesis.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA. By Nathan N. White. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1979, 231 pp. $17.00.

This is one of the few serious and dispassionate analyses of the important policy issues facing the U.S. in Korea. It comes down in favor of a policy designed to legitimize the existence of two Korean states. But its most disturbing note is the observation that "U.S. Korea policy, both at the general level and on the level of military support, is still very much in flux ... and is in many respects internally inconsistent and riddled with anomalies."

STRATEGY AND SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA. Edited by Richard B. Foster, James E. Dornan, Jr. and William M. Carpenter. New York: Crane,

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Russak (for the Strategic Studies Center), 1979, 309 pp. $19.50.

Some 14 of these 21 essays are written by Japanese and Korean scholars and the collection thus provides an interesting picture of their view of recent developments in the Pacific. Many of the Asians are clearly worried about American staying power.

A TURNING WHEEL: THE LONG REVOLUTIONS OF ASIA. By Robert Shaplen. New York: Random House, 1979, 385 pp. $15.00.

An up-to-the-minute account of 11 Asian countries by the *New Yorker* correspondent who has spent more than 30 years in the Far East and is one of America's shrewdest observers of that part of the world. Shaplen is superb at capturing the vivid detail that lights up the larger scene. The book is particularly strong on the dilemmas of development in Southeast Asia.

SMALL IS POLITICS: ORGANIZATIONAL ALTERNATIVES IN INDIA'S RURAL DEVELOPMENT. By Marcus Franda. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Ltd., 1979, 296 pp. Rs. 45.

An interesting argument that the new Janata Party's principal accomplishments have been not only a reversal of the authoritarian trends in Indian politics that culminated in "the Emergency," but a decided shift in economic priorities toward rural development. One positive result was an increase in food production of more than 12 percent during Janata's first year in office—the largest annual increase during any of the 30 years since Indian independence. But increasing attention to agricultural production has also aggravated tensions between city and countryside and among the rural classes. Also, the unorganized landless have yet to benefit. Still, as this book shows, India's new democratic revolution is almost certainly the beginning of an important new chapter both in Indian politics and in Indian development strategy.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

SOWETO: BLACK REVOLT, WHITE REACTION. By John Kane-Berman. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1978, 268 pp. R. 12.

WHITE MAN, WE WANT TO TALK TO YOU. By Denis Herbstein. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, 270 pp. $12.50.

A year after the bannings and detentions which ended the 1976–77 uprisings in Soweto and other urban areas, two South Africans tell essentially the same story about the escalation of their country's racial conflict during and after those events. Kane-Berman's book, published in South Africa, is remarkably similar in outlook to Herbstein's, though the former employs a battery of statistics to explain the institutions buttressing the current relationship between the races, while the latter makes greater use of first-person narrative accounts. Kane-Berman in particular points to the implications of the accelerating growth of the black population and the possibility of massive resettlement of urban blacks in overcrowded homelands. Both authors emphasize the continuing intensification of black militance.

THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN AFRICA: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE. By Wogu Ananaba. New York: St. Martin's, 1979, 248 pp. $19.95.

A former Nigerian trade union official now affiliated with the International

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Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) describes the political restrictions on labor union operation in Africa which have made these unions for the most part powerless to better the welfare of their members and indeed largely irrelevant; not surprisingly, he advocates rethinking of OAU measures which condemn international affiliation.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING CRISIS. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979, 404 pp. $17.50 (Paper, $7.95).

This first-rate collection has been substantially rewritten since its original publication in 1977 to take account of intervening events, and expanded with the addition of new chapters: on U.S. policy, by Thomas Karis; on Zambia, by Timothy Shaw and Douglas G. Anglin; on Lesotho, by Richard Weisfelder; and on southern African economic relationships, by Kenneth W. Grundy.

INTERVENTION IN UGANDA: THE POWER STRUGGLE AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. By Gad W. Toko. Pittsburgh: Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh; 1979, 160 pp. $7.95 (Paper).

A Ugandan air force colonel in exile provides a first-hand account of Uganda's relations with the Soviet Union through 1977. It is particularly interesting for his personal narrative of African student life in the U.S.S.R. during his training as a pilot there.

SOCIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Edited by Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California; 1979, 426 pp. $8.50 (Paper).

With the exception of the essay on Mozambique, which extends only to 1972, this collection provides an excellent review of contemporary African socialism. Particularly distinguished by Kenneth Jowitt's analysis of the general uses of socialist ideology in Africa, the case studies together show the continuing distance between rhetoric and governance—even in the "new wave" socialist states—and the reasons why this gap is likely to persist for some time to come.

A BEND IN THE RIVER. By V.S. Naipaul. New York: Knopf, 1979, 288 pp. $8.95.

THE COUP. By John Updike. New York: Knopf, 1978, 298 pp. $8.95.

These two recent novels view with terror and humor, respectively, current African tensions between tradition and modernity. Naipaul's mise-en-scène, strongly suggestive of contemporary Zaïre, is shaped by the author's vision of human helplessness amid the ruins of traditional social institutions; the plight of his Indian hero—and of East Africa's Asian community—is credibly rendered, but the mysterious malevolence of the African villagers does not ring true except within the author's particular cosmos. Updike's American-educated Marxist dictator of a small Sahelian satrapy sounds remarkably like the author himself at his best and worst—and his four wives embody, variously, the earthy virtues and ornery independence of vintage Updike women. The author seems to have kited his fancy freely while keeping his elbow firmly planted next to basic African source books. The resulting depiction of cultural mésalliance is a comic delight.

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Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice*: United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.*: Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office*: 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities*: 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*: 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 96th Congress, 1st Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

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Asia and the Pacific Ocean

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Recognizing the People's Republic of China: the experience of Japan, Australia, France, and West Germany. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 1979. Washington, 1979. 33 pp. (Com. Print.)

Refugees from Indochina: current problems and prospects. Report by a congressional delegation to Southeast Asia, Dec. 28, 1978, to Jan. 13, 1979, to the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, Apr. 30, 1979. Washington, 1979. 54 pp. (Com. Print.)

Security and stability in Asia: 1979. Report submitted by a special study mission to Asia, Dec. 28, 1978–Jan. 13, 1979, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House, May 1979. Washington, 1979. 144 pp. (Com. Print.)

U.S. Marines in Vietnam: the landing and the buildup, 1965, by Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson. Washington, History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978. 261 pp. $5.00.

Atomic Power

The Effects of nuclear war. Washington, Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, 1979. 151 pp.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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